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ABSTRACT 
 
Stokes, Keeley Wynne (Ph.D., Political Science) 
 
Poverty, Partnership and Punctuation: The Rise of Irish Social Partnership 
In Comparative Perspective 
 
Thesis directed by Professor Joseph Jupille 
 
This study considers the development of social partnership in Ireland via a 
comparative analysis of institutional friction, political and economic conditions 
and causal ideas.  Starting from the punctuated equilibrium framework as 
developed by Baumgartner and Jones, this work asks ―What explains episodes of 
dramatic policy change?‖ The analysis utilizes a mixed-methods research design 
to address policy change across time and space, departing from conventional 
explanations to focus on the role of ideas in shaping policy choices.  Using 
original data the punctuated equilibrium framework is tested in three stages, 
beginning with a comparative analysis of institutional friction within social 
welfare policies in three countries: Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands.  
Next, a time series model considers the effect of environmental conditions on 
policy outcomes over time.  Finally, a qualitative process tracing analysis 
highlights the role of ideas in driving policy change under changing 
circumstances.  Central to the argument here is the contention that shifting 
causal stories, as conceptualized by Deborah Stone (1989), drive episodes of 
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dramatic policy punctuation in moments of shifting institutional, political and 
economic pressures.  
Findings from a multi-method analysis of quantitative and qualitative 
data confirm that institutional, political and economic factors alone are 
insufficient to generate policy change.  In the case of Irish social policy, this 
study demonstrates that a changing conceptualization of partnership from the 
perspective of employers, unions and the Government produced a shared vision 
of the future that bound relevant political actors to a course of policymaking 
based on consensus and inclusiveness.  Moreover, this shared blueprint for 
future development transcended partisan boundaries, linking Ireland‘s major 
political parties to a new and cohesive policy trajectory. Finally, the 
conceptualization of poverty shifted to a multidimensional understanding based 
on the idea of social exclusion, motivating a comprehensive policy solution based 
on inclusivity for the future of Irish development.  This work challenges the 
existing literature on policy change to better address the underlying causal 
mechanisms at work during episodes of punctuation, concluding that overlooking 
the role of causal ideas is a detriment to our comprehension of the policy process.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
―Only partnership offers us the degrees of stability, engagement and trust 
that are needed if we are to continue to modernize and improve the 
quality of life for citizens in a fair and sustainable way.  I find it hard to 
imagine that any other approach would produce the sort of interlocking 
policy responses that would be needed to meet the challenges that lie 
ahead‖ 
          - Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, Dec. 6th 2005 
 
 
―In Ireland, a set of ideas on the management of the economy and the 
relationship of those ideas to anti-poverty policy were institutionalized in 
the policy hierarchy from the beginning of social partnership in 1987‖  
         - Dr. Eileen Connolly, 2007   
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a study of ideas and policy change.  In particular, this is a study of the 
decision to introduce social partnership in Ireland.  By ‗social partnership‘, I am 
referring to seven successive national agreements made between the Irish 
government, unions, employers, farmers and community groups that govern 
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economic development and social policy.  I will address three major questions: (1) 
why did Ireland adopt a social partnership model?  (2) Why did this change take 
place specifically in 1987? And (3) why was social partnership chosen over policy 
alternatives?  In short, what are the specific causes that contributed to what 
Baumgartner and Jones refer to as ‗policy punctuation‘ in the Irish case?  More 
generally, how can we understand episodes of dramatic policy change that do not 
accord with conventional expectations?  I will answer these questions via a 
series of empirical and qualitative tests, outlining the institutional and 
environmental conditions which contribute to policy change, ultimately 
demonstrating the significance of causal ideas in affecting major policy change.  
Although I will develop a model specific to the case of Irish social 
partnership and welfare policies, and their particular role in anti-poverty efforts 
in that country, the general themes presented here are applicable to an overall 
understanding of policy change.  Indeed, the design of this study is readily 
transferrable to evaluation of the role of ideas in affecting policy change across 
multiple European countries that have developed social partnership policies 
since the end of WWII.  Policy stasis and punctuation are not new concepts; 
much research has replicated the punctuated equilibrium model across countries 
and policy issues. What is novel about this study, however, is the 
operationalization of causal ideas within the punctuated framework.  The major 
premise of this study is that policy change is driven by causal ideas.  Change 
occurs in response to existing institutional, political and economic conditions, but 
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only when the relevant causal ideas have shifted, allowing for episodes of 
punctuation to arise.  Political and economic pressures are insufficient to 
generate dramatic policy change without the supporting force of changing causal 
ideas.   
Irish social partnership constitutes an excellent case to use in the testing 
of hypotheses about policy change as it has been well documented by Irish and 
international scholars alike.  Moreover, the recent economic crisis in Ireland has 
precipitated the dissolution of social partnership, leading many to reevaluate the 
original choice of partnership and consider whether it has proven successful in 
achieving its goals, particularly combating poverty.   To be clear, the primary 
goal of national partnership was to secure labor relations agreements and 
produce economic stability in a time of uncertainty.  However, as I will argue 
below, the introduction of social partnership fundamentally altered the way that 
social welfare and anti-poverty policies are formulated in Ireland1.  Partnership 
represented a radical departure from convention in terms of the social policy 
agenda, differentiating Ireland from other European countries in this regard.  I 
contend that gaining insights into the causal processes that led to this specific 
                                                             
1
 Whether or not social partnership represented a true commitment to an egalitarian, social democracy in 
Ireland is not the subject of this work.  While there is certainly an active debate around whether social 
partnership has achieved genuine gains in equality and social inclusion – see Allen 2000, Meade 2005, Kirby 
2008, 2010, among others – the work that follows does not engage directly with the discussion.  Instead, what 
is most relevant to this work is the fact that the introduction of social partnership indelibly altered the 
landscape upon which social policy is constructed in Ireland.  For better or for worse, the conventional 
methods for developing the social policy agenda was subsumed in the partnership process beginning in 1987 
and has been inextricably linked since.  While it might disappoint some that this work does not engage in a 
critical analysis of partnership’s success or failure with regard to social equality, this is a study of the events 
and ideas that lead up to partnership’s introduction as the primary means for approaching social policy.  
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policy shift contributes to our understanding of current events in Ireland and 
episodes of punctuation in general; this study suggests that existing literature 
on policy punctuation has not yet sufficiently addressed the effect of changing 
causal ideas within the ‗black box‘ of policy change.      
The remainder of this introduction situates the argument within the 
broader literature on social welfare policy and policy change.  Analysis in 
subsequent chapters proceeds in three stages.  The first formulates a test of 
institutional friction and policy punctuation across three European countries, 
revealing common characteristics across cases in social welfare policymaking 
processes.  This chapter also serves to situate the Irish case relative to a general 
baseline of policy punctuation in this single issue domain.  The next stage 
considers the case of Ireland more specifically, testing the effect of 
environmental conditions on policy change over time.  The third stage provides a 
comprehensive qualitative account of events leading up to the introduction of 
partnership in 1987.  This introduction concludes with a more detailed plan of 
action for the remainder of the study and a brief summary of findings from each 
section. 
  
FUNCTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR POLICY CHANGE 
Much of the literature on social welfare, and anti-poverty policies in particular, 
focuses on changes in government activity as a functional response to society‘s 
economic needs.  In this view, factors contributing to policy change typically 
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include economic indicators such as the unemployment rate, rate of inflation, the 
size of the dependent population, economic development, tax revenue, union 
membership, and trade openness.  Policy outcomes, therefore, are the result of 
economic need and the corresponding state capacity to address social problems; 
when unemployment, inflation and/or dependency rates are rising, welfare 
spending will increase in accordance with the capabilities of the state to match 
demand (Pampel and Williamson, 1989).   In his account of economic policy 
change in the United Kingdom during the Thatcher era, Peter Hall (1993) 
identifies these types of policy adjustments as ―incrementalism, satisficing, and 
routinized decision making‖ (Hall, 1993:280).  In Hall‘s estimation, policy 
decisions that fall within this realm are ―first or second order‖ changes, meaning 
that no observable paradigm shift occurs in the conceptualization of policy ideas, 
rather policymaking is responding to societal needs either through adjustments 
in the policy instruments (e.g. an increase/decrease in welfare payments) or 
change in the instruments themselves (e.g. attention to welfare and employment 
versus a focus on inflation).   
Functional explanations for policy changes in social protection spending 
are often based on aspects of incrementalism and the assumption that 
governments respond like markets, making small adjustments where necessary. 
However, there is no clear consensus on the specific role that political 
institutions play in affecting these policy changes.  State capacity for welfare 
spending is often linked to the generation of tax revenues, and can be 
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conditioned by sectoral pressures such as demands from the unions or state 
bureaucracy, activities that are clearly political.  However, access to the 
policymaking process is often limited and exclusive, meaning that seemingly 
functional economic adjustments of policy are politically motivated actions of 
state actors, with limited interference from competing viewpoints (Hall, 1993).  
―Claims of economic determinism pay insufficient attention to the politics of 
policy change‖ (Pierson, 1996).  Explanations of social policy change, therefore, 
should be more appropriately situated in both the economic and political 
institutional environment within which policymaking occurs. 
Institutional explanations for policy change emphasize the formal and 
informal rules and organizational structures that govern policy choice in a given 
political environment.  Institutions appear in social science research as many 
different things: formal and informal, political and apolitical organizations; 
formal and informal rules of behavior; formal and informal networks of 
individuals, organizations or governments; structures that define loyalties, 
debates, principles, preferences, interests and agenda setting; power 
arrangements; and mechanisms by which social and political outcomes are 
achieved (Steinmo, 1992; Lowndes, 1996; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001).  Political 
institutions, in contrast to more efficient economic markets, are often resistant 
to change, designed to bind successors to a specific policy direction and to 
preserve incumbent control over structures in situations of opposition 
assumption of power (Moe, 1990; Pierson, 2000).  Institutions are capable of 
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taking on their own interests, agendas and preferences; and may become ‗path-
dependent‘ or ‗locked‘ into patterns of activity that restrict future choices and 
outcomes (Pierson, 1996; 2004).    
Since the late 1980s, research addressing the role of the state and political 
institutions on social spending has empirically linked partisanship, bureaucracy, 
voter preferences, globalization and neo-corporatist structures to welfare policies 
(Lijphart, 1984; Evans, Reuschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985; Baldwin, 1990; Hicks 
and Swank, 1992).  Findings emphasize the power resources of left/center-left 
blocs and neo-corporatist institutions as predictors of more expansive welfare 
states.  Electoral competition, particularly in majoritarian systems where 
parties seek to capture median voters, is thought to drive political parties to 
adopt stronger welfare platforms (Pampel and Williamson, 1989). Lijphart 
(1999) concludes that ―kinder, gentler‖ consensual systems of government have 
higher social protection spending.  Finally, Persson and Tabellini (2003) 
demonstrate that parliamentary style governments generally spend more on 
social welfare, particularly if they have proportional representation electoral 
systems.   
Gøsta Esping-Andersen‘s work on welfare capitalism (1990) sought to 
connect economic and political activities to cultural predispositions based on a 
cross-national, historical typology of welfare states.  Welfare spending, in 
Esping-Andersen‘s estimation, is based on a complex integration of societal 
norms, institutional organization and historical force (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
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Critiques of his typology aside2, there appears to be an empirical disconnect 
between a country‘s status as a ‗Liberal‘, ‗Traditional/Conservative‘ or ‗Social 
Democratic‘ welfare state and the evaluation of the specific causal mechanisms 
that translate these socio-political classifications into policy outcomes.   
Finally, research on globalization presents competing explanations for 
adjustments in welfare state provisions.  On the one hand, international 
competition generates pressure for increased social benefits as citizens are 
exposed to the harsh realities of the global marketplace (Rodrik, 1996).  On the 
other hand, openness to trade and foreign direct investment encourages the 
state to reduce social spending in order to minimize the tax burden placed on 
incoming investors (Rhodes, 1996).  Furthermore, most welfare state countries 
have experienced a period of welfare retrenchment in recent years as a result of 
either economic necessity or an attempt to distance the state from powerful 
interest groups (Olson, 1982; Pierson, 1996).  However, the interaction between 
global economic forces and the politics of the welfare state are far from 
simplistic, indeed ―such links are likely to be more modest, complex and bi-
directional than is commonly suggested‖ (Pierson, 1996).   
Only a general picture of a nation‘s likelihood for welfare generosity 
emerges with regard to political and economic factors – stronger leftist 
representation in more socially egalitarian societies typically translates into a 
larger social protection budget – yet our analysis of the politics of specific social 
                                                             
2
 see Arts and Gelissen 2002 for a comprehensive discussion 
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policy change remains deficient.  Moreover, social policy changes beyond existing 
budgetary parameters or major alterations to the policy trajectory – such as the 
introduction of partnership – are insufficiently addressed in this literature.    
For the purposes of this study, I am specifically interested in how the 
institutions of government incorporate complex information into public policy 
outcomes.  In order to address this issue, I will examine the environmental 
factors that contributed to the Irish government‘s adoption of social partnership 
in the late 1980s and the causal stories at the heart of policy decision making at 
that time.  I consider institutions from a more narrow perspective as the formal 
organizations of government that guide decision making through each stage of 
the policy process.  Baumgartner and Jones direct our attention to the concept of 
friction: the combination of institutional structures, overcrowded public agendas, 
and boundedly rational decision makers that limit the rate of policy change 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 2005).   Specifically, I focus on the level of friction 
present in the institutions of policymaking and how the complex machinery of 
government deals with inputs from a variety of sources when enacting social 
policy.  In this sense, the work that follows is intimately linked with that of 
Baumgartner and Jones and their theory of punctuated equilibrium.  
Institutions add drag to policy decision making by imposing costs to collective 
action (Baumgartner and Jones, 2005).   Conversely, shifts in the institutional 
structure, including turnovers in political power, might smooth the way for 
dramatic policy changes.  Of particular significance to this study are the causal 
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ideas that help policy overcome institutional friction or capitalize on periods of 
transition, to produce dramatic alterations to the policy landscape.  I contend 
that functional and institutional explanations for policy change must be 
combined with a theory of causal ideas to reach their full potential. 
 
PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM AS POLICY CHANGE 
Peter Hall argues that first and second order policy changes are representative 
of ―normal policymaking‖, decisions that are contained within specific 
parameters that do not challenge the dominant policy idea or paradigm (Hall, 
1993).  At times, radical change does occur in the policymaking realm, 
overthrowing the existing discourse and generating entirely new policy 
trajectories.   ―If first and second order changes preserve the broad continuities 
usually found in patterns of policy, third order change is often a more disjunctive 
process associated with periodic discontinuities in policy‖ (Ibid: 279).  Hall 
argues that these shifts are the result of dramatic changes in the ―hierarchy of 
goals behind policy‖ (Ibid: 279) and the marked transformation of policy 
discourse.  As Hall notes, one implication of this framework is that first and 
second order policy changes do not automatically lead to third order changes 
(Hall, 1993: 280), but instead periodically significant changes are the result of 
shifting causal ideas.  
Radical, paradigmatic shifts are fundamental to the theory of punctuated 
equilibrium. Punctuated equilibrium theory accounts for both institutional 
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stability and change, arguing that changes in the same factors which contribute 
to stasis are also responsible for creating periods of rapid, dramatic policy shift.   
Baumgartner and Jones based their punctuated equilibrium theory on two key 
factors: stubborn political institutions and disproportionate information 
processing by political elites.  Political institutions, by design or historical 
development, are often resistant to significant policy changes, and policymakers 
in political institutions are considered only capable of serial issue processing due 
to cognitive limitations (Baumgartner and Jones, 2005).  Policymakers typically 
depend on selective information sources and revise their decision making 
calculus episodically, based on particularly salient or timely information. When 
previously relied upon information is proven false, the boundedly rational 
decision maker must update ―in a punctuated manner in the face of change that 
cannot be ignored‖ (Baumgartner and Jones, 2004).   When issues become ―hot‖ 
on the public agenda, the core ideas either serve to reinforce existing institutions 
or create opportunities for significant policy change.  As issues shift in the public 
discourse – e.g. the conceptualization of partnership or poverty – the momentum 
generated can overcome great institutional obstacles.  New causal ideas create 
intense friction within policymaking institutions, sufficient to open up 
opportunities for ―dramatic reversals in policy outcomes‖ (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1999; 2005).    
Normal policymaking is a four step process, however, there is an 
expectation that friction will increase with each subsequent stage as transaction 
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and collective action costs increase.  Social processes, or all the social movement 
and issue activity in a given environment, reach relevant political actors as 
information or political inputs.  Policy processing, or political attention, and the 
introduction of legislation follows from these inputs.   Finally, policy outputs are 
produced in the form of budget allocations or other decisions (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 2009).  Institutional friction is also produced by normal democratic 
features, such as election cycles, party preferences, and external global events 
that may require more immediate attention but are beyond the control of 
national policymakers.  Costs increase as a policy moves through the process, 
generating greater friction and resistance to policy change. Where the 
coordination of multiple agencies and political actors is required, particularly 
with regard to budget allocations, collective action costs and friction are expected 
to be at their highest (Ibid).  Given the nature of increasing friction within the 
policy process, a disjuncture between social inputs and policy outputs occurs over 
time, generating error accumulation and eventually episodes of punctuated 
change where policies catch up to shifting social realities.  Contrary to Hall‘s 
account, the theory of punctuated equilibrium argues that incremental changes 
over time will generate sufficient friction within the system to eventually 
produce a breaking point, or period of dramatic policy change.  
Punctuated events are often unpredictable and wholesale policy changes 
of this magnitude are rare.  Theory aids our understanding of where and when 
the tension is likely to develop in our political institutions such that we might 
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expect a punctuated change.  However, one aspect of punctuated analysis that 
remains elusive is a definitive threshold level at which a policy issue will receive 
attention except in the case of a national emergency.  For example, the severity 
of domestic problems may not be sufficient to generate an appropriate response 
when an unresponsive government is in power or when the public agenda is 
already overloaded.  As such, social issues go unnoticed or unaddressed until 
such time as they cross a contingent threshold of urgency when a dramatic shift 
in attention becomes absolutely necessary or when a new policy idea has 
emerged that creates an opportunity for change (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009).  
Social issues then receive disproportionate levels of attention, including long-
term budgetary commitments, the creation of supporting institutions, and the 
investment of political capital, sometimes long after the problem has been either 
solved or decreased in urgency.  These sunk costs contribute to a new period of 
stasis; ―bureaucratic inertia makes it hard for governments to reduce attention 
to issues that are improving just as it inhibits them from paying attention to 
problems that are just emerging‖ (Ibid, pg. 608).   
I contend that at their core, policy punctuations represent a re-evaluation 
of the underlying goals defining a policy issue. ―Third order changes‖, or major 
shifts in policymaking, are like a Gestalt shift, ―marked by radical changes in 
the overarching terms of policy discourse associated with a (Kuhnian) paradigm 
shift‖ (Hall, 1993).  I contend that the cycles of institutional friction identified by 
Baumgartner and Jones require further examination to uncover the causal 
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mechanisms, more specifically the role of policy ideas at the heart of the 
punctuated equilibrium framework, in order to explain major policy change.   
   
IDEAS, IMAGES AND CAUSAL STORIES 
Ideas appear in social science literature in a number of forms.  Ideas can make a 
fundamental contribution to both initiating institutional change and producing 
outcomes.  When institutions are forced to change as a result of unpredictable 
circumstances, ideas can help provide a guideline for new institutional 
configurations (Blyth, 2002).  However, institutional outcomes are not a given as 
ideas are contested, producing unique outcomes and future institutional 
constructions.  Ideas help reduce uncertainty; make collective action and 
coalition building possible; serve as weapons in the struggle over existing 
institutions; act as institutional blueprints following the delegitimizing of 
existing institutions; and make institutional stability possible following 
institutional construction (Blyth, 2002).   
Ideas are also theorized in the policy literature as conceptual frames 
through which actors understand their surroundings.  Ideational frames 
function as filters through which individual actors view their surrounding 
environment and make decisions accordingly.  Ideational arguments offer a 
unique departure from institutional considerations of rules and norms, focusing 
in particular on the interpretive aspects of individual decision makers.  In fact, 
empirical claims about how actors formulate and shape their thinking and action 
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may provide a more accessible view of reality when compared to artificially 
objective assumptions of rationality.  Individuals often ‗satisfice‘ in situations of 
imperfect information while simultaneously processing information from 
multiple sources (Simon, 1996), and ideational filters are often necessary tools 
for individuals unable to ―hold consistent preferences, accurately perceive 
external conditions, or match solutions instrumentally to problems‖ (Parsons, 
2007).   
The literature on policy design focuses on the role of framing in the social 
construction of policy images; symbolic and simplified definitions used for 
understanding and conveying ideas to policymakers and the general public 
(Ingram and Schneider, 1993; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).  The creation and 
control of these framed policy images has significant implications for target 
populations subject to the design of new public policies (Ingram and Schneider, 
1993).  Individuals in socially powerful target populations often receive the 
benefits of their advantaged position via policies framed using positive or 
progressive language.  For example, the impoverished elderly or mothers with 
children are often viewed as requiring the support of the State as worthy causes 
for social welfare policies.  Single men, drug addicts and minorities, conversely, 
are often framed as indigent, lazy and manipulative (Ibid pg. 335-6).  Policy 
monopolies often form around a specific image, rejecting all other competing 
images, producing powerfully emotive connotations for policy design.   
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Ideas, then, may appear as paradigms (e.g. monetarism vs. 
Keynesianism), cognitive shortcuts or politically motivated ―spin‖.  Yet, ideas, 
images, and frames are all socially constructed and, therefore, potentially 
malleable by motivated political actors.  Policymakers have incentive to 
influence both the definition (idea or image) of the policy problem and its 
proposed solution (frame), when constructing a particular causal story (Stone, 
1989).   Objective conditions, such as the existence of widespread poverty, are 
insufficient to force policy change alone.  As Deborah Stone argues, the catalyst 
for policy change can often be found in the specific causal story behind the 
problem (Stone, 1989), changing a ―private misfortune‖ into a ―public problem 
that calls out for a governmental response‖.  For example, when poverty appears 
in the discourse as a personal problem, resultant of poor planning or bad 
behavior, the government need not intervene.  However, where persistent 
poverty is discussed as a broader violation of human rights and a detriment to 
the State, it becomes the duty of the government to find policy solutions.  The 
key to policy change, then, becomes the way in which a causal story is 
constructed around a particular social issue. 
The construction and destruction of causal stories becomes especially 
prescient in explaining policy change within the punctuated equilibrium 
framework, providing leverage on identifying and defining thresholds for policy 
change as issues rise and fall on the public agenda.  The terminology of 
punctuated equilibrium offers multiple avenues for dramatic policy change.  
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Baumgartner and Jones argue that ―when images shift, punctuations can occur‖: 
when new information about a particular policy problem arises, via revised 
individual thinking, external events, policy entrepreneurs, or a change of venue, 
the associated policy image is altered (Baumgartner and Jones, 2005).   
However, the concepts of policy ideas, problem definition, framing and causal 
stories are often used interchangeably in this literature, conflating individual 
cognition and the political activity of problem definition, or the formation of a 
causal story to promote a specific agenda, under the generic term ‗policy image‘.   
I argue that the causal effect of ideas lies within the active politicization of 
meaning. Whether through cognitive shortcuts or ‗framing‘, omission or 
commission, what is significant for policy change is the way in which ideas are 
operationalized in the discourse.  Rather than differentiate whether an idea is 
cognitive or instrumental, generated unconsciously or consciously, I argue that 
the specific use of causal stories is fundamental in affecting policy choices.  
Defining causal stories ―is a process of image making, where the images have to 
do fundamentally with attributing cause, blame, and responsibility.  Conditions, 
difficulties, or issues thus do not have inherent properties that make them more 
or less likely to be seen as problems or to be expanded.  Rather, political actors 
deliberately portray them in ways calculated to gain support for their side‖ 
(Stone, 1989 emphasis in original). 
Fundamental changes in the causal stories surrounding the Irish 
experience of poverty and social partnership created the opportunity for 
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dramatic policy change in the late 1980s.  I argue the embrace of partnership 
was based on the adoption of a shared commitment to building consensus 
through multi-organizational problem solving.   Since the inception of the social 
partnership agreement in 1987, ―the social partners have aligned themselves to 
a consistent and coherent consensus based strategic framework focused on 
macroeconomic policy, income distribution and structural adjustment‖ 
(O‘Connor, 2002).  In the 1980s, the idea of partnership had shifted away from 
earlier understandings embedded in conflict driven labor relations and politics, 
providing a viable policy alternative compared to market centered options that 
were taking root in Thatcher‘s United Kingdom.  The new causal story 
supporting partnership required the social partners to solve their problems via 
cooperation rather than competition, promoting consensus based governance.   
Next, when defined by more traditional political leaders and groups such 
as the Catholic Church, the causal story surrounding poverty in Ireland 
reinforced existing policies of welfare and charity.  However, the causal ideas 
associated with poverty changed in the 1980s to an understanding emphasizing 
the structural, social and institutional causes of poverty.  More precisely, a 
multidimensional conceptualization of ‗social exclusion‘ that prescribes 
management via participatory, active partnership emerged rather than de facto 
treatment of the symptoms of poverty through supplemental income measures.  
So, while anti-poverty policies were not the primary aim of the Programme for 
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National Recovery (1987), the policy trajectory of both partnership and poverty 
became inextricably linked from 1987 forward. 
 
TABLE 1: POLICY STASIS AND PUNCTUATION 
Example Friction Environment Causal Ideas Policy Outcome 
1 High Good Static 
1st order  
policy change 
2 Low Good Static 
1st or 2nd order 
policy change 
3 High Bad Static 
1st or 2nd order 
policy change 
4 Low Bad Shifting 
3rd order 
change – policy 
punctuation 
 
Table 1 outlines my theory of policy change in general, indicating where 
policies are likely to remain static and where punctuation should be observed.  I 
argue that the necessary factors of changing institutional friction and 
environmental conditions combine with shifting causal ideas to create 
opportunities for radical change.  In the first three general examples listed 
below, despite variation in friction and environmental conditions, we see a 
steady status quo bias in policy outcomes.  In the final case, punctuation 
becomes possible as all three necessary conditions align.  As this study will 
demonstrate, friction and environment were insufficient to drive policy change in 
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Ireland until the operationalization of new causal ideas in the policy discourse.  
In later chapters, I will develop the contents of this table in more specific detail. 
The following study considers three specific questions with regard to the 
Ireland‘s unique experiment with partnership and anti-poverty policies: why was 
the social partnership model adopted?  Why did the change occur in 1987?  And 
why was partnership chosen over viable alternatives?  I argue that the 
introduction of Irish social partnership is the result of three convergent factors: 
shifting institutional friction, changing economic and social conditions, and the 
evolution of pragmatic causal ideas surrounding poverty and partnership in 
Ireland.  None of these factors was sufficient in isolation to affect the policy 
change observed in the late 1980s; only through a combination of events, most 
significantly the politicization of new causal ideas, was dramatic policy change 
possible. 
 
MODERN IRELAND AND THE CELTIC TIGER 
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Ireland experienced rapid economic 
growth and development.  Having been the impoverished junior member of the 
European Community, Ireland quickly became the second wealthiest country in 
Europe, surpassed only by Luxembourg.  Dublin joined the ranks of the most 
expensive cities in the world.  This period of phenomenal growth, dubbed the 
―Celtic Tiger‖ era, has been attributed to a number of government led policy 
initiatives such as low corporate tax rates and incentive schemes which 
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encouraged massive foreign direct investment, as well as the presence of a 
highly educated, English speaking work force.   But many also credit the lack of 
political and industrial conflict, achieved through national level social 
partnership agreements, with providing the necessary stability for sustainable 
growth.  National social partnerships, reflective of neo-corporatist models 
developed in Scandinavia and elsewhere across Europe, brought the government 
together with employers, unions and farmers into collective bargaining 
agreements.  Beginning in 1987, these partnership arrangements were renewed 
every three years, committing Ireland to a course of economic development 
through collaborative decision making by the major stakeholders. 
The introduction of the Programme for National Recovery in 1987 created 
an entirely new trajectory for social policy in Ireland.  A core feature of the 
national level agreements was a dedication to tackling Irish poverty through 
partnership, holding all sectors responsible for effecting positive social change.  
Provisions were made for addressing social welfare, employment, housing, 
health and education as a comprehensive package of anti-poverty reforms.  
Special emphasis was placed on finding housing for disadvantaged groups, 
encouraging wider participation in education, and providing stability in social 
welfare payments (PNR, 1987).  Each subsequent national partnership 
agreement has echoed or extended these original aims, even creating local level 
partnerships tasked with the specific goal of promoting social inclusion and 
community development.  Partnership became embedded in Irish social and 
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political life as the predominant way to address social exclusion at every level of 
governance (Connolly, 2007).   
Today, very little policymaking at either national or local level in Ireland 
is done without partnership.  Partnerships are seen as an innovative way to 
rapidly develop extensive social policies and employment strategies across the 
country, finding multidimensional solutions to complex problems arguably best 
addressed through these national and local level institutions.  Since 1987, there 
have been seven national level agreements.  In 1997, membership in the social 
partners expanded to include the community and voluntary sector.  In 2009, the 
environmental sector was also added.  Over time, the content of national 
agreements has broadened to include a range of policy issues from wage 
agreements, working hours, and job creation, to emigration, immigration and 
EU integration.  A significant feature of all national agreements since 1987 has 
been a commitment to combating poverty and social exclusion. 
 
 
TABLE 2: NATIONAL SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS 1987 - 2009 
 
Partnership Agreement Years Covered 
Programme for National Recovery 1987-1990 
Programme for Economic and Social Progress 1991-1993 
Programme for Competitiveness and Work 1994-1996 
Partnership 2000 1997-1999 
Programme for Prosperity and Fairness 2000-2002 
Sustaining Progress 2003-2005 
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IRISH PARTNERSHIP IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
‗Partnership‘ has come to mean many things in both the European and Irish 
contexts. Conceptually, partnership may include anything from simple 
contractual obligations to more complex, egalitarian, consensus based decision 
making processes that demand a higher level of commitment, or ‗buy-in‘, from 
members.   Within the European Union, there is an inherent tension between 
the desire to homogenize organizational arrangements at national level and to 
promote the subsidiarity principle at the local level (Benington and Geddes, 
2001).  On the one hand, European leaders are interested in securing an 
economic and social integration package across the EU, rapidly developing a 
model of best practice that is transferrable to other member states.  On the other 
hand, the notion of subsidiarity emphasizes a local, community based 
development model for policy issues that recognizes and supports unique policy 
solutions.  Because of this tension, it is difficult to differentiate Irish partnership 
from other forms of policy concertation, collaboration or networking since these 
activities take place across all levels of governance.  In fact, it may be more 
useful to visualize social partnership on a continuum ranging from more 
concretely organized, discreet formal policy networks to loosely defined, working 
relationships or communities (Ibid, 2001).  With the advent of local partnerships 
and public-private partnerships, the term ‗partnership‘ becomes rapidly 
ambiguous.   
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Irish national level partnerships traditionally consist of a formal neo-
corporatist, tripartite arrangement between ‗peak organizations‘: the state, 
employers and labor representatives.  Ireland arguably falls short of a classic 
social corporatist model3, which controls welfare and pay increases in tandem 
(Teague, 1995), but the institutional design is reflective of a competitive state in 
which economic progress is largely linked to the success of the partnership model 
(Kirby, 2002).  Partnership at the national level has been essential for keeping 
industrial conflict at a minimum in order to promote an internationally 
competitive economy and promote the best interests of the workforce.   
For the purposes of this study, I conceptualize partnership more narrowly, 
focusing exclusively on national level policies and politics.  Recent literature 
differentiates neo-corporatism and policy concertation; considering the former 
structural patterns of organization and the latter, a policymaking methodology 
(Berger and Compston, 2002).  Given the degree to which social partnership 
became embedded in the Irish policymaking apparatus, I argue that elements of 
both neo-corporatism and concertation are evident4.  In this study, social 
partnership is thus characterized by two key features: 
 
                                                             
3
 Indeed, Niamh Hardiman makes the argument that a significant reason behind this development was the lack 
of institutional, political and structural conditions necessary to adopt a more strictly corporatist arrangement 
in 1987 (Hardiman, 1988).   
4
 Neither ‘neo-corporatism’ nor ‘concertation’ are terms used in the Irish discourse on social partnership.  
More frequently the terminology of ‘centralized pay agreements’ or ‘the national programme’ is used to refer 
to the negotiated consensus that more aptly describes the broad national social partnership.  
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1. The formal organization for policymaking and implementation: this 
includes national5 level social partnership agreements made by the 
relevant social partners and all references to that institution in 
government decision making. (Neo-corporatism) 
 
2. The common agenda and multidimensional action program: this aspect 
refers to the ideological foundation for partnership, in particular, the 
dedication to consensus, inclusive governance via the social partners 
and the focus on poverty and social exclusion at the national level. 
(Policy Concertation) 
 
 
While there are several key aspects to the Irish social partnership, including 
centralized pay agreements and broad macroeconomic strategy, the substantive 
focus of this study is the national level commitments to social policies contained 
in each of the partnership agreements; this aspect of Irish partnership most 
explicitly differentiates Ireland from other European countries.  Many other 
European nations have adopted policy concertation or partnership in economic, 
labor or employment policies, but only Austria has a more comprehensive 
program than Ireland in the realm of social policy (Berger and Compston, 2002).  
In Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, strictly constructed 
national level pay deals gave rise to sectoral agreements to regulate the 
                                                             
5
 Beginning before the first national-level partnership agreement in 1987, local initiatives were also setting up 
partnerships within communities across Ireland.  In these cases, the initiative included relevant social partners 
and stakeholders from a given area specific to the needs of that community.  For example, PAUL partnership in 
Limerick was originally formed on the basis of promoting employment in poverty-stricken areas of Limerick 
city and included representatives from State agencies, social services, employers, and vocational/educational 
services, as well as individuals from the community and voluntary sectors.  In 1991, the national level social 
partnership agreement (Programme for Economic and Social Progress) formalized the existence of 12 local 
partnerships and sought to expand the model around the country.  In addition, LEADER and HORIZON projects 
were initiated at the European level introduced partnership into further rural and urban areas.  There are now 
more than 58 such local level partnerships across Ireland specifically tasked with combating social exclusion.  
The experience of local level partnerships is not covered in detail in this study but will be explored in some 
depth during the concluding remarks. 
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economy.  In Italy, Finland, Belgium, and, more recently, Spain, these structures 
took on unique country level characteristics, supporting neo-corporatism under 
nontraditional conditions (Hardiman, 2006; Crouch and Streeck, 1997).   In 
France, social partnership has been sporadic and generally more narrow in 
scope, due primarily to the lack of cohesion within union and employers‘ 
organizations (Berger, 2002).  Finally, the United Kingdom has avoided policy 
concertation at the national level until quite recently.  Under the Labour 
government from 1997-2010, many local level partnerships were formed to 
encourage regeneration of urban areas and promotion of economic development.  
Since Thatcher, however, the UK has largely resisted the social partnership 
model (Dorey, 2002).       
While Ireland stands out as a critical example of a country that 
purposefully linked social and economic policy through partnership agreements, 
Denmark and the Netherlands are included in this study for the purpose of a 
detailed comparison of institutional friction and policy change.   The hypotheses 
developed here are readily transferrable to both of these countries and empirical 
tests could be used to examine the role of ideas in affecting policy change in each 
case.   In Denmark, the social partnership model adopted in September of 1899 
is centered on ―conflict based consensus‖, or an institutional framework of 
compromises and settlements that are maintained via an ad hoc, organic fluidity 
based on the spirit of partnership (Berger and Compston, 2002).  Beginning in 
the late 1980s and 1990s, however, the Danish partnership model has been 
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evolving away from concertation towards more consultation, whereby social 
partners contribute more to the pre-legislative phase of policymaking via 
informal political structures (Mailand, 2002).  This important shift to a 
consultative capacity for the social partners is linked to changing concepts of 
social solidarity and social responsibility (Ibid, 92).  The Danish State, in 
particular, has developed policy based on causal stories connecting the role of 
government more directly with social policy reform. 
In the case of the Netherlands, similar trends are in evidence.  In the post-
war periods, Dutch social partnership was widely embraced as the panacea for 
the economic devastation of the war.  In particular, throughout the 1950s and 
1960s Dutch wages were kept 20-25% lower than Germany or Belgium 
(Hemerijck, 2002), giving the Netherlands a competitive edge in Europe.  
However, in the late 1960s, both wages and inflation accelerated upwards and 
the welfare state was forced to expand dramatically despite the shrinking 
economy. Real labor costs increased, exceeding profit gains, and unemployment 
rose significantly as firms readjusted to recession.  Social partnership was 
effectively ―immobilized‖ until the early 1980s when a sharp conceptual shift 
took place within the incoming Lubbers administration.  The Lubbers coalition 
of the Christian Democrats and the Labor Party was a ‗no nonsense‘ government 
which enacted drastic cut backs in social policy and spending, independent of the 
social partners.   This tactical change in economic and social policy, based on 
shifting causal ideas, ultimately led to the resurrection of social partnership in 
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the Netherlands, along a more strictly neo-liberal model prioritizing 
competitiveness and profitability (Hemerijck, 2002).    
While this study focuses specifically on the case of policy change in 
Ireland, it is evident from the discussion above that multiple countries could be 
substituted into the model.  The choice of Denmark and the Netherlands as 
comparative cases is particularly relevant in this study since both countries are 
open, internationally driven economies.  However, only in the case of Ireland has 
social policy become so intimately linked with partnership.  The course of policy 
change in Ireland is, therefore, an instructive example of how ideas affect policy 
outcomes.   
 
CHAPTER OUTLINE AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The focus of this research is on the role of causal ideas in generating changing 
policy outcomes, specifically the development of social partnership policies in 
Ireland.  The study proceeds in three stages, beginning with an empirical 
analysis of punctuated changes in social welfare policies across Europe.  The 
chapter that follows develops a baseline model for policy change based on 
theories of punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner et al. 1993-2010).  The effects 
of institutional friction on social welfare outcomes are highlighted in three 
European cases; Ireland, Denmark, and the Netherlands.  Whereas the Policy 
Agendas work normally focuses on a broad range of political issues, this study 
uses a single policy case to explore the tenets of punctuated policy change in the 
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European context.  Findings confirm the highly punctuated nature of social 
welfare policymaking within the broader European context, demonstrating some 
commonalities across country settings.  However, evidence in this chapter 
reveals that a variety of policy trajectories is possible and suggests that 
additional economic and political variables need be included in our analysis.  
Findings in this chapter identify an inherent ecological fallacy present in 
existing literature on punctuation due to policy aggregation, demanding a more 
nuanced analysis of the politics of policy change in a specific issue domain.  
Friction is clearly evident in the policy processes for each country, contributing 
to the likelihood of policy stasis over time, but results in the Irish case indicate 
that the procedural stage, where legislative debate and policy deliberation take 
place, may be more intimately linked to economic and political conditions than 
analysis accounts for in the traditional punctuated model.   
The second empirical chapter, Chapter three, specifically examines Irish 
social policies from the 1980s to the present day, investigating the causal factors 
behind the identified periods of policy punctuation via multivariate time series 
analysis.  The analysis in this section extends findings from chapter two, 
revealing the underlying political and economic conditions that contribute to 
policy change.  Institutional friction is operationalized as an independent 
variable, connecting the stages of the policy process to the political environment 
within which policy change occurs.  Results reveal some expected outcomes.   
Election cycles and the share of seats controlled by left/center-left political 
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parties have a significant effect on the level of social welfare spending.  Also, 
economic factors, such as the rate of inflation and openness to international 
trade, contribute to increased rates of welfare spending.  However, findings also 
indicate that both past and present levels of friction contribute significantly to 
policy outcomes.  Where friction is high, indicating a strong status quo bias in 
policymaking, both the overall level of spending and the rate of change in social 
protection allocations is reduced.  Finding that policy outcomes for a single social 
issue are consistently affected by existing levels of friction in conjunction with 
political and economic factors demonstrate the need to disaggregate policy issues 
when conducting analysis on specific episodes of policy punctuation.   Moreover, 
these findings confirm that empirical tests should expand to connect the stages 
of the policy process appropriately and incorporate relevant economic conditions 
affecting policy outcomes. 
 The final empirical chapter traces the introduction of social partnership as 
a dramatic policy change in Irish social welfare policy.  Whereas earlier analysis 
focuses on the institutional and environmental factors that contribute to policy 
changes within the parameters of social welfare budgets, this chapter examines 
the adoption of a radical new policy direction outside the confines of conventional 
expenditure measures.  The adoption of social partnership in Ireland in 1987 
represented a dramatic new policy direction beyond regular cycles of increasing 
or decreasing welfare budgets. Critical to this analysis is an interrogation of 
causal ideas as a contributing factor; Chapter 4 traces the process leading up to 
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the introduction of social partnership and the causal ideas that contributed to 
decision making by exploring the discourse surrounding partnership and poverty 
in the 1980s.  ―The first social partnership agreement of 1987 was part of the 
institutionalization of a new policy regime that marked a distinct break with the 
past, and most importantly that the parameters of the policies established in 
that first agreement and the ideas that underpinned them continue to shape 
Irish social policy into the 21st century‖ (Connolly, 2007).  Findings in this 
chapter demonstrate that the conceptualization of partnership by prominent 
politicians and social partners had shifted from a conflict oriented perspective to 
the recognition that consensual governance was mutually beneficial.  Likewise, a 
multidimensional understanding of the realities of poverty and the social 
problems in Ireland during the 1980s emerged on the political agenda, leading 
policymakers to adopt more comprehensive social policies via partnership.  This 
final empirical chapter confirms that institutional and environmental factors are 
insufficient to account for this period of dramatic policy shift without the 
necessary inclusion of the significant causal ideas present in the policy 
discourse. 
The conclusion examines the most recent cycle of negotiations and the 
dissolution of this social partnership in light of the current economic crisis.  
Evidence from the empirical analyses conducted in earlier chapters provides 
some useful insights into comprehending partnership‘s recent demise in Ireland 
and for understanding policy change more generally.  The discussion also reflects 
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on the broader implications for local level partnerships following recent episodes 
of dramatic policy change at the national level.  Partnerships at the local level, 
in many cases, have developed as a result of the same causal ideas that drove 
national level policy change in the late 1980s.  Three decades later, those causal 
ideas continue to inform the work of many community based organizations, even 
while national agreements have proven to be less persistent in their 
commitment to eradicating social exclusion. The work concludes with 
suggestions for future research, including the need to explore the potential for 
reinforcement of existing power structures in society and institutionalization of 
poverty regimes through national and local partnerships.  In particular, this 
chapter suggests the need for work that addresses the question of whether 
partnerships represent a ―hollowing out‖ (Rhodes) of the state and create a 
democratic deficit in public service provision in the absence of electoral 
oversight.  As partnership becomes an increasingly popular policy choice across 
the European Union – in both neo-corporatist and public-private guises – the 
implications for democratic governance must be more thoroughly examined. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
ON FRICTION: 
WELFARE POLICY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Governments and policymakers together comprise a complex system, handling 
diverse and multifaceted streams of information.  These inputs are translated 
into policy outputs via institutions, conditioned by the level of political attention 
paid to a given problem by the public and politicians.  Research by Baumgartner 
and Jones over the past two decades emphasizes that issue importance and the 
rate of government response to social inputs are not often in direct proportion to 
one another, but are instead characterized by periods of dramatic change or 
policy punctuations.  Since governments must handle such vast amounts of 
information on a range of policy topics, the inability to process this information 
efficiently leads to lapses in government attention and budgetary allocation 
when issues are perceived to be less salient on the agenda.  Moreover, 
policymaking institutions impose transaction costs such that policy inputs do not 
34 
 
translate neatly into predictable or even, at times, appropriate policy outcomes.  
Political institutions, in particular, are resistant to change; policymaking via 
government is, often by design, deliberate and slow.  Baumgartner and Jones 
utilize the concept of friction, or the combination of institutional structures, 
overcrowded public agendas, and boundedly rational decision makers that limit 
the pace at which policy change takes place (Baumgartner and Jones, 2005).  
Friction creates episodes of ‗slip-stick‘ policy change where exogenous events 
force institutions to catch up or make substantial policy adjustments 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009).  Finally, friction is also expected to increase as issues 
progress through the policy process; as decision making costs increase, the 
consequences of making policy decisions create more and more barriers to 
change over time.  Policy outcomes, therefore, are predominantly static except 
for periods of significant departure from past policy decisions (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 2003; Baumgartner et al., 2009).   
  While the work of Baumgartner and Jones offers several complex 
avenues for understanding factors that contribute to policy punctuations6, I 
argue that dramatic policy shifts are a function of three things: changes in 
existing levels of friction within the policymaking system, changes in the social 
environment, and changes in the causal stories underlying a specific policy.  
                                                             
6
 Among the factors that contribute to punctuated change are institutional rules and designs, policy venue, 
agenda overcrowding, collective action problems, social inputs, political party preferences, international 
events, entrepreneurial actors, problem definitions, attention thresholds, and windows of opportunity.  I 
argue that these factors can be usefully categorized into three thematic areas: existing institutional friction, 
environmental conditions and policy images.  
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Where friction levels are shifting and political or economic factors generate the 
necessary pressure, the likelihood of policy punctuation increases significantly.  
However, these factors are insufficient to produce policy change without 
simultaneous shifts in the relevant causal stories.  This chapter examines social 
welfare policies presented by European governments from the 1970s to present, 
exploring policy punctuation across national institutions.  I develop a baseline 
model for exploring episodes of punctuated change using three European 
countries: Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands, observing levels of 
institutional friction in a single policy domain.  Results reveal that social welfare 
policies display familiar levels of institutional friction, replicating and 
confirming existing findings on punctuated equilibrium.   
Situating the Irish case in a comparative context provides the motivation 
for the analysis conducted here, but the broader implications of institutional 
friction are important for understanding policy change in diverse settings.   More 
importantly, as findings in this chapter demonstrate, the three country 
comparison provides strong evidence that exogenous factors, beyond the ‗slip-
stick‘ dynamics of institutional friction, contribute to episodes of policy change.  
The next chapter thus extends the analysis within a country specific setting to 
evaluate political and economic factors affecting social policy outcomes in 
Ireland.  And the specific effect of causal stories is considered in more detail in 
subsequent process tracing of Irish policy change during the late 1980s.   
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ANALYSIS OF PUNCTUATED CHANGE 
A policy process that is efficiently responsive to social and economic problems 
would exhibit a proportionate distribution of policy inputs to outputs.   Issues 
would rise and fall on the agenda in accordance to their urgency or severity; 
policy outcomes, such as budget allocations, would increase or decrease in 
response to social needs.  In a frictionless environment, it is expected that once a 
given social indicator, such as the poverty rate, crossed some threshold, a 
government response would be automatically generated.  However, given the 
number of issues that demand the attention of government at any given time, 
the policy agenda is often overcrowded (Kingdon, 2003; Baumgartner et al, 
2009).  Issues compete for the attention of policymakers and items rise on the 
agenda only when they become publicly urgent, a responsive government is in 
power, an entrepreneurial actor takes up the cause, and/or when the level of 
intensity for other policy issues is momentarily slack.  In addition, once a policy 
issue arrives on the agenda, it often persists even after a crisis has passed.  
Having committed time and money to a problem, governments often maintain an 
increased level of attention, and financial commitment, to an issue even when 
the urgency of a situation has diminished.  Baumgartner et al. (2009) find that 
this friction is common to all systems of government ―based on the limitations of 
human cognition‖, and that similarities outweigh institutional differences. 
Governments do not respond seamlessly or simultaneously to numerous policy 
demands. Therefore periods of punctuated change, or moments of heightened 
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attention and intense activity that produce dramatic changes in output, are the 
more frequently observed norm.   
In the following analysis, I test the adequacy of Baumgartner et al 
(2009)‘s model for explaining changes in European social welfare outcomes.   My 
study extends their model in three distinctive ways: through analysis of a 
specific policy issue; inclusion of a new country case; and extension of the 
empirical test.  First, I focus on a single policy issue, social welfare, rather than 
the panoply of topics covered in the Comparative Policy Agendas study7.  
Theoretically, single policy issues, such as social welfare, may be less subject to 
periods of stasis and punctuation.  A single policy issue may be more vulnerable 
to swings in importance and attention, especially over the short term, and 
should, therefore, be more responsive to public and elite demands.  Particularly 
in the era of globalization across the European Union, labor market and welfare 
demands require increased levels of government attention. Rather than 
drastically reduce social spending, many European welfare states have instead 
created competitive social pacts in order to reform social protection spending 
rates (Rhodes, 1996). As such, welfare spending in particular is an area where 
modern European governments are particularly attuned to the demands of both 
the market and the populace.   
                                                             
7
 Their Policy Agendas Project began this process by coding data from 21 policy topic areas in the United States 
over the last century.  Having expanded into comparative analysis of European policy trends, the Comparative 
Policy Agendas work now represents an extensive source of data on policy change in Western Europe.  Their 
research focuses on a wide array of policy issues; the overall picture presented includes the full spectrum of a 
government’s policy interests and attention.  See www.comparativepolicyagendas.org  
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The case of social welfare presents a unique test for Baumgartner et al.‘s 
(2009) theory of punctuated change in three ways.  In the first instance, their 
use of multiple policy issues may create an ecological fallacy that overlooks 
individual differences in the policy trajectory for different social issues.  The 
policy process may be characterized by increasing levels of friction as issues 
move from one stage to the next when items are aggregated, but a single policy 
issue may not have the same path.  Secondly, social welfare is an area that is 
inextricably and often uniquely linked with economic performance in a given 
country.   Government officials may be expected to pay closer attention to social 
welfare indicators given the political ramifications, potentially lowering levels of 
friction and easing policy change.  Finally, social welfare spending is an area 
where a parliamentary style of government in likely to be more efficient.  
Friction during the procedural stage should be lower given the responsiveness of 
majority governing parties and the fact that parliamentary systems often use 
welfare spending increases as a political tool (Persson and Tabellini, 2003).  
Therefore, policy outcomes in the area of social welfare could be expected to be 
more sensitive to changing political and economic conditions.      
Next, I extend the work of Baumgartner et al. (2009) by including three 
European countries in the analysis: Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands, 
while omitting the United States.  While Denmark and the Netherlands are 
already within the Comparative Agendas project, Ireland represents a unique 
new case for analysis.  All are parliamentary systems, with some variety in 
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structure, which removes selection bias based on the inherent friction present in 
a presidential system and tests the efficiency of parliamentary governments 
relative to one another.   I argue that these cases provide a broad perspective on 
the policy process across Europe, reflecting a variety of policy agendas and 
national histories.   
Lastly, in this analysis I advance the empirical evaluation of institutional 
friction by connecting the stages of the policy process in three European 
countries.  While the model used by Baumgartner et al. (2009) is suggestive of 
linking the effect of each policy stage to the outcomes of the subsequent stage, 
the nature of the distributions identified in their models at each stage of the 
policy process is singularly related to only that stage given the measurements 
utilized.  The authors correctly identify the fact that the proportionality of the 
output response may not be accurately related to the input signal, but their 
models fail to connect these stages in a way that effectively evaluates the 
relationship between policy inputs, procedures and outputs.  In this chapter, I 
establish a baseline model of punctuated change in three countries; the next 
chapter uses a time series analysis to test the empirical relationships between 
every stage of the policy process. Later extensions include operationalization of 
causal ideas in achieving dramatic policy change.  
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DATA AND METHODS 
In the initial analysis, I test two central hypotheses, the first being a general 
theory about the presence of kurtosis in European welfare policymaking.  
Positive kurtosis in annualized time series indicates policy stasis in social 
welfare policies from year to year.  Higher positive kurtosis increases the 
likelihood that policy change will be punctuated; since the trend is for 
reinforcement of the status quo, significant change increasingly represents a 
radical departure rather than an incremental adjustment.  The null hypothesis 
is that distributions are normally distributed and not characterized by 
leptokurtosis, indicating an efficient transfer of inputs to policy outputs.   
Despite the fact that social welfare policy presents a difficult test for 
Baumgartner and Jones‘ theory about punctuation, I argue that the policy 
process in all three countries will still display high levels of friction.  However, 
as outlined in the second hypothesis, I expect different patterns of kurtosis over 
the policy process from those found in the traditional punctuated equilibrium 
scholarship. 
 
H1: Output distributions for European social policymaking 
institutions will be characterized by positive kurtosis.  
 
The second hypothesis deals with the level of observed friction as the policy 
process proceeds from input to procedural to output stages.  Contrary to 
Baumgartner and Jones‘ (2009) finding that friction increases in a linear fashion 
across the stages of the policy process, I expect that political attention in the 
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procedural process will reduce kurtosis for that stage relative to both the input 
and output stages for these parliamentary governments.  
 
H2: As social policies moves from input to procedural to output 
stages in the policy process, kurtosis values are expected to increase 
overall.  However, kurtosis in the procedural process is expected to 
be lower than the input or output stages.   
 
As outlined above, I argue these periods of punctuation are a function of 
three changing variables: existing friction, political and economic conditions, and 
the relevant causal ideas at work in the topical discourse.  For the purposes of 
this chapter, the analysis will focus on the first element of punctuated change 
via social welfare policies from a comparative perspective across three European 
countries.  For each country, I collected annual data on elections, media 
attention, industrial action, legislative activity, and budgetary outputs to assess 
the year to year change in institutional friction as measured by kurtosis levels.  
The information was then coded into three specific categories:  information 
contained within the input stage of the policy process; the procedural stage, 
including policy negotiations; and the output stage, including budgetary 
allocations.  Policy data was collected from the Comparative Policy Agendas 
project for Denmark8 and the Netherlands9 and by personal research for Ireland.  
Domestic sources were consulted for economic and political variables for each 
country.  Given the limitations of a single policy issue, the data for each country, 
                                                             
8
 Thanks to Dr. Christoffer Green-Pedersen at the Danish Comparative Policy Agendas Project for the data. 
9
 Thanks to Gerard Breeman at the Dutch Comparative Policy Agendas Project for this data. 
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particularly the Netherlands, are not extensive.  However, the number of 
observations will be sufficient to provide a robust test of my hypotheses for all 
three countries.   The table below outlines the data series10: 
 
TABLE 3: THREE COUNTRY DISTRIBUTIONS 
                                                             
10
 More complete tables of indicators and calculations can be found in Appendix A. 
Country Distributions Studied Source 
Ireland Input Series 
 Parliamentary Elections 
 Industrial Disputes 
 Media Coverage 
Procedural Series 
 Irish Parliamentary Debates, 
Ministers Questions 
 Legislative Bills and Motions 
Output Series  
 Social Welfare Budget Allocations 
 Social Protection Budgets including 
Housing, Health, Education, and 
Welfare 
 Local Anti-Poverty Partnership 
budgets 
Source: The Irish Times 
Lexus-Nexus Search 
 
Source: Irish Government Website – 
www.irlgov.ie  
 
Source: Central Statistics Office – 
www.cso.ie 
 
Source: Dáil Éireann Archives: 1983 
to 2009 
 
Source: Irish Department of Finance; 
Irish Central Statistics Office; Irish 
Welfare Department; and Pobal 
Denmark Input Series 
 Parliamentary Elections 
 Industrial Disputes 
Procedural Series 
 Parliamentary Speeches 
 Legislative Bills 
Output Series  
 Social Welfare Budgets 
Source:  Statistics Denmark 
http://www.dst.dk/homeuk.aspx 
 
Source: Comparative Policy Agendas 
Denmark  
http://www.agendasetting.dk/ 
 
Source:  Statistics Denmark 
http://www.dst.dk/homeuk.aspx 
The 
Netherlands 
Input Series 
 Parliamentary Elections 
Procedural Series 
 Queen‘s Speeches 
 Coalition Agreements 
 Parliamentary Questions 
 Legislative Bills 
Output Series  
 Social Welfare Budgets 
Source: Statistics Netherlands 
http://www.cbs.nl/en-
GB/menu/home/default.htm 
 
Source: Comparative Policy Agendas 
Netherlands 
 
Source: Statistics Netherlands 
http://www.cbs.nl/en-
GB/menu/home/default.htm 
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POLICY INPUTS 
The policy inputs series includes election results collected up to the most recent 
parliamentary elections in 2007 for all three countries.  In Ireland, the Dáil 
Éireann is the lower house of the Oireachtas, the Irish Parliament.   Although 
the Irish political system became independent from the United Kingdom in 1922 
at the end of the War of Independence and the Irish Civil War, the modern Irish 
party system only began to take shape in 1937, after the finalization of the 
Bunreacht Na hÉireann, the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland.  The data 
reflect the percentage change in first preference votes at the national level for 
the major parties at each national parliamentary election for the Dáil since 
1937.  Ireland has a single-transferrable vote proportional representation 
system.  Therefore, first preference votes are the most accurate way of capturing 
individual voter preferences and policy input changes over time.   Elections have 
been held approximately every three to four years in Ireland subject to 
confidence in government.  The shortest Dáil lasted 252 days, the longest 1833 
days.  The sample here includes election results from twenty-two national 
contests.  Data were also collected on the percentage of seats held by each of the 
major parties for the same time period.  Because of the single transferrable 
voting system, the percentage of first preference votes may not reflect the overall 
share of seats gained by a particular party.  Later rounds of voting may yield 
additional seats, particularly for candidates from smaller political parties. 
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The policy input series for Denmark reflects similar measures of electoral 
outcomes. Denmark was officially established as a constitutional monarchy in 
1849, but parliamentary supremacy was not fully secured until 1901.  The 
monarchy serves as a non-partisan mediator during negotiations to form new 
governments, helping combine Denmark‘s fragmented party system into a 
workable coalition (Frankland, 2009).  Denmark‘s electoral system works via 
proportional representation.  Since 1966, a two bloc pattern has emerged, with 
the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist People‘s Party and others on the left; 
the Conservative, Liberal and Radical Liberal parties being more centrist, but 
often aligned with right wing parties.  The Social Democratic Party has 
traditionally been linked with Danish labor unions, while the Conservative 
Party is broadly representative of business interests.  Danish unions are active 
participants in setting the social policy agenda in Denmark as a result of closer 
party ties (Jensen, 2002).  Most governments in Denmark since the end of WWII 
have been minority governments, typically with the support of a centrist 
coalition member, and no single party has held an absolute parliamentary 
majority in the 20th century.  The election results in this section date to 1947, 
including twenty-four parliamentary election cycles for the Danish Folketing.     
Finally, the Netherlands also has a constitutional monarchy and the 
Dutch Queen also aides in the political process of government formation by 
appointing an ‗informateur‘, an individual identified by party leaders as being 
the best politician to lead governmental negotiations (Frankland, 2009).  The 
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multi-party, proportional representation system in the Netherlands typically 
produces ten or more parties in the elections for the 150 seat Tweede Kamer, the 
lower house of the Parliament.  Representatives are elected according to a broad 
national party list, not running in districts or local constituencies.  Political 
parties and trade unions typically remain faithful to their original social 
identities (whether Calvinist, Catholic Socialist or Liberal); however consensus 
politics have typically characterized Dutch parliamentary negotiations.  Today 
there are serious divisions within the Dutch political parties and within Dutch 
society that are expected to become more politically significant in the next 
decade.  Data here reflect results from twenty-four national contests, dating 
back to 1925. 
The input series also includes several measures based on the number of 
initiated and ongoing industrial disputes; the number of firms and workers 
involved in disputes; and the number of working days lost per year to industrial 
action for Ireland and Denmark.  As input measures, they provide a 
thermometer on public opinion.  Findings for industrial activity are especially 
relevant for Ireland given the inclusion of union representatives in national 
policymaking via social partnership arrangements.  Danish laws are also highly 
restrictive with regard to labor practices given the neo-corporatist style of 
governance.  Data in these measures are recorded from 1985 to 2009 for Ireland 
and 1996 to 2009 for Denmark.   
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Finally, in the Irish case, the first series of data includes media coverage 
from the national newspaper, The Irish Times.  The annual percentage change 
in the number of stories covering relevant policy issues is calculated across the 
time period of 1992 to present.  Content categories include social welfare, 
poverty, social exclusion, social partnership, local partnership and government 
budget allocations.  Stories were taken from three sections of the paper: Front, 
Ireland and Opinion & Letters.  The first two sections include news stories 
relevant to the Irish political situation.  The Opinion & Letters section includes 
social commentary from journalists, politicians, researchers, Irish and foreign 
citizens.   
 
POLICY PROCESS 
The policy process series of information covers the period from 1983 to 2009 for 
Ireland.  Data collected in this section includes questions in the Dáil for the 
Taoiseach (Prime Minister); questions addressed to specific departmental 
ministers; debates in parliament (including non-legislative motions); and 
deliberation over parliamentary legislation. Questions addressed to the 
Taoiseach and Ministers are often political exercises, designed to challenge 
government positions and provoke conflict as much as to develop constructive 
debate.  Adjournment debates and statements are more involved, requiring 
increased levels of ministerial time and dedication for their preparation and 
delivery.  All legislative items were collected via personal research in the Dáil 
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archives using content analysis to code debates on social welfare, poverty, social 
exclusion, social partnership, local partnership, and welfare budget allocations.  
Data here reflect the annual percentage change in parliamentary attention for 
questions, debates, statements, and legislation relating to social welfare issues.  
Procedural data for Denmark spans the time period of 1954 to 2008.  Data 
include the Prime Ministers‘ speeches from the opening and closing of 
parliament as well as relevant bills in the parliament.  Topics covered in the 
Prime Minister‘s speeches give a strong sense of government attention to 
particular policy issues.  Speeches are expected to be relatively low transaction 
cost events since they are statements about the government agenda.  However, 
institutional friction is expected to be somewhat higher in the legislative process 
given party negotiations and debates.  Bills in parliament come from the 
government and, therefore, can be considered equivalent to laws since nearly all 
are enacted (Green-Pedersen, 2005).  Together, these two policy processes are 
observed in order to measure the level of friction in the Danish procedural stage. 
For the Netherlands, data in the process series include parliamentary 
questions, the Queen‘s speeches, coalition agreements, and legislative debates 
ranging from 1945 to 2008.  As with other parliamentary systems, questions for 
the minister are largely political exercises, designed to draw attention to the 
short comings of government and/or highlight the position of the opposition.  
Similar to the Prime Minister‘s opening and closing of the Folketing in 
Denmark, the Queen‘s annual speech reflects the platforms of the government 
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rather than the specific views of the monarchy.  Coalition agreements reflect the 
negotiation process of governing coalitions when setting out distinctive 
platforms.  Finally, legal debates cover all relevant pieces of legislation in the 
negotiation process in a given year.      
 
POLICY OUTPUTS 
Policy outputs for all three countries include a variety of budgetary outlays 
including annual budgets for social welfare, health, housing, education, local 
level partnerships, and national level bodies associated with social expenditure.  
Statistics for social protection budgets are calculated as a percentage change 
from the previous year‘s budget as an overall percentage of national GDP.  Data 
were collected from the Irish Central Statistics Office; the Irish Department of 
Social Welfare; Statistics Denmark/Danmarks Statistik; and Statistics 
Netherlands/Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek.   Data in this series cover the 
period from 1980 to 2009 for Ireland, from 1985 to 2008 for Denmark and from 
1995 to 2008 for the Netherlands. 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
A policy process that is efficiently responsive to social and economic problems 
should exhibit a normal distribution of policy inputs, procedures and outputs.  
As policy issues become more salient on the public agenda, policymakers respond 
with an increased level of attention and budgetary output.  As issue importance 
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decreases, a corresponding decline in response should be expected in later 
phases of the policy process.  Punctuated policy changes are instead 
characterized by leptokurtic distributions with high levels of kurtosis.  So rather 
than a response mechanism that translates inputs to outputs in a fluid fashion, 
policies remain static and resistant to change (high friction = high kurtosis) and 
the distribution of outputs appear leptokurtic rather than normal11.  The 
existence of policy stasis and punctuation can be measured via observation of 
variable distributions and kurtosis scores for each of the policy inputs, 
procedures and outcomes.  Leptokurtic distributions confirm policy stasis as the 
modal observations are clustered around a mean value, in this case zero, 
representing little change from one period to the next, with the exception of 
significant outliers located in the ‗fat tails‘ of the distribution model.   
Leptokurtic distributions are indicative of a strong status quo bias, meaning that 
policies do not reflect adjustments made as needed, but instead are marked by 
occasional, dramatic corrections (Baumgartner et al., 2009).  For example, media 
attention, legislative debates, and budget outlays are expected to remain 
approximately the same year after year, unless an episode of policy punctuation 
occurs.   Friction can be measured via comparison of kurtosis scores from each 
stage of the policy process.  As the stakes become higher going from the input to 
output stages, the level of friction and associated kurtosis values are expected to 
                                                             
11
 A normally distributed curve has the predicted kurtosis value (K value) of 3.  The higher the K value, the 
more leptokurtic the distribution, and the more the distribution deviates from normality.   
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increase, meaning the policy is more resistant to change and outcomes become 
more highly punctuated.   
Analysis and results displayed here are deliberately modeled very closely 
on the work of Baumgartner, Jones, et al. (1993-2009).   In an attempt to 
replicate their results for a single policy issue, this study utilizes the analytical 
tools and strategies employed in their work in order to evaluate the presence of 
friction over the course of a specific policy issue. Statistical findings are 
confirmed via robustness checks.  The distributions presented here represent 
pooled data collected from each of the topics outlined above.  For each of the 
measures in the policy input, process and output series, the percentage change 
from the previous year was calculated as a first-difference change12.  Overall, the 
countries included in this study display similar trends of punctuated policy 
development in social welfare over time.    
 Results presented here relate to the two hypotheses listed above: 1) that 
national policymaking institutions are characterized by positive kurtosis overall 
and 2) that kurtosis values increase as social policies move along the policy 
process.  The level of kurtosis measures the relative deviation from normality for 
each variable distribution: values above three are considered statistically 
significantly different from a normal distribution.  All of the variables included 
here display highly leptokurtic, punctuated distributions meaning that stasis is 
                                                             
12
 More complete tables of indicators and calculations can be found in Appendix A, including more information 
on the calculation of first-difference change.  The calculation essentially gives a measure of the percentage of 
change from one observation year to the next. 
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the norm across all measures except for episodes of dramatic policy shift.  In 
order to test the robustness of these findings, I employ the Shapiro-Francia13 
test for non-normality.  For the Shapiro-Francia test, smaller values of W‘ are 
indicative of significant deviation from normality.  V‘‘ values are additional 
measures of non-normality where the 95% critical values ranges from 2.0 to 2.8 
depending on sample size, meaning that values greater than 2.8 indicate 
leptokurtosis (Royston, 1992).   P-values and z-scores provide measures of 
confidence.  
 
TABLE 4: SUMMARY LEVELS OF KURTOSIS FOR INPUT, PROCESS & OUTPUT MEASURES 
IRELAND 
Data Series N K W‘ V‘ Z 
(p) 
% change in Dáil seats by Party 113 14.67 0.82 17.48 5.48 
(0.00) 
% change in first preference votes by party 103 10.23 0.83 15.91 5.27 
(0.00) 
% change in industrial disputes 92 9.93 0.65 29.58 6.28 
(0.00) 
% change in media coverage 34 28.77 0.32 26.07 5.75 
(0.00) 
% change in Dáil Questions/ 
Statements/Adjournments 
56 6.74 0.90 5.42 3.16 
(0.00) 
% change in Dáil Motions/Legislation/Budgets 66 8.95 0.78 14.20 4.88 
(0.00) 
% change in Social Protection as % of GDP 312 21.89 0.74 62.02 8.37 
(0.00) 
 
 
                                                             
13
 This test is appropriate for sample sizes above N=50 and indicates the degree to which a distribution is 
statistically non-normal.  The purpose of this test is “to provide an index or test statistic to evaluate the 
supposed normality of a sample” (Shapiro-Wilk 1965); the null hypothesis is that the distribution is normal.  
The W’ test is not predicated upon scale or origin and therefore provides an effective measure of normality for 
a sample population.  The Shapiro-Francia test was developed from Shapiro & Wilk 1965 which accommodates 
larger sample sizes. 
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DENMARK 
Data Series N K W‘ V‘ Z 
(p) 
% change in Folketing seats by party 181 5.08 0.35 27.68 5.85 
(0.00) 
% change in Folketing votes by party 231 212.45 0.13 158.16 9.87 
(0.00) 
% change in industrial disputes 39 19.45 0.35 27.68 5.85 
(0.00) 
% change in Folketing speeches and bills 102 5.10 0.93 6.55 3.66 
(0.00) 
% change in Social Welfare as % of GDP 117 5.66 0.92 8.13 4.11 
(0.00) 
% change in Social Protection as % of GDP 207 9.67 0.87 21.75 6.19 
(0.00) 
 
 
 
THE NETHERLANDS 
Data Series 
N K W‘ V‘ 
Z 
(p) 
% change in Tweede Kamer seats by party 
208 7.40 0.82 29.44 
6.76 
(0.00) 
% change in Tweede Kamer votes by party 
256 7.45 0.82 35.31 
7.21 
(0.00) 
% change in Queen‘s Speeches  
65 23.30 0.60 25.18 
5.85 
(0.00) 
% change in Tweede Kamer debates & 
legislation 
88 16.43 0.55 36.30 
6.60 
(0.00) 
% change in Social Protection as % of GDP 
134 10.26 0.82 20.65 
5.87 
(0.00) 
 
In the input series, the high level of kurtosis for national election 
measures (percentage change in seats and percentage change in votes) is 
indicative of high rates of incumbency, meaning that from one election to the 
next, very little variation occurs in terms of the percentage of seats and/or votes 
received by each party.  For Ireland, finding that election results display 
leptokurtic distributions fits with expectations of the general domination of Irish 
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politics by two centrist parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael.  In Denmark, the 
effect is extremely pronounced when it comes to the percentage of votes received 
by each political party over time.   Danish politics have been largely controlled 
by coalitions of the center-right and center-left since the mid-1980s and ―Danish 
parties are characterized by mass membership and considerable discipline‖ 
(Frankland, 2009).  Since the number of parties that are able to participate in 
government is typically high, voter loyalty remains stable over time.  Dutch 
politics has also been strongly consensual for decades, often with broad 
governing coalitions, generating high rates of party incumbency.  On only three 
occasions since WWII has the Dutch Labor Party won enough votes to form a 
single party minority government; 1971, 1977, and 1982 (Dutch Statistics, 2009); 
otherwise more diverse coalitions have dominated.  As observed in other work on 
policy inputs, election results are typically subject to high kurtosis levels since 
political allegiance and vote shares generally shift only minimally over time 
(Baumgartner et al. 2009).  This finding is most clearly confirmed here in the 
case of Denmark, but equally so in Ireland and the Netherlands.   
As expected, the measures of industrial disputes also reveal strongly 
leptokurtic distributions. While powerful indicators of public dissatisfaction, 
industrial disputes are relatively uncommon events.  In neo-corporatist countries 
like Ireland, the Netherlands, and Denmark, industrial relations are largely 
controlled by national agreement; therefore, disputes represent highly 
significant breeches of corporatist arrangements.  Results for media coverage in 
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Ireland also reveal a strongly leptokurtic distribution; we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the distribution is normal.  These findings indicate that while 
attention to social welfare may be relatively low overall, it remains a consistent 
theme on the public agenda in Ireland, characterized by shifts of attention on 
the public agenda at moments of heightened or diminished salience.   
In the policy process series, the level of kurtosis is somewhat reduced as 
compared to the input process for Ireland and Denmark, but higher for the 
Netherlands.  The overall attention to social welfare policies as compared to all 
other policy issues is low; other issue items typically dominate government 
activity.  However, social welfare remains significant on the policy agenda year 
after year.  Discovering that friction levels are reduced in the Irish and Danish 
cases indicates that policy change at the procedural level may be more 
responsive to relevant and timely signals.  In the Netherlands, higher levels of 
friction are driven by the consensual nature of politics since governance by broad 
coalition limits opportunities for efficient policy change.  Moreover, the fact that 
Dutch government ministers are not allowed to hold seats in the parliament 
means that government policymakers are institutionally isolated from the 
electorate and perhaps less responsive to the public agenda.  Overall, the 
leptokurtic nature of these distributions indicates that, even at consistently 
relatively low levels of attention, these policy issues are characterized by a static 
place on the agenda.  While attention might be relatively consistent over the 
years, there are opportunities for dramatic policy shift when political and 
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economic factors combine to draw political attention to an issue in line with 
changing causal ideas.   
The annual percentage change in social protection spending as a 
percentage of GDP also displays high levels of kurtosis for all three countries.  
Social spending does not increase rapidly, even perhaps where required, given 
political competition over budget allocations and pressure to control government 
expenditure.  However, once increased, spending is unlikely to decline given the 
strong political attachment between social benefits and constituency support.  
Changes in social protection budgets are therefore highly punctuated.  Results 
below reveal highly static policies over time; however the effect varies across 
countries.  For Ireland, budget outputs are highly punctuated, whereas the 
Netherlands and Denmark display somewhat less leptokurtic distributions. 
Figures 1-6 present distribution results in the form of histograms for some 
of the policy data series measured above.  All of the histograms clearly 
demonstrate both stability and punctuated change with high ‗peaks‘ and ‗fat 
tails‘ for each distribution.  The vast majority of observations lay within +50 
percentage points of the mean value; for the social protection budgets, nearly the 
entire sample lies within +10% of the mean.  Rather than present histograms for 
every measure above, six distributions are displayed here as examples from each 
stage of the policy process.  The remaining distributions are presented in 
Appendix B.  Leptokurtosis is clearly evident in each of the figures; a normal 
distribution curve with a similar standard deviation is included for comparison. 
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FIGURE 1 & FIGURE 2: ANNUAL % CHANGE IN SEATS BY PARTY 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3 & FIGURE 4: PARLIAMENTARY LEGISLATION AND DEBATES 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5 & FIGURE 6: SOCIAL WELFARE SPENDING AS % OF GDP 
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Results presented in Table 4 and Figures 1-6 confirm the first hypothesis 
for all three countries and the second hypothesis for Ireland and Denmark only: 
European welfare policymaking is characterized by positive kurtosis and, while 
friction increases overall in all three countries, the procedural stage displays the 
lowest level of kurtosis over the three stages for Ireland and Denmark.  All 
distributions are clearly leptokurtic, as can be seen in the histograms displayed 
above, and the level of punctuation is significantly higher for the policy output 
process than for most input and policy processes.  The level of kurtosis generally 
remains high as the policy processes progresses, indicating high levels of friction 
and increased likelihood of punctuated change.   The hypothesis for increased 
levels of friction over the policy process is not convincingly confirmed, however, 
given that the change from input to process to output distributions does not 
show a consistent increase in kurtosis across all measures for each country.   
Kurtosis levels for the procedural process are lower in Ireland and Denmark, yet 
higher for the Netherlands, indicating that friction is likely to be politically 
influenced when it comes to legislative attention but not always in a consistent 
manner.  Results confirm that in even a difficult case, the policy process is 
generally resistant to change over time.   
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TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND OUTCOMES FOR HYPOTHESES 
Country Hypothesis I Hypothesis II 
Ireland High kurtosis across all measures 
Lower Procedural Friction 
relative to Input and Output 
Denmark High kurtosis across all measures 
Lower Procedural Friction 
relative to Input and Output 
The Netherlands High kurtosis across all measures 
Friction increases across all 
stages of the policy process 
 
To summarize, the results here demonstrate that policy input, procedural 
and output distributions are characterized by high levels of kurtosis, yet levels of 
friction do not increase steadily throughout the policy process.  With more than 
five hundred observations for the policy arena of social welfare and anti-poverty 
policies, it is clear that institutional stasis and punctuated change is 
characteristic of this single policy issue.  Moreover, this trend is present in all 
stages of the policy process, particularly in the policy input stage where the 
central limit theorem would suggest normality should prevail.  Budgetary 
outputs are also strongly resistant to change; annual allocation levels represent 
a predictable percentage of GDP.  The robustness of these findings is confirmed 
visually through histograms and with the results from the Shapiro-Francia non-
normality tests. 
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The analysis above demonstrates the punctuated nature of social welfare policies 
in three European countries, confirming that outcomes at each stage of the 
policy process are characterized by high levels of kurtosis, displaying highly 
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leptokurtic distributions. These findings confirm previous scholarship on 
punctuated equilibrium and reveal policy stasis across time and national 
contexts.  In the case of a single policy issue, similar outcomes prevail for social 
welfare policies as are found in aggregated policy data despite theoretical 
expectations that social expenditure might be a more responsive policy area 
given political attention to national economic conditions. Friction clearly 
contributes to the likelihood of minimalistic policy change over time, punctuated 
by dramatic shifts or ‗lurches‘ as policy catches up to a changing agenda.  Rather 
than a timely, responsive policy process, we observe highly punctuated jumps in 
attention.     
 Analysis here reveals a strong status quo bias in policymaking, indicating 
that change is nonexistent or major, rather than moderate and incremental.  In 
this sense, policy change in Ireland is contextualized by comparison to the 
Danish and Dutch cases.  Social welfare policies in all three countries confirm 
the presence of friction; Ireland is not unique in this regard.  In terms of the 
broader research question informing this study – what explains policy 
punctuation in the form of the introduction of Irish social partnership? – these 
findings imply that far reaching policy change in this case was the outcome of 
increasing levels of friction that suddenly gave way to radically new policies.  
Indeed, Baumgartner and Jones analogy to the natural science phenomenon of 
earthquakes implies that pressure must be building for some period of time 
before a powerful change occurs.  As shown in Figure 7, in the period 
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immediately preceding the introduction of social partnership, procedural friction 
was at its highest point in four years – however, friction in 1983 was also 
notably high.  Yet, we did not witness a corresponding dramatic change in social 
policy outcomes in 1983.  Likewise, from 1994 and 1997 when institutional 
friction was at its peak, we did not observe major change.  So, while we have 
certainly gained insight into friction in the policy process across three European 
countries, our understanding of policy change requires a more comprehensive 
approach when it comes to explaining specific episodes of transformation.     
 
FIGURE 7: FRICTION IN THE POLICY PROCESS: IRELAND 
 
 
While this chapter confirms the findings of Baumgartner and Jones et al 
(1993 – 2009), the results also indicate that policy issues have different 
trajectories over the course of the policy process.  Rather than proceed along a 
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linear path from input to procedure to output, with kurtosis increasing at each 
phase, political factors appear to contribute significantly to altering levels of 
friction in the procedural stage of the process.  This finding challenges the 
existing literature to better account for both the ecological fallacy introduced by 
policy aggregation and to evaluate the manner in which political variables alter 
policy trajectory.   The time series analysis in the next chapter utilizes these 
findings to explore the effects of politics on policy change in a more 
comprehensive way, connecting the stages of the policy process to the political 
environment within which policy change occurs. 
This chapter provides a useful baseline model for further interrogation of 
the punctuated equilibrium model.  Finding that a single policy issue displays 
similar levels of kurtosis over time suggests it may be more productive to start 
with a null hypothesis predicting punctuation rather than normality14.  The 
finding that policy outcomes are a function of existing friction in conjunction 
with unique political and economic factors demonstrates the need to 
disaggregate policy issues when considering policy change in a specific domain.  
Likewise, our empirical tests should be expanded to connect the stages of the 
process appropriately and incorporate the relevant environmental conditions 
affecting policy outcomes.  If we accept Baumgartner and Jones‘ prevailing 
thesis that governments are inefficient and actors are boundedly rational, our 
analysis must do a better job of recognizing institutional and environmental 
                                                             
14
 Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this insight. 
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conditions that contribute to policy friction and a bounded understanding of 
reality.   
Kurtosis measures displayed here show the rate of change from one period 
to the next, confirming periods of consistency and departure from the norm in 
policymaking.  But more detailed quantitative measurements are necessary to 
gain leverage on how political attention specifically translates into policy 
outcomes.  The findings also suggest that additional qualitative evaluation is 
critical here; consistently low, but positive discourse about a policy issue may 
well have a different effect than erratic, highly negative attention.  Uncovering 
the relevant causal stories in conjunction with observable friction that contribute 
to episodes of dramatic policy change requires more qualitative assessments.   
This chapter has taken the first step in evaluating the effects of friction on policy 
outcomes; the next considers the political and economic setting more specifically; 
the final empirical analysis explores the relevant causal stories in use by 
political actors to fully connect the three strands defining policy punctuations.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT? 
 EXPLANATIONS FOR CHANGING IRISH SOCIAL POLICY 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Findings from the previous chapter confirm that European policymaking 
institutions display levels of friction and resistance to change similar to those 
that have been observed in other policy settings.  Moreover, the results indicate 
that a single policy issue, social welfare, behaves in a fashion comparable to 
much broader collections of policy items, yet with particular differences in each 
national context.  These results provide strong evidence of policy stubbornness, 
even in a case where friction might be expected to be lower from the input to 
output phases given the level political attention paid to national economic well 
being.  However, discovering that policy change is largely static may be 
somewhat unsurprising given the extensive literature on policy stasis and 
institutional stickiness (Baumgartner and Jones et al, 1993-2009; Pierson 1996; 
2007).  Policies are recognizably conditioned by the institutional structures 
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within which they are created and finding that institutions are stubborn and 
resistant to change over time lends itself to tautology.  Institutions, by their very 
nature, are engineered to last.  Instead, friction in the policy process may be 
more usefully operationalized as an independent variable, a casual mechanism 
for explaining policy inertia, in conjunction with underlying economic and 
political factors.  The three countries in the previous chapter each displayed 
different policy trajectories over time, indicating that additional analysis is 
required to uncover the specific causal mechanisms at work in affecting policy 
change.  After confirming the presence of friction in the policymaking process, 
this chapter extends our understanding of policy change by directly testing the 
effects of changes in friction on policy outcomes.   The central questions explored 
here are to what extent are variations in Irish social welfare policy a function of 
standard economic and political explanations attributed to a liberal welfare 
state?  How does procedural friction contribute to that explanation?  Finally, 
how much explanatory power is gained for understanding significant episodes of 
policy punctuation?     
 In relation to the broader goals of this research, this chapter seeks to 
address functional explanations for policy change in the area of social welfare.  
While findings for the institutional friction model provide clear evidence that 
policymaking in Ireland is, indeed, punctuated, we gain little insight into the 
specific causal mechanisms leading to the dramatic policy change in 1987.  
Clearly, economic and political factors were key to these events; ideally 
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operationalization of these factors will offer some leverage on an explanation.   
As mentioned in the introduction, this line of inquiry provides ample opportunity 
beyond the case of Ireland. Across Europe, periods of economic growth and 
recession, as well as changing political landscapes, have generated a parallel 
experience in social policies.  However, as discussed above, Ireland is unique in 
having embedded its social policy decision making directly in the partnership 
agreement, unlike most European nations.  The reasoning behind the decision to 
incorporate social policy in the agreement in 1987 is a consistent theme in this 
research; this chapter considers this process against the background of the 
economic and political environment of the day.  Ultimately, arguments for both 
institutional friction and functionalism are left wanting; causal ideas are at the 
heart of this remarkable policy change.     
In this chapter, I develop a time series analysis to examine the effects of 
both past and present levels of institutional friction as well as environmental 
conditions on policy outcomes for social protection expenditure in Ireland.  I 
advance the empirical evaluation through time series analysis, connecting 
friction in the procedural process to budgetary outcomes.  In Baumgartner and 
Jones et al.‘s (2009) analysis, the levels of friction are disconnected between 
stages, meaning that the contributions of an earlier stage to later episodes of 
policy change are empirically underspecified.  The presence of high or low 
friction in the procedural phase, for example, might alter outcomes in the 
subsequent stage.  In addition, I included the effects of political and economic 
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factors on policy change in the analysis in order to facilitate the identification of 
windows of opportunity where institutional and environmental changes coincide.  
Political party influence, election cycles, economic growth or recession, changing 
rates of inflation are all factors that might correspond with the level of friction 
present at a given point in time.  The variables are operationalized in my model 
as independent controls on the effect of friction in the policy process, meaning we 
can quantify the combined effect of these factors on policy change.  The 
remaining empirical chapter will analyze what I argue to be the final steps in a 
punctuated policy process: the contribution of causal ideas to episodes of 
dramatic policy change.   
 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON POLICY CHANGE  
As discussed in the introduction, the literature on social welfare spending 
attributes changes in government policy to a number of potential causes: the 
level of unemployment, rate of inflation, size of the dependent population, 
economic development, tax revenue, union membership, voter turnout, trade 
openness, and neo-corporatist agreements.  Much research in this area focuses 
on policy outcomes as a function of the economic need and the corresponding 
state capacity as explanations for changes in welfare spending (Pampel and 
Williamson, 1989).  As the size of the dependent population, including children 
and the elderly, increases, corresponding budgetary allocations are expected to 
rise.  Likewise with higher rates of inflation, voter turnout, and union 
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membership – all lead to higher levels of spending.  Finally, globalization and 
openness to trade are expected to lead to higher social protection in 
compensation for international competition. While the literature on globalization 
also foresees international trade generating downward pressure on welfare, 
smaller states like Ireland have often maintained a more compensatory stance 
(Rhodes, 1996; Katzenstein, 1985), particularly with the introduction of social 
partnerships in the face of a global trend towards retrenchment.  Indeed, very 
little in the literature indicates factors likely to decrease rates of social 
protection, apart from periods of economic recession and more conservative 
political leadership.   However, even conservatives are not immune to welfare 
spending, as observed in the post-war consensus and Keynesian economic 
policies across much of 1950-60s Europe (Hall, 1993).   
While each of the economic variables above appears to contribute to the 
level of social welfare spending in industrialized countries, the literature does 
not present a clear consensus on the specific role of politics in affecting these 
policy changes.  State capacity is connected to the generation of tax revenue and 
external revenue, conditioned by political factors, public pressure, and neo-
corporatist structures.  In the late 1970s, several authors approached this 
question, attempting to empirically link partisanship, bureaucracy, voter 
preferences and neo-corporatist structures to welfare policies (Cameron, 1978; 
Castles and McKinlay, 1979; Stephens, 1979), although the early work was often 
criticized for small sample sizes and unreliable results (Hicks and Swank, 1992). 
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Research concerning the role of the state and political institutions on 
welfare spending expanded significantly in the mid-1980s and 1990s (Lijphart, 
1984; Evans, Reuschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985; Baldwin, 1990; Hicks and 
Swank, 1992).  Findings highlight the role of partisanship, the strength of 
left/center-left blocs and neo-corporatist institutions as predictors of more 
expansive welfare states.  Electoral competition, whether in majoritarian 
systems where parties seek to capture median voters, or in proportional 
representation systems where competitors outspend one another, welfare 
platforms are generally expansive (Pampel and Williamson, 1989; Persson and 
Tabellini, 2003).  Finally, Gøsta Esping-Andersen‘s work (1990) connects welfare 
spending to economic and political realities and cultural predispositions: a 
complex integration of societal norms, institutional organization and historical 
forces (Esping-Andersen, 1990). However, the translation of socio-political 
classification into policy outcomes, particularly over time and changing political 
and economic circumstances, relies on causal mechanisms that are 
underdeveloped in Esping-Andersen‘s framework. Ultimately, only a generalized 
picture of each nation‘s likelihood for welfare generosity emerges with regard to 
both economic and political factors; stronger leftist representation in more 
socially egalitarian society translates into a larger social protection budget.   
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THE CASE OF IRELAND 
While the baseline model in the previous chapter included three European 
countries, data here reflect only the Republic of Ireland from 1980 to present 
day.  As indicated in earlier findings, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands 
each followed a different trajectory with regard to social welfare over the course 
of the policy process suggesting that politics plays a specific role in each country 
rather than just generally contributing to overall friction.  The analysis here 
focuses on Ireland for three significant reasons: Ireland‘s status as a ‗Liberal‘ 
welfare state; Ireland‘s historically weak political left; and Ireland‘s unique 
experiment with social partnership. Given these factors, social welfare 
expenditure in Ireland presents a difficult test for the policy punctuation 
literature.  These factors contribute to the expectation of minimalistic policy 
change and changes that are more socially and economically conservative in 
nature.  First, Ireland is typically classified as a ‗Liberal‘, ‗Anglo-Saxon‘ or 
‗British‘ welfare state in the majority of the literature on welfare typologies, 
meaning social provisions are expected to be minimalist; a social safety net 
rather than a socially egalitarian redistribution program (Esping-Andersen, 
1990; Leibfried, 1992; also Ferrara 1996; Bonoli, 1997; and Korpi and Palme, 
1998 as cited in Arts and Gelissen 2002), but the reasoning behind this 
classification overlooks the role of the Catholic Church in maintaining social 
protection via charity and volunteerism.   While the clustering of welfare states 
in these typologies may accurately reflect Ireland‘s traditional spending 
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patterns, the socio-cultural aspects of a traditionally Catholic society have 
played a significant role in welfare provision over time.   Since the 1960s, the 
influence of the Church has diminished, making the government increasingly 
responsible for social welfare provisions and potentially more responsive to 
social need.  Earlier periods of policy stasis were likely as related to the presence 
of the Church in the policy process as to a Liberal social welfare tradition.   
 Next, the political left in Ireland has been less influential in affecting 
levels of social spending relative to expectations from the literature for similar 
cases (Mair, 1987; Marsh, 2003).  For example, welfare spending rates were high 
during the 1970s and ‗80s due to recessionary spending and international 
borrowing, despite a weak, disorganized left bloc.    While the political left was 
weak, trade unionism has filled that gap, masking the effect and generating 
pressure on the government for broader social policies until the Labour party 
become more prominent in 1992.   In many ways, the role of the unions has been 
to carry the banner for social provision where the Labour party has been unable 
to do so: rates of union membership mirror social spending almost exactly until 
the early 2000s (see graphs below).   
Moreover, Fianna Fáil has typically appealed to all sectors of society, 
including workers, through broadly populist policies that keep many labor 
platforms on the agenda even if Labour ministers were not in government.   
Indeed, Fianna Fáil‘s strategy has been cited as ―seeking a special relationship 
with labour to cover an electoral flank‖ (O‘Donnell and Thomas, 2002).  In the 
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1980s and ‗90s, the Labour party only gained access to government as a junior 
partner in coalition with either Fine Gael or Fianna Fáil.   But as the Irish party 
system has moved away from traditional moorings established during the civil 
war era, including Sinn Féin returning from the fringe as a viable political party 
in the Republic of Ireland and the entry into government by the Green party in 
2007 in coalition with Fianna Fáil, the effect of the political left is certainly 
increasing, prompting greater attention to social welfare.   At the same time, 
union membership has consistently fallen over the past three decades.  The 
transition of greater political power to a rising left in Ireland is only very 
recently a serious consideration for social welfare outcomes.   
 
FIGURE 8: SOCIAL SPENDING RATES AND SEATS FOR THE LEFT 1980-2009 
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Figure 8 and Figure 9 provide a comparison of social welfare spending in 
Ireland over the last thirty years. Figure 8 shows the spending rates as 
compared to the relative political power of the Irish left.   Figure 9 compares 
spending rates and the density of union membership in Ireland.   As is clearly 
evident from these two figures, the rate of social welfare spending has been 
intimately linked with union membership for the past three decades, while the 
power of the political left is only recently significantly correlated.   
 
FIGURE 9: SOCIAL SPENDING RATES AND UNION DENSITY 1980-2009 
 
 
Finally, the neo-corporatist model introduced in Ireland in the late 1980s 
solidified the role of the social partners in policymaking, economic planning and 
social protection.  Irish social partnership includes relevant actors not only from 
employers and unions, but also from farmers, community/voluntary groups, 
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environmental actors and government.  Moreover, partnership has taken on a 
unique multi-tiered, multi-layered approach in Ireland, encompassing 
organizations at the national, regional and local level.   Particularly in the area 
of anti-poverty programs, much recent government policy has been delivered via 
partnership at every level of governance.  Until the current period of instability, 
each successive social partnership agreement has brought the different economic 
sectors closer, into ever more binding arrangements, particularly during the 
economic boom of the 1990s.   
However, welfare budgets continue to display significant variation even 
after seven successive partnership agreements, contrary to expectations in the 
scholarly literature on social protection (Evans, Reuschemeyer and Skocpol, 
1985; Baldwin, 1990; Lijphart, 1999).   The conventional expectation is that neo-
corporatism creates a stronger welfare state and a more socially egalitarian 
society.  In fact, some authors argue that in Ireland, ―far from being a form of 
social democratic concertative mechanism between capital and labour, social 
partnership has been used as a vehicle for imposing a neoliberal agenda‖, 
reducing welfare spending after securing compliance from the relevant economic 
sectors (Kirby, 2008).  The tension between neo-liberal retrenchment and neo-
corporatist promotion of welfare in Ireland creates an opportunity for very 
dynamic policy change.  In some ways, the policy outcomes of 1987 may be 
viewed as the natural outcome of a neo-liberal economic agenda, rather than an 
expansive social democratic model as found in Scandinavian countries.  
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However, the inclusion of the social pillar in the partnership agreements implies 
a greater commitment to social inclusion than more narrowly concentrated 
countries like Germany, Spain or France.  Whether social policy change in 
Ireland displays expected outcomes, and more importantly, whether punctuated 
policy change can be accounted for in a traditional model, is the subject of the 
following analysis.     
 
DATA AND METHODS 
In order to test my theory of policy punctuations in social welfare spending for 
the Irish case, I have conducted a time series analysis using an autoregressive 
distributed-lag model.  The models displayed here contain both short-run and 
medium term multipliers.  For the empirical analysis I have operationalized a 
series of institutional, economic and political indicators.  Data included here 
span the time period of 1980 to 2009, years for which complete and comparable 
data are readily available.  I observe the effects of friction in the decision making 
process in conjunction with political variables, such as the share of seats in the 
Dáil controlled by left leaning parties and election year cycles, to evaluate the 
effects of institutions and environment on policy outcomes.  I control for 
economic indicators, including the consumer price index and trade openness.  
Models III and IV include the same variables, but the dependent variable 
measures annual changes in social spending (Model III) and social spending as a 
percentage of GDP (Model IV), with appropriately lagged dependent variables 
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included in the model.  The table below lists each of the variables that are 
included in the final model, their measurement specifications and sources.   
 
 
TABLE 6: SUMMARY OF VARIABLES15 
Variable Measurement Source 
Total Annual Welfare 
Spending 1980 – 2009 
(DV) 
Logarithmic values of annual 
spending and annual spending as a 
percentage of GDP at t and t-1 
Irish Department of 
Finance; Irish Central 
Statistics Office; Irish 
Welfare Department 
Change in Total Annual 
Welfare Spending ‘1980 
– 2009 (DV) 
Year to year change in annual 
social spending and spending as a 
percentage of GDP at t and t-1 
Irish Department of 
Finance; Irish Central 
Statistics Office; Irish 
Welfare Department 
Institutional Friction Kurtosis Scores from the procedural 
stage of the policy process 
measured at t and t -1 
Authors calculations 
Seat Share of the 
Left/Center Left 
Annual percentage of seats held in 
the Dáil by the Labour, Green, 
Socialist, and Sinn Fein parties at t 
Irish Central Statistics 
Office & 
Authors calculations  
Election Cycle Dummy variable for the year 
preceding and year of national 
general elections  
Irish Central Statistics 
Office & 
Authors calculations 
Consumer Price Index Annual Irish consumer price index 
measured at t-1 
Irish Central Statistics 
Office 2009 
 
Trade Openness Annual ratio of trade to GDP 
measured at t-1 
OECD National 
Statistics 2009 
 
Total Annual Receipts 
from the EU 
Annual receipts from the EU as an 
overall percentage of GDP at t-1 
Irish Central Statistics  
Office 2009 
 
Total Annual Tax 
Revenue 
Annual tax revenue received as 
percentage of GDP at t-1 
Irish Central Statistics 
Office 2009 
 
 
                                                             
15
 Additional variables, such as union membership, the relative size of the older and dependent populations, 
voter turnout, unemployment rates, GPD per capita growth rates, and other measures were tested in similar 
regression models.  In most cases, multi-collinearity presented an insurmountable statistical problem, and 
variables were necessarily dropped from the model.  
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The time series models are depicted in the following equations: 
Model I & II: 
Δ Annual Social Spendingt or Δ Annual Social Spending as % of GDPt = α 
+ βAnnual Social Spendingt-1 + βFrictiont + βFrictiont-1 + βLeft Seats 
Sharet + βElection Cyclet + βConsumer Price Indext-1 + βTrade to GDP 
Ratiot-1 + βEU Revenuet-1 βTax Revenuet-1 + ε  
 
Model III & IV: 
Δ Annual Change in Social Spendingt or Δ Annual Change in Social 
Spending as % of GDPt = α + βAnnual Social Spending as % of GDPt-1 + 
βFrictiont + βFrictiont-1 + βLeft Seats Sharet + βElection Cyclet + 
βConsumer Price Indext-1 + βTrade to GDP Ratiot-1 + βEU Revenuet-1 βTax 
Revenuet-1 +ε 
 
Autoregressive distributed lag models account for both past and 
contemporaneous values of the dependent and independent variables.  In the 
models that follow, I operationalize four different dependent variables.  The first 
model includes the logged value of the annual social welfare budget; the second 
model uses the annual social welfare budget as a percentage of Ireland‘s gross 
domestic product.  Both models include a lagged value of these respective 
variables on the right-hand side of the equation.  These two dependent variables 
measure the annual level of social protection, measuring the total amount 
committed to social welfare by the Irish government over a thirty year period.   
In the case of social welfare spending, last year‘s budget is expected to be the 
strongest predictor of current levels of spending; this assumption fits with 
theoretical models developed in the previous and present chapters.   Models III 
and IV use dependent variables to evaluate the change in social welfare 
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spending and spending as a percentage of GDP.   These models measure the 
extent to which the Irish government decided to increase or decrease their 
commitment to welfare spending.  In particular, the change in spending as an 
overall percentage of GDP is especially notable given the thirty year increase in 
GDP growth Ireland experienced over this time period.    
The remaining contemporary and lagged values included in the model are 
those I argue to be theoretically significant contributors to observable changes in 
social spending.  First, given the naturally slow pace of parliamentary activity, I 
include both present and past levels of kurtosis in the procedural processes as a 
predictor of current policy outcomes.   I expect that higher levels of institutional 
friction in the procedural stage of the process will lower the level of social 
spending in the outcome phase, particularly spending relative to GDP as other 
budget items compete for the attention of lawmakers.  Where friction eases, 
dramatic changes in policy become more likely as social welfare rises on the 
political agenda.  The model includes two additional political variables: the share 
of seats controlled by the center left/left in the Dáil and a dummy variable for 
election cycles.  As described above, the political left in Ireland has been 
underdeveloped until recently as a result of the historical alignments with civil 
war era ideologies.  While the trade union movement has accommodated 
traditional demands placed on the political left, decreasing rates of union 
membership have provided a significant opportunity for the left to expand their 
social welfare platforms.  Over time, I expect that an increasing level of 
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representation by the left will be positively associated with higher social 
protection spending.  Likewise, during election cycles I expect welfare spending 
to increase. Social spending typically increases in countries with proportional 
representation prior to the election as a way of generating political support from 
broader coalitions of voters (Persson and Tabellini, 2003).  This suggestion 
resonates with the Irish case in particular as voters are increasingly considered 
―open to competition‖ or ideologically available (Marsh, 2003). Since the 
incentives for government to increase spending are at their peak in the period 
immediately prior to the elections, I have included both the year before and the 
year of national general elections in this study.   
  The regression models included here use two additional variables to 
control for national economic need and state capacity.  While several additional 
variables could have been included in the analysis, the consumer price index and 
the national trade to GDP ratio represent two key indicators.  The consumer 
price index, a measure of annual inflation, has played a significant part in Irish 
politics over the past fifty years.  Before the introduction of Irish social 
partnership in 1987, the inflation rate fluctuated between ten and twenty 
percent annually.   The consumer price index is an often mentioned subject in 
government debates and a frequent point of conflict between political parties.  In 
the area of social welfare, the inflation rate is of particular importance since 
increasing prices can significantly reduce the real value of welfare payments.  I 
expect that increasing consumer prices will lead to larger social protection 
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budgets.  The second economic measure, the trade to GDP ratio, is the sum of 
total exports and imports divided by GDP, measuring openness to the world 
economy (OECD, 2009).  This measure is of particular importance for Ireland as 
it indicates the national dependency on foreign trade for economic growth, a 
large factor in generating the revenue needed for government expenditure, 
including social welfare spending.  Moreover, trade openness has often been 
associated with higher demand for social protection as both citizens and 
domestic industries are exposed to more international trade.  Both increased 
state capacity and pressure for greater protection make trade openness a key 
factor in explaining changes in social welfare spending; I argue that more 
openness will lead to more welfare support. 
To summarize my expectations for the analysis that follows, I outline five 
hypotheses with regard to the conditional effects of institutional, political and 
economic factors:  
   
H1: As friction in the policy process increases, spending will decrease 
H2:  As the seat share of the left rises, social welfare spending will increase 
H3: During election cycles, social welfare spending will increase 
H4: As the consumer price index rises, social welfare spending will increase 
H5: As trade openness increases, social welfare spending will increase 
H6: As EU revenue increases, social welfare spending will increase 
H7: As total tax revenue increases, social welfare spending will increase 
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RESULTS  
Table 7 below provides regression results for the first two models predicting 
annual social spending and annual social spending as a percentage of GDP.  
Findings in the first model indicate that present levels of friction in the 
procedural stage of policymaking are negative and significant for predicting 
current levels of social spending, while election cycles, inflationary, trade and 
EU revenue variables all demonstrate positive and significant effects.  The 
lagged value of total social spending is included to account for autoregressive 
effects.  This variable is significant, as expected, but does not overcome the 
significance of the other indicators, meaning that the pressure for continuity is 
overcome by changes in other environmental factors. Model II shows the results 
for social spending as a percentage of GDP over time.  Here, it is the lagged 
value of procedural friction that is significant.  While the election cycle and the 
consumer price index remain positive and significant, this model demonstrates a 
surprisingly negative effect for total tax revenue.  Contrary to expectations, an 
increase in tax revenue does not lead to increased social spending in the 
subsequent year‘s budget as an overall percentage of GDP.    Again, the lagged 
value of the dependent variable controls for autoregressive effects and is positive 
and significant.    
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TABLE 7: PREDICTORS OF ANNUAL SOCIAL SPENDING16 AND SPENDING AS % OF GDP 
 
Model 1: 
Annual Social 
Spending (logged) 
Model II: 
Annual Social 
Spending as % of 
GDP 
Lagged Total Social Spending  
1.03** 
(0.02) 
 
Lagged Social Spending as % of GDP  
1.12** 
(0.16) 
Friction in the Policy Process 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
Lagged Friction in the Policy Process 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.12* 
(0.06) 
Share of Left/Center-Left Dáil Seats 
0.0003 
(0.0007) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Election Cycle Dummy 
0.02** 
(0.006) 
0.48** 
(0.24) 
Lagged Consumer Price Index Rate 
0.01** 
(0.002) 
0.06* 
(0.04) 
Lagged Trade to GDP Ratio 
0.001** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.01) 
Lagged EU Revenue 
0.02** 
(0.006) 
0.05 
(0.12) 
Lagged Tax Revenue 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.22* 
(0.11) 
Constant 
-0.42 
(0.30) 
4.77 
(4.73) 
R-squared 0.9997 0.9646 
Adj R-squared 0.9995 0.9458 
N 27 27 
   Significance:  †p > 0.1 *p>0.05 **p>0.01 
 
                                                             
16
 The measure of annual social spending in the models presented here represents the discretionary spending 
available to Government for all social welfare benefits.  Overall national socially related spending, including 
education, housing, health care and other statutory provisions are used as the dependent variable in models 
to confirm robustness presented in Appendix C. 
82 
 
Highly notable in both models is the effect of friction in the procedural 
process on social spending rates17.  When friction is increased, the level of social 
spending is significantly decreased. The effect for social spending as a 
percentage of GDP is more pronounced for the lagged measure of procedural 
friction.  The lagged consumer price indicator is positive and significant, as 
expected, confirming the likelihood of increased social protection in the presence 
of economic pressure.  The lagged trade to GDP ratio and EU revenue measures 
show significant results in the first model, indicating that capacity and demand 
play an important role in determining the overall government protection budget.  
Finally, the lagged tax revenue variable in negative and significant in the second 
model, indicating higher tax revenues do not translate into higher social 
spending as an overall percentage of GDP.   Findings here suggest that friction, 
political and economic factors are key, not only for explaining levels of social 
protection, but expenditure relative to national GDP.  This finding is especially 
significant as social protection budgets have generally failed to keep pace with 
rapid GDP growth over the past thirty years in Ireland (Kirby, 2008); clearly 
certain environmental factors contribute to policymaking that seek to narrow 
that gap18. 
                                                             
17
 All four models were pre-tested without the procedural friction variables (both contemporary and lagged) as 
a test of the validity of the complete model.  In all four models, control variables are significant before the 
introduction of friction measures, indicating that the departure from parsimony represented by their inclusion 
in the final complete model is beneficial to our analysis.    
18
 An additional measure that could be considered here is overall government debt relative to GDP.  However, 
measures of annual social spending and the debt/GDP ratio are highly correlated, leading to insurmountable 
problems of multicollinearity in the models presented here.   
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 Figure 10 provides a graphic depiction of the regression results shown 
above, clearly demonstrating the relationship between the logged value of total 
social spending and procedural friction within 90% confidence intervals.  As 
procedural friction increases, the level of social welfare spending decreases 
significantly: 8.64 to 8.55 (logged value) when observed from minimum to 
maximum levels of friction.   
 
FIGURE 10: ANNUAL SOCIAL SPENDING (LOGGED) AND PROCEDURAL FRICTION 
(WITH 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 below also portrays the significant effect of procedural friction.  From 
a friction score of one (the lowest score, indicating a frictionless policymaking 
environment) to a maximum score of 11, the overall percentage of GDP spent on 
social welfare decreases by nearly 2%.   
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FIGURE 11: ANNUAL SOCIAL SPENDING AS % OF GDP AND PROCEDURAL FRICTION 
(WITH 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Regression results in Table 8 reflect the effects of institutional, political 
and economic variables on annual changes in social protection.  Results here 
mirror many of the findings above, most significantly the effects of procedural 
friction for overall annual changes in spending.  The dependent variable in 
Model III, annual changes in social spending, measures the degree of yearly 
budgetary shift rather than pure levels of output.  Higher levels of friction, 
therefore, correlate to smaller changes in social welfare budgets – a finding that 
fits with expected theories on policy punctuation and institutional stickiness.  
The election cycle variable remains significant here.  Also, the trade to GDP 
ratio is positive and significant, confirming the effects of capacity and demand in 
changes in social spending.  The EU revenue variable has a notably strong effect, 
reducing the annual changes in social protection.  Acting much like the 
procedural friction variable, this measure indicates that higher revenue from EU 
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leads to lower rates of change in Irish social protection budgets.  In both models, 
the lagged values of the dependent variable are significant, controlling for 
autoregressive effects.  
 
TABLE 8: PREDICTORS OF CHANGES IN SOCIAL SPENDING AND CHANGE AS % OF GDP  
 
Model III 
Annual Change in 
Social Spending 
Model IV: 
Annual Change in 
Social Spending as 
 % of GDP 
Lagged Annual Change in Social Spending  
0.49** 
(0.17) 
 
Lagged Change in Spending as % of GDP  
0.29** 
(0.14) 
Friction in the Policy Process 
-71.47** 
(34.52) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
Lagged Friction in the Policy Process 
-25.55 
(35.61) 
-0.14** 
(0.05) 
Share of Left/Center-Left Dáil Seats 
15.32 
(12.23) 
-0.009 
(0.02) 
Election Cycle Dummy 
442.83** 
(123.19) 
0.54** 
(0.17) 
Lagged Consumer Price Index Rate 
20.89 
(19.36) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
Lagged Trade to GDP Ratio 
9.64* 
(5.39) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
Lagged EU Revenue 
-151.60* 
(86.19) 
0.17* 
(0.09) 
Lagged Tax Revenue 
26.81 
(60.99) 
-0.21** 
(0.08) 
Constant 
-1414.54 
(2744.79) 
7.33** 
(3.38) 
R-squared 0.9345 0.8295 
Adj R-squared 0.8977 0.7336 
N 26 26 
  Significance:  †p > 0.1   *p>0.05   **p>0.01 
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 In Model IV, lagged procedural friction is again significant: higher levels 
of past friction lead to lower rates of change relative to national GDP.  The 
remaining political and economic variables are significant, with the exception of 
the center/left party share and the trade to GDP ratio.   However, the EU 
revenue variable becomes positive in this model, indicating that increased 
revenue streams might lead to higher rates of positive change in allocation of 
social spending relative to overall GDP.   This finding is consistent with that of 
Model III in that increased revenue decreased the likelihood of negative 
spending changes in annual social welfare and increased revenue in Model IV 
increases the likelihood of positive spending changes in welfare relative to GDP.   
Consistent with Model II, the overall tax revenue indicator is negative and 
significant.     
 
 
FIGURE 12: CHANGE IN ANNUAL SOCIAL SPENDING AND PROCEDURAL FRICTION 
(WITH 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS) 
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 Figure 12 relates changes in social welfare spending to increasing levels of 
procedural friction, again indicating a significant effect.  The substantive effect 
on the social welfare budget is clearly evident in this graph: for every increase in 
the level of procedural friction, the associated decrease is nearly €100 million.  
From the lowest to the highest level of friction, the overall change in social 
protection is a decrease of over €700 million in spending. 
In Figure 13, the overall change in social spending as a percentage of GDP 
is particularly notable as increasingly levels of procedural friction are 
demonstrably correlated with a negative change in spending patterns relative to 
GDP, or a shrinking of social welfare budgets.  Therefore, social protection 
represents not only a smaller percentage of GDP when friction is on the rise, but 
also sees a negative year-to-year change. 
 
FIGURE 13: CHANGE IN SOCIAL SPENDING AS % OF GDP AND PROCEDURAL FRICTION 
(WITH 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS) 
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DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The time series analysis presented here used findings from the first empirical 
chapter to explore the effects of politics on policy change in a more 
comprehensive way, connecting the stages of the policy process to the political 
environment within which policy change occurs. Evidence from the tables and 
figures above provide support for most of the hypotheses above: overall, friction 
decreases both the level of and changes in social protection spending while other 
political and economic variables have a clear impact on annual budgets.    
Election cycles have had an increasingly significant effect on the annual level of 
welfare spending total and relative to GDP, consistent with theoretical 
expectations.  Likewise, increases in the consumer price index and national 
openness to trade are both significant for predicting rising levels of welfare 
spending.  However, EU revenue and national tax revenue have inconsistent 
and, at times, opposite effects on social spending.  Most importantly, while the 
effect of the political and economic variables varies somewhat across all four 
models, the effect of friction remains significant across all regression results.     
This study has begun to uncover the specific mechanisms at work across 
stages of the policy process within a single policy arena over an extended period 
of time by examining the conditional political and economic factors at work.  
Regression analyses above confirm that social policies are subject to significant 
pressure from exogenous factors including institutional resistance and 
environmental conditions.  In the case of Irish social policies, it is clear that the 
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policy stages are resistant to change, yet tempered by specific economic and 
social conditions.  The previous two chapters have confirmed theories of 
institutional stasis and change by examining Irish institutions inimical to 
change, demonstrating the level of friction present at each phase of the policy 
process, and exploring the contribution of political and economic indicators.  
Empirical work has confirmed the punctuated nature of Irish social policies and 
the effect of environmental conditions on social policy outcomes; the next step is 
to examine a specific episode of policy change, the introduction of social 
partnership, via the use of causal stories.  It is plausible to suggest that the 
policy arena, particularly with regard to poverty and social exclusion, may be 
subject to periods of policy innovation, where a popular solution, such as social 
partnership, rises on the agenda during a period of punctuation.  How new policy 
ideas translate into policy outcomes is the subject of the research that follows.
 Figures 14 and 15 provide a visual account of the effect of procedural 
friction on annual social spending and changes in annual social protection 
budgets, as demonstrated in the regression results above.  Where kurtosis levels 
are at their highest, the social protection budgets and changes in budget 
allocations are significantly diminished.  Where kurtosis levels dip, welfare 
budgets typically have higher rates of change.     
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FIGURE 14:  ANNUAL SOCIAL SPENDING RELATIVE TO PROCEDURAL FRICTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 15: ANNUAL CHANGES IN SOCIAL SPENDING AS % OF GDP  
RELATIVE TO PROCEDURAL FRICTION 
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 Most notable from these graphs are four periods of dramatic change in 
kurtosis: 1980-84, 1986-88, 1995-98 and 2005-09.  In the first instance, political 
turbulence was highly pronounced, with three elections over the course of 
eighteen months.  Friction in the procedural process here indicates a strong 
status quo bias, meaning that the level of attention paid to social welfare issues 
was extremely consistent over this period.  In the second period, Fianna Fáil 
won the general election, introduced social partnership and produced an episode 
of consistent attention to social welfare issues.  In this case, the status quo is a 
near permanent place for social policy on the agenda.   While Fianna Fáil won 
the general election in 1997 as well, the level of friction was extremely high.  
Social policy and partnership were consistent agenda items during this period as 
the Partnership 2000 agreement was in the negotiation process.  Finally, in 
2007, the elections produced more varied results, including the entry into 
government by the Irish Green party.  Lower kurtosis levels here are indicative 
of the political discourse surrounding social welfare, as well as other topical 
issues, becoming more responsive to normal ups and downs of the political 
agenda.  This means that social policy rose and fell more fluidly on the agenda, 
according to salience.      
 What the regression results above fail to explain are the series of potential 
and actual policy punctuations that appear in these graphs.  While, over time, 
the general trend in social welfare spending in Ireland follows expected 
predictions from the literature – all of my above hypotheses are confirmed – a 
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simple explanation for the events of 1987 is still absent.  The introduction of 
social partnership coincided with dramatic cuts in the social welfare budgets, 
rather than increased levels with spending typically expected with the 
consolidation of neo-corporatist institutions.  As shown in the graph below, 1987 
marks a turning point in social expenditure in Ireland relative to national GDP. 
  
FIGURE 16: SOCIAL SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP COMPARED TO ANNUAL GDP 
 
 
 While sympathetic to labor and the unions, the incoming Fianna Fáil 
government of 1987 was hardly leftist and the Labour Party, in fact, lost seats in 
that election.  The decision to create a social partnership was clearly not driven 
by pressure from an organized political left.    The consumer price index, having 
peaked in 1981 at 20.4%, was steadily declining by the time social partnership 
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was introduced.  Likewise, the trade to GDP ratio had steadily improved through 
the 1980s; while not yet approaching the levels reached in the Celtic Tiger 
economic boom, signs of economic improvement through international trade were 
on the horizon.   
 In addition, Figures 14 and 15 reveal other episodes of shifting friction 
where policy breakthroughs might have also occurred, but did not.  In the early 
1980s, arguably when economic and political conditions were at their worst, no 
radical social policy outcomes are present.  During the economic boom, the sharp 
drop in friction in 1997 with the return to power by Bertie Ahern and Fianna 
Fáil was not accompanied by remarkable social change.  And today, we are 
arguably witnessing another episode of policy punctuation, with the return of 
economic recession and a period of low friction.  While it is too early to fully 
analyze the collapse of social partnership in the past two years, in some ways the 
collapse of social partnership today is more in line with the expectations of the 
literature on social welfare than the introduction of partnership was thirty years 
ago: a center-right coalition government facing challenging economic times with 
mounting budget deficits seems more likely to eliminate binding agreements 
that protect industry and unions from necessary market adjustments.  So, why 
then, did a Fianna Fáil government under very similar circumstances choose an 
alternative course in 1987?  The final empirical chapter reveals the power of 
causal ideas when undertaking dramatic policy change.     
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
IRISH SOCIAL POLICY: THE NARRATIVE OF CHANGE 
 
 
―The Programme for National Recovery showed what can be done 
when we work together to improve our standard of living and social 
equity.  A small trading economy cannot prosper with divisive and 
competing interests‖  
     - Charles J. Haughey, Taoiseach 
 
 
―The breakthrough that led to the agreement known as the 
Programme for National Recovery (PNR) was by no means 
inevitable.‖ 
- Hastings, Sheehan and Yeates, 2007 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The substantive focus of this chapter is the first of two periods of significant 
social policy change in Ireland during the last thirty years.  Beginning in 1987, 
social partnership was adopted in order to resurrect the economy and combat 
widespread joblessness across Ireland.  In 2009, social partnership effectively 
collapsed.  This chapter examines historical events leading up to 1987 using 
process tracing, arguing that the causal ideas at work in the discourse on 
partnership and poverty in Ireland played a significant role in explaining the 
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decision to adopt social partnership over viable alternatives.   Insights gained 
from the analysis of this earlier period will be used in the concluding chapter to 
examine the most recent end to Irish social partnership.   While it now seems 
that the thirty year experiment with negotiated consensus governance is coming 
to an end, the story of social partnership‘s formation is fundamental to 
interpretation of recent events and, indeed, the likely direction of Irish social 
policy in the future.   More broadly, this work confirms the importance of ideas 
in policymaking, addressing Peter Hall‘s criticism that existing scholarship ―has 
yet to develop an overarching image of the way in which ideas fit into the policy 
process‖ (Hall, 1993: 276).   As this study demonstrates, causal ideas in concert 
with changing institutional and environmental conditions are fundamental to 
the generation of major policy change.          
 
BACKGROUND: IRELAND IN THE 1980S 
By the early 1980s labor relations in Ireland had reached a crisis point.  The 
return to ‗free-for-all‘ bargaining between unions and employers, with the 
government purposefully absent, had entrenched conflict and mistrust.  In the 
midst of the global economic recession, achieving a new direction in social policy 
built on a consensus based agreement among the social partners seemed 
unlikely.  Moreover, poverty in Ireland during the late 1980s had become a 
national epidemic, and its causes and solutions were often the subjects of 
politically charged debate.  Before and during the election campaign of 
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1986/1987, policy ideas surfaced that suggested the structural problems causing 
poverty were being reinforced by disorganized, inept governance and a 
misunderstanding of the depth of Irish economic problems.  More specifically, 
the discourse suggests that conservative, deeply held ideological views of 
economic policy were stifling efforts at recovery and intensifying the effects of 
poverty.   
Traditional views of partnership and poverty, held by politicians and the 
social partners alike, were fundamentally changed as the government and 
leaders of the major economic sectors increasingly saw their fates as intertwined 
and the misfortunes of those in poverty as multidimensional.   During the mid-
1980s, social welfare spending rates were high, but so were unemployment, 
emigration and tax rates.   Social partnership was put forward as a solution to 
national economic woes, representing a decidedly new trajectory in Irish 
economic and social policy.  The initial partnership agreement represented a 
radical departure from the policy stasis that had characterized earlier periods in 
Irish social policy.  Partnership was a solution amenable to all relevant parties, 
separate from the sentiments of ‗politics as usual‘ associated with the back and 
forth political leadership of Fianna Fáil versus Fine Gael/Labour throughout the 
early 1980s.  The concept instilled a genuine confidence that the new Fianna 
Fáil government was serious about economic recovery and social protection.  I 
argue that the causal ideas surrounding partnership and poverty were 
fundamental to the institution‘s successful launch.  
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As earlier chapters have outlined, the institutional, economic and political 
conditions were not sufficient to generate the dramatic policy change observed 
with social partnership‘s introduction.  I argue that our understanding of how 
these major policy changes came to pass is incomplete without the inclusion of 
relevant causal stories into the analysis.  Taking evidence from historical 
analysis, the contributory effect of causal ideas are considered in length in this 
chapter, demonstrating the mechanisms at work in outlining the choices 
available to the Government and ultimately generating significant policy change 
through the introduction of social partnership.  Throughout this work I have 
argued that policy punctuations are a function of simultaneous variation in 
three factors: changing institutional friction, environment conditions and causal 
ideas.  This chapter identifies the causal mechanisms that translated ideas into 
the significant policy changes observed in the late 1980s. 
 
PROCESS TRACING AND CAUSAL MECHANISMS 
Process tracing is an analytic method that accounts for both theory and data 
through the rigorous analysis of history.  The method employs a logical line of 
reasoning to draw out of a rich history the most parsimonious explanations for 
events and outcomes (George and Bennett, 1998).  General or abstract 
theoretical analysis of past events often overlooks significant causal mechanisms 
at work in guiding institutional and policy change (Ibid, 1998).  ―Process tracing 
is a methodology well-suited to testing theories in a world marked by multiple 
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interaction effects, where it is difficult to explain outcomes in terms of two or 
three independent variables – precisely the world that more and more social 
scientists believe we confront‖ (Hall, 2000). The goal of this type of research is 
identification of micro-level causal mechanisms rather than macro-to-macro 
linkages or, to use Hempel‘s (1965) terminology, ―covering laws‖.  The analysis 
should be well ordered, identifying and testing causal hypotheses via underlying 
causal mechanisms and guarding against the risk of overly subjective 
interpretation of the evidence within a given case.  However, George and 
Bennett (1998) emphasize the heuristic nature of process tracing, citing the 
capacity to discover new variables and hypotheses over the course of the 
analysis.   Indeed, they argue that ―it is the very lack of independence among 
observations that makes them a powerful tool for inference‖ in explaining a 
particular case (George and Bennett, 1998:207).   
I argue that George and Bennett‘s process tracing methodology for 
uncovering causal mechanisms fits appropriately with the literature on causal 
ideas, informing this specific study of policy change.   In the micro-level stages of 
their analysis, ‗framing‘ can be understood as a ―schemata of interpretation‖ that 
enables individuals to ―locate, perceive, identify and label‖ events within their 
life space and broader environment (Goffman 1974; Snow et al. 1986).   Actors 
utilize framing as a shorthand methodology for coping with new information 
based on personal sets of values, interests, ideology or goals such that the ―choice 
of a course of action depends on the interpretation of a situation rather than on 
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purely instrumental calculation‖ (Hall and Taylor, 1992).  Frames are human 
constructions that translate into symbolic devices and causal stories while 
seemingly ―simply describing facts‖ (Stone, 1989).  These micro-level details are 
at the heart of the macro-level policy shift we witness with the introduction of 
social partnership; however, individual acts of cognition are not the primary 
concern in this work.  Rather, the collective action of a political party or group of 
individuals in affecting the macro-level change is where ideas demonstrate true 
causality in determining policy outcomes.  While individual actors are not 
necessarily instrumental in their personal interpretation of information via 
framing, the collective action of groups can lead to the politicization of causal 
ideas, affecting the direction and outcomes of policy change.   
Moving a social issue, such as poverty, onto the public agenda requires an 
acknowledgement that such problems are not ―embedded in the realm of nature, 
accident, and fate – a realm where there is no choice about what happens to us‖ 
(Stone, 1989). Macro-level events, such as increasing poverty rates, 
unemployment, or emigration, are the exogenous factors that inform individual 
thinking and, thus, policy development.   However, each of the relevant parties 
and organizations involved in policymaking has different views of the problem 
definition, or causal story, and as such, the most appropriate solution.  As 
Deborah Stone outlines, the ―problem definition is a process of image making, 
where the images have to do fundamentally with attributing cause, blame, and 
responsibility. Conditions, difficulties, or issues thus do not have inherent 
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properties that make them more or less likely to be seen as problems or to be 
expanded.  Rather, political actors deliberately portray them in ways calculated 
to gain support for their side‖ (Stone, 1989).  The purpose of the following 
narrative is to extract and differentiate the socially constructed causal stories 
surrounding partnership and poverty in Ireland during the late 1980s.  I argue 
that institutional and functional explanations for policy change are incomplete 
without incorporating the associated causal ideas in use by relevant political 
actors and organizations.  This chapter will demonstrate how the concepts of 
social partnership and social exclusion became altered in the policy discourse, 
generating dramatic social policy change. 
 
THE ORIGINS OF IRISH SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP 
Three specific causal stories inform this narrative of policy punctuation.  First, 
with regard to the ideas of both partnership and poverty, the shifting political 
landscape contributed significantly to new conceptualization of these issues.  The 
1980s in Ireland were characterized by high levels of political turbulence; there 
were three national elections within eighteen months in the early 1980s, with 
control of government changing hands each time.   All three major political 
parties seemed trapped in an ideological battle for Irish voters, overspending the 
national budget in order to generate support.  By 1986, the gravity of the 
economic crisis was beginning to overtake ‗politics as usual‘ and leaders from all 
sides started looking for more realistic options.  Despite being in coalition with a 
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more left leaning Labour party, the center-right Fine Gael party under 
Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald was unwilling to enter into national agreement 
negotiations.  When the more centrist Fianna Fáil party won the elections of 
1987, forming a minority government under the leadership of Taoiseach Charles 
Haughey and Ray McSharry as Minister for Finance, a decisive policy shift 
became possible.  Yet, without the support of significant opposition leaders, like 
Alan Dukes of Fine Gael, the new economic plan would have never gotten off the 
ground.  I argue that as the political parties in Ireland began to see their own 
futures as dependent upon practical, non-partisan solutions to the national 
economic crisis, the policy choice of social partnership became more viable.  
 Second, while the concept of partnership in Ireland has a long history in 
labor relations, its meaning was never as comprehensive or inclusive as later 
observed.  At various points from the 1940s – 1970s, Irish governments arranged 
industrial relations deals between the unions and employers to regulate pay 
raises (Hastings, Sheehan, and Yeates, 2007).   Early efforts at corporatism 
generally failed in Ireland during the 1930s and ‗40s.   While the Catholic 
Church and some fascist sympathizers were willing to support these 
arrangements, corporatist proposals during this period amounted to little more 
than ongoing state control of the economy (O‘Connor, 2002).  In the 1960s and 
‗70s, ‗national understandings‘ helped somewhat to maintain industrial peace, 
but they were largely ineffectual in terms of real economic gains for union 
members who saw pay increases eroded by inflation and taxation (Hastings, 
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Sheehan and Yeates, 2007).  The agreements were jettisoned in the early 1980s 
in favor of ‗free-for-all‘ negotiations between employers and unions directly.  
While pleasing some employers by returning to firm-level negotiations, this 
development hardened the stance of private employers, unions and the State 
(Hastings, Sheehan and Yeates, 2007).  The governments‘ ‗hands off‘ approach 
during negotiations led to further divisions between the unions and employers. 
 Although partnership was not a new concept in Irish industrial relations, 
the agreements had generally worked to ease conflict rather than build 
consensus or, indeed, create truly binding relationships.  An ‗us‘ vs. ‗them‘ 
mentality typically prevailed as opposed to a sincere feeling that each 
organization‘s future was inextricably linked to the other‘s.  Key to the evolution 
in understanding the concept of social partnership was the development of policy 
within the National Economic and Social Council (NESC).  Created in 1973 as an 
independent ‗think tank‘ comprised of the social partners, senior civil servants 
and government officials, the NESC was able to facilitate meetings that were 
somewhat removed from the political environment and aimed at producing 
practical, consensus based solutions.  I argue that for the unions, employers and 
the Government in particular, as the view of partnership shifted towards a more 
collective, consensual understanding of governance, the preferred choice became 
a comprehensive national agreement over other available alternatives such as a 
return to limited pay deals or exclusion of the unions from negotiations. 
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Finally, I argue that as the conceptualization of poverty shifted from a 
focus on monetary disadvantage to the more multidimensional, contextual 
definition of social exclusion, policy choices also advanced in a similar vein.  
Viewing poverty in this manner implied that monetary solutions would be 
insufficient, even counterproductive.  Therefore, rather than continue to spend 
significant funds on welfare, a dramatic structural change was needed.   Social 
exclusion as a conceptualization of poverty was much more compatible with the 
formation of new policy networks associated with a partnership model.  Being 
more reflective of the multifaceted nature of poverty, it was appropriate that 
policy solutions like partnership utilized a multi-organizational approach.  I 
argue that as the definition of poverty advanced to a more multidimensional 
understanding, the appeal of social partnership as a new policy direction 
increased significantly.      
While social partnership appears in many ways an economically and 
politically sound direction to have taken in hindsight, it is important to 
remember that partnership was not a foregone conclusion in the mid-1980s.   As 
outlined above, the experience with national understandings had not been 
entirely successful and many, particularly in the employer‘s camp, were not 
enthusiastic about returning to those times.  Indeed, it is surprising in some 
ways that social partnership was adopted at all.   Union membership was falling 
significantly at this time, due to job losses and high emigration rates.  Rather 
than introduce a social partnership agreement, the incoming Fianna Fáil 
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government might have followed a Thatcherite/Reaganite model or other non-
partnership alternative.  Although in a minority government in 1987, Fianna 
Fáil arguably might have had the support of more fiscally conservative Fine 
Gael in shutting out the unions.  Instead, the new agreement was built on 
inclusivity and consensus.  It is also plausible to suggest that the Government 
might have chosen a third pathway, weathering the economic storm with the 
help of foreign investment and EU support.  EU structural funds were 
contributing to economic recovery and the Irish Development Authority (IDA) 
was actively ‗hunting and gathering‘ for outside investors.    
Instead, we witness a convergence of ideas including post-partisan 
political leadership with clear policy direction; new thinking about the future of 
labor relations; and a multidimensional conceptualization of social exclusion.   
Had the new partnership agreement not been so comprehensive, it is possible 
that a weaker national deal would have failed.  Halfhearted reforms, or reforms 
that obviously favored either the employers or the unions, would have hardened 
existing tensions and collapsed the deal.  Critical to the success of social 
partnership was the common understanding of the problem and the solutions: a 
shared blueprint. 
 
THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC EXPANSION AND GROWTH 
Many of the roots of modern Irish social policies can be found in the period 
immediately following Ireland‘s split from the United Kingdom.  Following 
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independence in 1922, the Irish Free State was a highly centralized, deliberately 
controlled system of government (Barrington, 1987).  The bitter civil war that 
followed the struggle for independence resulted in a state characterized by 
highly consolidated, centralized institutions, unwilling and unable to devolve 
power for fear of total collapse (Ibid).  Policymaking was confined to the national 
level in order to promote broad economic recovery, yet the Irish Free State 
remained heavily dependent on the British economy.  The UK market served as 
the end destination for Irish agricultural products, accounting for 98.6% of 
exports in 1924 and still a total of 92.7% by 1950 (Mjøset, 1992).  Throughout 
this period, Ireland remained trapped in a cycle of economic dependence and 
massive levels of emigration.  The economy stagnated under the ―population 
decline via emigration and a weak system of national innovation‖ (Ibid).  These 
two mechanisms reinforced one another to disastrous effect, producing economic 
marginalization of the country on the international market and weak domestic 
industrialization.  Ireland‘s failure to diversify production and to break away 
from the UK in developing alternative trading partners stunted economic growth 
for generations.    
From the late 1950s onwards, the protectionist, isolationist ethos of the 
earlier generation was cast off and economic growth became truly viable.  
Accompanying the rapid economic expansion in the 1960s were significant 
increases in government spending as Ireland embraced Keynesian economic 
strategies.  In particular, the Irish government focused on employment in the 
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public sector, the growth of state sponsored private enterprise, and expansion of 
educational opportunities and general services, such as income support, health 
care and housing (Walsh et al., 1998).  While reforms in economic policy carried 
some increases in social welfare provisions, the extension of additional social 
policies remained largely incremental.  Social progress was limited to politically 
opportunistic moments when the government could be pressured into making 
changes (Kiely et al., 1999).  More often, internal parliamentary developments 
presented significant roadblocks to advancing social policy. 
In 1948, Fianna Fáil lost power to a broad coalition made up of Fine Gael, 
the Labour Party, National Labour Party, Clann na Talmhan, Clann na 
Poblachta and other parties.  Although Fianna Fáil returned to power in 1951, it 
did so as a minority government and only lasted three years in power before 
falling to a second ‗rainbow‘ coalition.  Fianna Fáil finally returned to full 
strength in 1957, with Sean Lemass becoming Taoiseach after de Valera‘s 
retirement in 1959.  Lemass‘ early leadership was characterized by a dramatic 
increase in foreign trade and rapid economic development.  Lemass ended the 
Irish experiment with autarky, removing protectionist economic policies that 
had stifled Irish growth by offering grants and tax incentives to foreign 
investors.  Particularly in the 1960s, development was aggressively pursued at 
the national and regional level, producing growth outside of Dublin and giving 
greater recognition to local level economic policy (Adsheed and Quinn, 1997).  
Ireland signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1961 and 
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opened its doors to free trade: ―Ireland‘s switch to openness was more dramatic 
than in the other European states and was implemented in terms of a rigorous 
industrial incentive package‖ (Bradley, 2000:12).  The Second Programme for 
Economic Expansion, launched in 1964, focused extensively on economic growth, 
but it failed to deliver any massive social change.  
As a result of these developments, Ireland experienced rapid 
industrialization which created an impoverished urban population.  Yet despite 
increasing pressure, social progress was again postponed until economic 
prosperity increased (Conroy, 1999).  Between 1961 and 1966, over 600,000 
young people emigrated from Ireland, including 30% of young men between the 
ages of 20-24 years old.  Approximately 20% of the population was reliant on a 
weekly welfare payment (Deeny, 1971 as quoted in Conroy, 1999).  Community 
activists in Ireland during the 1980s were dealing with poor housing, a 
burgeoning heroin problem, staggering unemployment and mass emigration.  
Individuals working to solve poverty issues during this time period were well 
aware of the multidimensional nature of the problem.   However, while several 
social activists and civil society groups were cognizant of the need to rapidly 
expand social programs, the Irish government‘s solution remained focused 
entirely on economic growth and inter-party competition.  Insofar as it accepted 
responsibility for lifting the citizenry out of poverty, the State focused on 
economic advancement rather than more comprehensive or multidimensional 
programs.  Committed to Lemass‘ sentiment that ―a rising tide lifts all boats‖, 
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the Government turned attention elsewhere despite growing social and economic 
need for comprehensive social policies.  As Breen et al. (1990) conclude: ―despite 
the depth of transformation in Ireland since the 1950s, stability rather than 
change has prevailed‖.  The overwhelming consequence was sclerotic anti-
poverty policy development and a system which maintained a centralized, 
traditional policy approach to the problem. 
Lemass‘ subsequent retirement as Taoiseach in 1966 produced an internal 
leadership crisis in Fianna Fáil as six men professed an interest in the 
leadership of the party.  When a reluctant Jack Lynch was appointed leader, 
internal divisions within the party became starkly apparent.  Fianna Fáil lost 
the general elections in 1973, bringing a coalition government to power under 
the leadership of Fine Gael and the Labour Party.  In response to the 
international oil crisis, the coalition government began expansionist economic 
policies financed by high levels of borrowing.  The traditional convention of 
balancing the budget was ―formally abandoned‖ (Kirby, 2008).   When the 
coalition lost power in 1977, Taoiseach Jack Lynch returned to enjoy the last 
absolute majority the Fianna Fáil party would hold in the Dáil (1977-1979), but 
was undermined by the popularity of his own party‘s backbenchers after the 
strong popular mandate Fianna Fáil received in the elections.  By 1978, there 
was open revolt among the party members and Lynch was forced to resign in 
December of 1979.  From December of 1979, after Taoiseach Jack Lynch‘s 
resignation, until March of 1987, the party in government changed a total of six 
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times with no single party establishing an absolute majority in the Dáil.  Given 
electoral volatility, a coherent response to international recession as a result of 
the second oil crisis was impossible; by 1986, the national debt to GDP ratio had 
risen nearly 90% (Kirby, 2008).  Despite substantial need for comprehensive 
policy reform during the 1970s and ‗80s, the Irish government was largely 
ineffective in social policy until 1987.  Despite the fact that Ireland‘s welfare 
spending increased far faster than the EU average, by 1987 over 22% of the 
population was living below the poverty line (Callan and Nolan, 1994).     
During the early 1980s, the political situation in Ireland was often too 
unsettled to precipitate real action in the realm of social policy.  The leadership 
of three-time Fianna Fáil Taoiseach Charles Haughey (1979-‗81, 1982, 1987-‗89) 
was often characterized by scandal and economic mismanagement19.  In his first 
term, Haughey frequently clashed with his own Ministers for Finance, Michael 
O‘Kennedy and Gene Fitzgerald, taking matters into his own hands with regard 
to economic policy.   In a radio address to the Irish public, Haughey identified 
overspending as a primary source of economic trouble during this period: 
  
―I wish to talk to you this evening about the state of the nation's 
affairs and the picture I have to paint is not, unfortunately, a very 
cheerful one… As a community we are living way beyond our means.  I 
don't mean that everyone in the community is living too well, clearly 
                                                             
19
 In the second term, conflict with Desmond O’Malley and other party backbenchers forced a motion of no 
confidence (the motion failed, but Des O’Malley was expelled from the party as a result).  Finally during his 
last term as Taoiseach, Haughey’s Minister for Finance Albert Reynolds openly declared an interest in the party 
leadership, challenging Haughey to maintain his grip on power.  Haughey ultimately resigned and was replaced 
by Albert Reynolds. 
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many are not and have barely enough to get by, but taking us all together 
we have been living at a rate which is simply not justified by the amount 
of goods and services we are producing. To make up the difference we 
have been borrowing enormous amounts of money, borrowing at a rate 
which just cannot continue. A few simple figures will make this very 
clear...we will just have to reorganise government spending so that we can 
only undertake those things we can afford.‖ 
—Charles Haughey, 9 January 1980 
 
However, Haughey‘s own political aspirations often led to conflicting 
policy choices.  Despite arguments about reducing the national debt and 
controlling spending, during the election campaign of 1981 Haughey took a 
populist line in order to address the challenge put forward by Fine Gael and he 
failed to make any radical economic changes.  Fianna Fáil lost the 1981 elections 
by a narrow margin and Haughey was forced back into opposition.  In his brief 
tenure as Taoiseach in 1982, Charles Haughey identified the limitations of 
partisan politics as a major contributing factor to the nation‘s economic struggles 
when his party published ―The Way Forward,‖ a Fianna Fáil policy document 
that called for massive spending cuts and a reorganization of the tax system.  
However, shortly thereafter his government collapsed as Socialist and 
Independent government ministers withdrew from Haughey‘s policy agenda.   
Despite clear economic need and political opportunity under Haughey‘s early 
leadership, the achievement of a new policy direction at this time was stifled by 
entrenched causal ideas about governance and inter-party rivalry20. 
                                                             
20
 In other examples of political opportunism, Haughey was broadly critical of early attempts at a peace 
settlement in Northern Ireland made under the Fitzgerald government in the mid1980s.  However, upon 
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Haughey‘s opposition counterpart as Taoiseach during this time period 
was Fine Gael leader Garret Fitzgerald (1981-‗82, 1982-‗87).  Fitzgerald served 
as Taoiseach twice in the 1980s, during periods of severe economic recession and 
tumultuous internal party relations.  The first Fine Gael government of 
Fitzgerald and Labour party Tánaiste Michael O‘Leary was short lived as the 
economic crisis quickly dominated the political agenda21.  Fitzgerald had named 
a young, dynamic cabinet, but their early attempts at tax reforms and budget 
cuts were sidelined by electoral concerns.  A shock defeat of the January 1982 
budget led to elections in February of that year; and despite losing only two 
seats, Fine Gael was forced into opposition.  Fine Gael won the elections of 
November 1982, returning to government in coalition with the Labour party.   In 
his second period as Taoiseach, Fitzgerald and Labour Tánaiste Dick Spring 
achieved a working harmony, keeping the coalition afloat despite severe external 
pressure from Fianna Fáil.  However, conflict prevailed among government 
ministers over the direction of future economic policy.  For example, Minister for 
Finance, Alan Dukes, proposed economic recovery via cuts in tax rates, control of 
social spending and more fiscally conservative measures.  These suggestions 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
returning to power in 1987, Haughey embraced the Anglo-Irish agreement (signed in 1985) which had strong 
public support.  Likewise, as Minister for Health and Social Welfare during the 1970s, Haughey sponsored 
legislation to legalize contraception.  However, he later removed his own party whip, Desmond O’Malley from 
the party for abstaining from a vote in 1985 on a contraceptives bill proposed by Fine Gael/Labour to which 
Fianna Fail stood in opposition.  O’Malley was quoted as saying: “I do not believe that the interests of this State 
or our Constitution and of this Republic would be served by putting politics before conscience in regard to this 
.... I stand by the Republic and accordingly, I will not oppose this Bill” (Dáil Debates 1985). For Haughey, 
dominance of the party was clearly more a more pressing concern than the social progress for which he had 
previously stood. 
 
21
 The H-Block hunger strike crisis in Northern Ireland also contributed to Fitzgerald’s unpopularity, although 
he was not directly involved other than handling public protests in the Republic of Ireland. 
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were unacceptable to the Labour party which was deeply committed to 
maintaining public services, creating intense pressure on the governing 
coalition.  Labour‘s suggested reforms would have further extended the welfare 
state to soften the effects of economic recession, yet the status quo remained 
because of Fine Gael‘s conservative economic policies.  Fitzgerald‘s government 
was deeply unpopular with the public due to the stagnant economy, rising 
unemployment and emigration rates and indecision by the governing coalition 
which led to further economic downturn. 
Throughout the 1980s, the traditional stalwarts of both Fianna Fáil and 
Fine Gael relied on standard ideas of inter-party rivalry rather than more post-
partisan thinking.  Despite internal power struggles within the dominant 
parties, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil were unified only in their opposition to one 
another.  Each party participated in political opportunism, scoring points off the 
opposition in every available setting.  As examples:  
 
―Fianna Fáil were rejected at the polls basically because of the perception 
by the people that that party failed to govern, a failure to govern that has 
no precedent in the annals of this country and which has led to the near 
collapse of our public finances. In the couple of hours since I was 
appointed Taoiseach I have had many things to do because the nature of 
the changeover on this occasion was such that tasks that might have been 
undertaken earlier could not be undertaken until this afternoon. However, 
even in that brief time I have learned something of the scale of the 
damage done. I have to say I am shocked...‖ 
- Garret Fitzgerald, Fine Gael upon       
becoming Taoiseach in 1981 
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―‗The phasing of the elimination of the current Budget deficit between now 
and 1987 will have to be undertaken with due regard to prevailing 
economic conditions, and in particular to the importance of achieving 
economic growth and dealing with unemployment.‘ That was the promise 
the Coalition made when they took office three years ago. After a series of 
measures that have devastated the Irish economy, after a series of 
promises that were broken and a series of U-turns they have got the 
country in a financial mess.  What kind of mess is the Irish economy in 
today following almost four years of so-called financial rectitude in order 
to bring the nation's finances into order? What price has the country had 
to pay in economic and human misery as a result of those misguided 
financial policies?‖ 
      -Frank Fahey: Fianna Fáil Galway 1986 
 
 
 With regard to social policy, it is notable that Garret Fitzgerald, both in 
1971 and again in 1981, was a delegate to the Kilkenny Poverty Conference.  
This largely ecumenical and academic conference was convened in order to 
address growing problems of poverty in Ireland and put forward policy solutions.  
Fitzgerald‘s statements at both conferences, the second time as Taoiseach, are 
indicative of his real theoretical commitment to social policy.  However, as an 
orthodox economist, and with mounting political pressure to maintain a 
governing coalition, Fitzgerald was unable to reconcile his views to a policy 
agenda. While Fitzgerald‘s ideas about poverty were evolving, his 
conceptualization of partnership and the benefits of consensual governance had 
not altered.   Without connecting these causal ideas, in concert with difficult 
political and economic conditions, the momentum for dramatic social policy 
change would not be realized.    
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―What has happened over the past century is that a small privileged class 
in society has become a large privileged class and once people who are 
well enough off to think in terms of ―I‘m alright Jack‖, once they become a 
majority of a population, the political problem of mobilizing support in an 
individualist and increasingly materialist society for the kind of action 
needed for social welfare becomes very difficult… I think there is a real 
danger that if the Government – and I don‘t mean the present 
Government – I mean the political system – if it doesn‘t respond to the 
kind of need being thrown up now, very quickly this society will become 
individualist and materialist to the point where changes in patterns will 
become impossible.‖ 
        - Garret Fitzgerald, TD, 1971 
 
 
―The challenge of poverty in a society in recession is to focus attention on 
the need for redistribution from the ‗haves‘ to the ‗have nots.‘… It will be 
necessary to display poverty in all its ugliness to such people so that they 
will know its effects.  It is no longer possible to set aside a small part of 
our proceeds from national growth from year to year; people will have to 
accept that the State does not have the resources to solve the problems.  
The terrible complacency surrounding poverty will have to be dispelled… 
our society will have to be subverted if it is going to change sufficiently‖.    
  - Taoiseach, Garret Fitzgerald, 1981 
  
 By 1986, there was an undercurrent from all sides of the debate to 
encourage new policy directions, including the introduction of a comprehensive 
social partnership.  However, the Fine Gael-Labour coalition was increasingly 
isolated from the social partners in seeking this change.  Alan Dukes, the Fine 
Gael Minister for Finance recalls: ―My suspicion is that both the trade unions 
and the employers felt that if they came to any kind of understanding it wouldn‘t 
last because the Government wouldn‘t be around for long‖ and ―the union 
leaders felt they would get a better deal…and employers would get a better 
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hearing with Fianna Fáil‖ (Alan Dukes as quoted in Hastings, Sheehan and 
Yeates, 2007).   
 By this time, Charles Haughey was firmly in charge of the Fianna Fáil 
party.  Political challengers within his party had been largely silenced in the 
years preceding the election22 and Haughey‘s own reputation following earlier 
scandals had been mostly resurrected.  When it came to the 1986 election 
campaign, Haughey and Fianna Fáil again put forward the policies outlined in 
―The Way Forward‖ as the plan for cutting spending and boosting economic 
growth.  This time, however, Haughey and Fianna Fáil seized upon the need for 
non-partisan solutions to the economic crisis and promoted an inclusive 
policymaking agenda. The document coincided with the ―Strategy for 
Development 1986-1990‖ published by the National Economic and Social Council 
(NESC), under the leadership of senior civil servant Padraig O‘hUiginn, with the 
support of the social partners and government representatives.  Partisan politics 
had been excised from the policy document in an effort to build consensus and 
the document read as a policy prescription rather than an ideological treatise.  
Finally, as a firm indication of where the Fianna Fáil leadership were heading, 
Haughey made this statement at the close of Dáil for the Christmas holidays, 
1986:      
 
                                                             
22
 Specifically, of the main challengers Des O’Malley had left the party after being expelled.  George Colley and 
Clement Coghlan had both died. 
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 ―It was a fatal mistake by this Coalition to reject the concept of an 
understanding between the social partners and the Government, based on 
a consensus on the broad objectives of economic and social planning. This 
was clearly a deliberate policy on their part. Both trade unions and 
employers were effectively kept at arm's length. This has brought 
divisiveness and confrontation. Employers, trade unions, farmers, 
vocational organisations and representative bodies should all be fully 
involved in economic and social planning if we are to succeed. As far as 
possible, there must be created a shared sense of purpose based on a 
broad consensus. It will require leadership and responsibility on the part 
of both trade unions and employers and I believe they are not only ready 
for it but are anxious to bring it about.‖ 
      - Charles Haughey: Dec. 19th, 1986  
 
 
 The general consensus among the social partners was the Fine Gael and 
Labour leadership were out of ideas, lacking creativity or a clear view of policy 
direction for future economic recovery.  The pragmatism and broad popular 
appeal of Fianna Fáil, combined with the powerful imagery of partnership as a 
negotiated consensus for shaping the future, generated the necessary pressure to 
produce dramatic social policy change outside conventional parameters.   
 
THE SOCIAL PARTNERS IN MODERN IRISH POLITICS 
The federation of Irish labor began in 1894 when fifty-two unions founded the 
Irish Trade Union Congress (ITUC) as a parallel to the British TUC.  Free 
collective bargaining with little state intervention in negotiations defined labor 
relations during the early 1900s through the 1920s.  As was common in the 
British system, an environment of antagonistic labor-state relations was fostered 
by this early organizational structure (O‘Connor, 2002).  Stronger Irish trade 
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unionism was established following the war of independence and the civil war, 
particularly with the return of Fianna Fáil to government – a traditionally 
populist and pro-worker party.  However, it was only in the 1940s and ‗50s that 
Irish unions broke with their British counterparts and established the 
independent Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) that is recognizable today.   
 On the employer‘s side, centralized bodies were formed in response to 
industrial conflict and the need for better organization of industry in the post-
independence period.  In 1942, the Federated Union of Employers (FUE) formed 
following a series of iterations, eventually gaining unique recognition from 
government as the main representative employers body (O‘Connor, 2002).  In 
1989, FUE was renamed the Federation of Irish Employers, and in 1993 it 
merged with the Confederation of Irish Industry to form the Irish Business and 
Employers‘ Confederation (IBEC), the single largest employers organization 
today. Throughout the multiple generations of organization, the employers‘ 
bodies have generally favored centralized wage bargaining as a counter weight 
to union militancy.     
In 1959, after Lemass had succeeded Eamon de Valera as Taoiseach, he 
introduced radical changes to national economic strategy, ending the era of 
protectionism, which led to the creation of tripartite consultative bodies to 
reform industrial relations and wage determination.  Lemass also created the 
Employer-Labour Conference (ELC), a bipartite organization linking ICTU and 
FUE.  These early efforts at policy consultation were aided by the consolidation 
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of ICTU and FUE as representative bodies, but substantial reform was limited.  
Relations between all parties were complicated in the 1970s as strike action 
among industrial craftsmen threatened to generate a subsequent string of 
demands across the unions.  The government sought a return to bipartite 
consultation, but when ICTU rejected a centralized pay agreement, national 
legislation was swiftly introduced to discredit the union position.  The bill was 
withdrawn after Congress agreed to the first National Wage Agreement in 1970 
(NWA), but labor relations were clearly antagonistic during this period 
(O‘Connor, 2002).   
There were six more NWAs between 1970 and ‘78, eventually generating 
the necessary momentum to produce two ―National Understandings for Social 
and Economic Development‖ introduced by Fianna Fáil in 1979 and 1980, 
directly involving the government in negotiations over pay determination.  
Moreover, the national understandings included a two-tier system, the first 
relating to pay rates and the second to public policy.   These early models of 
policy concertation give validation of Fianna Fáil‘s later commitment to social 
policy through partnership. Yet, despite positive momentum towards 
consolidation of these policies, the trend was short lived due to political 
turbulence and strained labor relations.  Moreover, these early incarnations of 
partnership were far less comprehensive and inclusive than later iterations.     
In the 1960s and ‗70s, industrial relations were often strained; strike 
activity peaked during the 1960s, eased in the early ‗70s and then returned to 
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higher levels in the late ‗70s and early 1980s (Roche and Murphy, 1998).  Much 
of the effort of the unions during this period was concentrated on achieving pay 
raises in line with increasing inflation rates.  Inflation reached 13.2% in 1979 
and hourly earnings rose 15.6% that same year (Hastings, Sheehan and Yeates, 
2007).  The National Understanding of 1980 secured additional benefits under 
centralized arrangements, but these achievements were short lived.  The 
economic and political climate of 1981-82 poisoned efforts at policy concertation 
as rising unemployment and political instability altered national priorities.  
When a third national understanding failed, the Fine Gael-Labour government 
did not intervene and centralized bargaining collapsed.  During the mid-1980s, 
labor relations were governed by ‗free-for-all‘ negotiations with the government 
adopting a ‗hands off‘ policy.  ‗Free-for-all‘ negotiations meant that bargaining 
took place at the local level, meaning companies were free to deal with industrial 
issues on a case by case basis.  Serious industrial action often followed as local 
unions went on strike during negotiations, but many companies were able to 
avoid serious disruption through assistance by the Federation Union of 
Employers.  This period of free collective bargaining was generally favorable to 
the employers, rather than the unions, but everyone suffered from recessionary 
conditions during the 1980s.   
The employer‘s perspective on social partnership began to soften in the 
mid-1980s, however, with organizations such as the FUE signaling interest in 
―seeking common ground with Government and Congress‖ (the Irish Congress of 
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Trade Unions) as early as 1983 (Hastings, Sheehan and Yeates, 2007).  
Likewise, the Confederation of Irish Industry (CII) foresaw a role for social 
partnership in an effort to control public spending and return fiscal stability to 
the Irish economy.  However, centralized bargaining was not the primary 
interest of the employer‘s organizations at this time, given the relative success 
they had had during the ‗free-for-all‘ bargaining arrangements and the 
ideological precedent being set by Margaret Thatcher in the UK.  The 
predominant concern was that a new wage deal might result in the same 
confrontational bargaining process that had characterized labor relations in the 
past.  Moreover, as noted in Hastings et al. (2007) ―quite a number of American 
firms had come into Ireland and not recognized unions, and the employers 
believed that union influence seemed to have waned at a national level‖ (see 
Figure 17 below).  The ideas surrounding partnership had yet to evolve beyond 
traditional views of labor relations and memories of conflict-ridden negotiations.   
As the economic recession worsened, however, the position of the 
employers began to weaken relative to the government and unions and new 
policy ideas began to surface.   As Hardiman notes, although the unions were in 
a stronger position in the early 1980s than later in the decade, the risk of 
disputed negotiations producing gains for the unions was sufficient to encourage 
employers to seek consensus (Hardiman, 1988).  Also, with the likelihood of 
Haughey and Fianna Fáil returning to power in 1987, economic and political 
pressure began to mount against the employers‘ resistance to a national social 
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partnership agreement.  The employers‘ organizations began to view their future 
as more intimately connected with inclusive, consensual governance rather than 
their traditionally independent position.       
 
FIGURE 17: UNION MEMBERSHIP RATES VS. TRADE OPENNESS 1980-200923 
 
 
From the union‘s perspective, the situation was increasingly bleak.  In the 
early 1980s, over 250,000 manufacturing jobs were lost and approximately 
80,000 people were emigrating each year (Ibid, 9).   As Phil Flynn, former 
general secretary of the Local Government and Public Services Union noted 
―every single economic indicator was going steeply in the wrong direction….So 
from the early 1980s, as early as 1982, we were going to have to revisit the whole 
                                                             
23
 These variables are significantly negatively correlated with a Pearson’s R of -0.8942 
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question of strategy and ask how we are going to deal with this?  How are we 
going to cope?‖ (Phil Flynn as quoted in Hastings et al, 2007).   Moreover, the 
specter of Thatcher weighed heavily on the trade union leaders: ―Thatcher was 
rampant in England.  She had beaten the miners and was systematically 
dismantling what was left of the trade union movement in terms of adding 
influence…Against that background you either had to do something radical or 
you literally just couldn‘t continue‖ (Billy Attley, SIPTU24, as quoted in Hastings 
et al, 2007).   
There was a real sense of fear that any national economic strategy 
developed by government with the employers might exclude the unions given 
their weakened position in the economy.   Moreover, internal division in Fianna 
Fáil generated a new, more staunchly center right party in 1985, the Progressive 
Democrats (PD).  The popularity of the PDs in the build up to the 1987 election 
was a clear signal to the unions that a major shift in policy direction was 
necessary.  Finally, new leadership within the unions, recognized ―by both 
private sector employers and some civil servants as being more attuned to the 
dynamics of an increasingly competitive economy‖, facilitated openness to new 
approaches and economic strategies (Hastings, Sheehan and Yeates, 2007).  New 
ideas about the benefits to be gained from consensus through partnership were 
clearly evident in the discourse of the social partners.   The key to success was 
the fact that employers, unions and Government alike saw the way forward as 
                                                             
24
 SIPTU – Services, Industrial, Professional and Technical Union 
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necessarily inclusive of all economic sectors; this shift in the causal story behind 
partnership toward a negotiated consensus model was fundamental to the new 
policy trajectory.  
 
THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN IRISH HISTORY 
Following independence from the United Kingdom, the Irish Free State was 
more focused on survival than expansive welfare provisions.  Money was simply 
not available to extend welfare policies beyond those residual obligations left 
over from the union with Britain (Kiely et al., 1999).  Nor were early Irish Free 
State leaders inclined to extend welfare spending even if funding were available, 
given popular beliefs about poverty and the role of the State.   Before the turn of 
the 20th century, the definition and measurement of poverty were largely 
ambiguous concepts.  Capitalizing on the advances of the scientific revolution, 
early head counts of individuals living in poverty during the 17th and 18th 
century inspired thinkers like Adam Smith and Thomas Paine to argue for a 
stronger market mechanism, progressive taxation systems, and State sponsored 
benefits programs, including payments for pensions, sickness and children 
(Smith, 1776; Paine, 1791).  Despite the lack of concrete measurements, poverty 
or ‗pauperism‘ was a visibly identifiable condition and an often misunderstood 
circumstance during this period.  Particularly in the United Kingdom and, by 
extension Ireland, the general belief was that individuals were entirely 
responsible for their own financial predicaments and the poor were ―perceived as 
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a problem population of socially and economically useless individuals‖ (Powell, 
1992). Conceptualizing poverty in this manner was coupled with the congruent 
assumption that the institution of moral rectitude was the proper solution for 
overcoming these circumstances.  The religious and moral values of Christian 
love, charity and a strong work ethic were to be instilled in the ‗feckless‘ poor, ‗a 
race of thieves and robbers‘ (Ibid).  In particular, the ‗able-bodied‘ poor, 
particularly young men, as opposed to the ‗respectable poor‘ (mothers, widows, 
children, sick, elderly), were considered deserving of punishment if they could 
not comply with the social and economic obligations of society.  Above all, this 
causal story of poverty relieved the State of most responsibility for addressing 
the causes and consequences of impoverishment. 
In the early 1900s, the conceptualization of poverty began to evolve as a 
result of two significant poverty studies.  Charles Booth carried out a study from 
1886 to 1902 that revealed nearly 30% of the London population to be living in 
poverty, unable to afford basic levels of subsistence.  Rowntree‘s study in 1901 
confirmed the existence of absolute poverty in York, where 15.6% of individual 
wage earners were living at or below the poverty line (Rowntree, 1901 as quoted 
in Levitas, 2005).  These studies made poverty ―measurable and by implication 
remediable‖, shifting the responsibility for poverty away from the individual and 
towards the State (Powell, 1992).   The shifting image of poverty in the United 
Kingdom ultimately led to social reforms and the post-war consensus following 
WWII.  However, in Ireland the discourse remained within a traditional context 
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of personal responsibility; and the charity of the Catholic Church was viewed as 
the appropriate ameliorative avenue.   
As leader of the first government of the Irish Free State, WT Cosgrave, 
the deeply conservative leader of the Cumann na nGaedhael party (later Fine 
Gael) envisioned a powerful role for the Catholic Church, guiding the decision 
making of the government.  Any policy decision not in conformance with Church 
views would be met with resistance, including innovative welfare and social 
policies.   Eamon de Valera, another central political figure during the war of 
independence and in the formation of the Irish Republic, also foresaw a role for 
the Church within government after bringing his Fianna Fáil party back into 
national politics in 1927.  Western economies were slipping into depression, as 
exemplified by the Wall Street crash of 1929, and Ireland was not immune to 
this global economic turmoil.  Yet, the policy of Fianna Fáil was that public 
assistance should be available only to those most in need and guaranteeing ―the 
maintenance of the work ethic by ensuring benefits remained below wages in the 
market‖ (Powell, 1992).  As such, the extension of poverty policies was severely 
limited financially despite the dramatic rise in need.  The preferred solution 
remained the support and charity of the Catholic Church, an arrangement firmly 
codified in the 1937 Constitution.   
During this period, unemployment skyrocketed and the living conditions 
of the poor in Ireland became increasingly intolerable. Yet, despite embarrassing 
political attacks from the left with regard to Fianna Fáil‘s social policy, de 
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Valera‘s party enjoyed an absolute majority in the Dáil and was little inclined to 
alter its course of action.  De Valera‘s image of Ireland was traditional, pastoral 
and bucolic; economic development on the international scale was not in line 
with de Valera‘s plans for the country. The 1933 Unemployment Assistance Act 
provided for some level of unemployment insurance and was extended in 1935 to 
include widows and orphans.  The 1939 Public Assistance Act included a weekly 
allowance for job seekers (Burke, 1999).  These acts represented Fianna Fáil‘s 
incremental policy solutions to the unemployment crisis and were decidedly 
insufficient as they failed to cover substantial portions of the workforce, 
including those in agriculture, the dominant economic sector at the time.   
Internationally the conceptualization of poverty began to shift in the 
aftermath of World War II.  The 1942 Beveridge study in the UK outlined a 
specific role for the State in post-war recovery, committing the British 
government to nationalization of health and social services as well as pursuing 
full employment.  The UN Declaration on Human Rights of 1948 guaranteed 
individual human rights, basic standards of living, and the extension of the 
definition of citizenship.  No longer were individuals seen as solely responsible 
for their economic fate.  While Ireland‘s policymakers were certainly affected by 
these developments, they were largely unable to act upon them due to budgetary 
constraints in the immediate aftermath of the war.  More significantly, however, 
the power of the Catholic Church had diminished little, causing political storms 
throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, with specific reference to the issue of 
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social policy.  As quoted in Powell (1992), Sean O‘Faolain wrote that with 
reference to the power of government and the power of the Catholic Church, 
based in Maynooth, Co. Kildare: ―it is just to speak of two Parliaments.  The Dáil 
proposes, Maynooth disposes.  The Dáil had when up against the Second 
Parliament, only one right of decision; the right to surrender‖ (Powell, pg. 260).  
The Church was opposed to State intervention on behalf of social welfare policy, 
stifling reforms such as the ill-fated Mother and Child Service (1950) which 
would have provided for free maternity care for mothers and free health care for 
children up to 16 years of age regardless of income level.  Catholic leaders saw 
the scheme as a violation of the sanctity of the family and a pathway to the 
liberalization of abortion and birth control rights.  Church disapproval 
precipitated a crisis in government and forced the resignation of Noel Browne, 
the Fianna Fáil Minister for Health at the time.  On both an institutional and 
conceptual level, policymaking was subject to strong forces preserving the status 
quo.   
However, despite the political and economic woes of the country in 
general, it was during this period that poverty did eventually achieve a place on 
what Cobb and Elder (1983) call, the ‗systemic agenda‘: the national level of 
political discussion and policymaking.  Beginning in the 1960s, with new ideas 
about equality, human rights and justice pouring out of the civil rights 
movements in the United States and Northern Ireland, and from the Second 
Vatican Council (1962-65), the popular understanding of poverty began to move 
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away from individual responsibility and towards a framework of poverty as a 
multidimensional, contextual issue, better understood via concepts like social 
exclusion.   
 The transformation of poverty from a purely individual circumstance into 
a publically acknowledged social problem was essential to national level policy 
change in Ireland.  Peter Townsend‘s work in the United Kingdom in the late 
1970s introduced the idea of multidimensionality to more accurately 
characterize the realities of poverty as a both structural and social condition.  He 
argued that poverty was both objective and subjective, and should not be 
approached using income measures and solutions alone:  ―Individuals, families 
and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty when they lack the 
resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities and have the 
living conditions and amenities which are customary, or at least widely 
encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong‖ (Townsend, 1979).  
French sociologists coined the term social exclusion to capture the process of 
‗social disqualification‘ or ‗social disaffiliation‘ leading to the breakdown of the 
relationship between society and the individual (Paugam, 1993; Castel, 1995 as 
cited in Room, 1995).  Social exclusion, therefore, constitutes ―inadequate social 
participation, lack of social protection, lack of social integration, and lack of 
power‖ (Room, 1995). 
The concept of social exclusion encompasses many realities, relative to the 
individual‘s given community, including deprivation, lack of resources, social 
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class marginalization, political disenfranchisement, and discrimination.  The 
definition focuses on the interconnected economic and social aspects of poverty, 
and the process by which exclusion occurs.  Problem solving with regard to social 
exclusion demands multifaceted, comprehensive approaches to address 
imbalances.  In line with ideological trends regarding poverty and social 
exclusion, the role of the welfare state was increasingly seen as fundamental to 
the achievement of human rights.  The Second Vatican Council‘s social message 
of improving social life and conditions resonated in Irish society (Conroy, 1999).  
Within Ireland, the launch of the Kilkenny Conference on Poverty (1971 & 1981) 
forced the subject on to the domestic agenda.  Where poverty was recognized 
prior to this time as being the result of individual ineptitude, the 
conceptualization began to shift towards greater State responsibility for citizen 
wellbeing.  The dominant policy idea was being challenged by the increasing 
public perception that poverty needed to be redefined and a more comprehensive 
solution found. 
Ireland‘s entry into the European Economic Community also represented 
a watershed.  When Ireland joined the EEC in 1973, the social dimension of 
Europe was just beginning to take shape.  For many Irish politicians, entry into 
Europe offered a ready scapegoat for the country‘s economic woes based on the 
demands of European integration.  Many blamed joblessness on the shift of 
industry to other EEC member countries, exacerbating already high levels of 
unemployment and poverty at home.  While this frame was primarily anti-
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Europe – or at least pro-Irish protectionism – the core conceptualization of 
poverty contained within this viewpoint was largely structural and 
multidimensional.  The Social Action Programme, adopted by the European 
Council in 1974, provided a role for the European Community in combating 
poverty, leading to the 1975 introduction of the first of three European Anti-
Poverty programs (Landford, 1999).  The first program sought to address 
shortcomings in prevailing poverty theories and policy solutions, identifying the 
need to target specific groups with anti-poverty strategies and actively 
encouraging partnership between the government, private sector, trade unions 
and, particularly, community and voluntary groups.   The second European Anti-
Poverty program (1985-1989) included extensive research on poverty in Ireland 
leading to a growing understanding of the structural and multidimensional 
causes and consequences of poverty (Ibid pg. 92).   
 
THE CONVERGENCE OF IDEAS AND THE INTRODUCTION OF SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP 
By 1986, the three components of the changing discourse surrounding 
partnership and poverty for the Government and the social partners outlined 
above began to converge.  Economic turmoil had affected every economic sector 
in the country.  The concept of social partnership as a potential solution to the 
nation‘s economic problems became a permanent fixture in employer, union and 
political discourse during this period.  The climate of industrial relations had 
reached new depths and it became clear that a new policy direction was 
131 
 
required.  Partnership was also a consistent theme in the Fianna Fáil campaign; 
the Programme for National Recovery was so called after the party‘s political 
manifesto of the same name.  Finally, the conceptualization of poverty had 
shifted towards a multidimensional understanding among the public and 
policymakers alike.   The stage was set for dramatic policy change.  
In January of 1987, the Labour Party withdrew from coalition with Fine 
Gael over budget disagreements, precipitating a crisis in government.  Taoiseach 
Garret Fitzgerald dissolved the Dáil and called for new elections rather than 
continue with the Fine Gael policy agenda as a minority government.  Elections 
were scheduled for February 17th; the unusually long waiting period was 
planned in hopes that the general public might respond positively to Fine Gael‘s 
budget proposals.  While public opinion polls suggested a strong showing for 
Fianna Fáil, they failed to win enough seats for an absolute majority.  However, 
the new center-right Progress Democrat party emerged as a surprisingly strong 
third party, taking seats from Fine Gael and allowing Fianna Fáil to form a 
minority government alone.  The Labour party lost only four seats, but the losses 
were sufficient to place them fourth.   Between the three major parties, however, 
a mere twenty seats changed hands; incumbency rates were still very high.  
Rather than consider the 1987 election as an unprecedented electoral watershed 
for Fianna Fáil, thereby driving the observed policy change, it is necessary to 
identify the underlying shift in causal ideas that created the opportunity for the 
launch of social partnership.    
132 
 
The new Government, under Haughey‘s leadership, was clearly set on 
social partnership.  Achieving the necessary agreement of the social partners 
required building a causal story that outlined dysfunctional policymaking as the 
problem and negotiated consensus as the solution.  Also significant were the 
practical considerations requiring attention in the face of the economic crisis.  
The Government had to make some harsh economic choices, cutting spending to 
shrink the national debt. In order to achieve these ends, the social partners had 
to be in support of the plan from the start.   Although seemingly instrumental, 
the motivation for binding the social partners to a national agreement was 
fundamentally based on a discourse of partnership‘s virtue as the best method 
for economic recovery and reduction of poverty. 
Taoiseach Charles Haughey and Labour Minister (future Taoiseach), 
Bertie Ahern had already made in-roads with union leaders, negotiating support 
for a national partnership agreement.  Moreover, Fianna Fáil capitalized on the 
publication of the NESC strategy report, generating widespread support for the 
consensus model already outlined by the social partners.  The employers were 
slower to get behind the new deal, still skeptical about the sincerity of the union 
stance.  Ultimately it became clear to all parties that the new Government was 
serious about setting aside partisanship in the interest of a national agreement; 
it was abundantly clear that the future of every economic sector in Ireland was 
undeniably intertwined.  
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The reluctance of employers‘ organizations was addressed in three 
significant ways, leading them to reconceptualize partnership as a new policy 
direction; the causal story within the discourse shifted from one of conflict and 
diminishing union power to one of economic development and success through 
consensus.  First, it became increasingly clear that Charles Haughey and 
Padraig O‘hUiginn, as his senior civil servant in the Department of the 
Taoiseach, were prepared to move forward with partnership arrangements with 
or without the employers.  The threat of marginalization was significant and 
demanded new thinking on behalf of the employers when addressing social 
partnership.  Secondly, the employers‘ perceived benefits from participation in 
the partnership negotiations were increasing relative to the strength of the 
unions.  Had bargaining remained outside of a national agreement, unions might 
have secured more benefits than possible within the confines of a strict 
partnership deal.   Finally, employers were clearly suffering the ill effects of the 
economic recession as well; it had become abundantly clear that economic 
recovery was not going to be possible under the status quo.  In fact, as Hastings 
et al. (2007) note, ―a view was gaining acceptance in business and indeed in 
wider circles that, ultimately, the Irish political system might not have the 
ability to address the situation‖; the future of Irish industry could not be 
entrusted to the government alone.  
From the unions‘ perspective, social partnership represented a way into 
governance that was largely pragmatic, rather than ideological.  As compared to 
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unions in the UK, Irish trade unionism identified the negotiated consensus 
model as the means by which their declining membership might maintain 
national influence.  Despite skepticism among the employers as to the sincerity 
of union commitment, the leadership was genuinely dedicated to achieving 
progress for its workers, but also pursing the best interests of the country.  In 
particular, the unions made it clear that they were prepared to deal with severe 
cutbacks in order to manage the national debt, foregoing pay raises until 
economic recovery could be realized.   While the tenacity of union leadership in 
obtaining the support of their membership surprised many within the 
partnership negotiations, there was a sense of destiny (nearly ‗patriotic duty‘ as 
Tim Toner, former President of IBEC, describes the unions‘ activity in Hastings 
et al. 2007) that required the embrace of partnership to ensure Ireland‘s future.  
Emerging political leaders within Fine Gael also foresaw their political 
futures as incumbent upon solving the national economic crisis.  The idea of 
consensual governance appealed as leaders sought to be a part of the solution 
rather than the problem.  Haughey‘s minority government, in conjunction with 
leaders like Fine Gael‘s Alan Dukes, seized the opportunity in 1987 to actively 
promote a new inclusive institutional framework designed to tackle economic 
and social development as the only possible means forward.  In what was 
subsequently described as the ―Tallaght Strategy‖, Dukes publically supported 
government policy despite deep political divisions: ―When the Government is 
moving in the right direction, I will not oppose the central thrust of its policy.  If 
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it is going in the right direction, I do not believe that it should be deviated from 
its course, or tripped up on macro-economic issues‖ (Dukes, Tallaght Chamber of 
Commerce Sept. 1987).   A broad political consensus existed around the need for 
spending cuts, but more importantly, the Opposition gave unspoken agreement 
to end ‗politics as usual‘, opposition for opposition‘s sake.  As Minister for 
Finance, Ray McSharry describes ―Everybody realized after the 1987 election 
things had to change.  It was a minority government.  Fine Gael or the PDs 
could have turned around any day and put us out… The Tallaght Strategy, when 
it came in, made it a little easier on the political side‖ (Ray McSharry as quoted 
in Hastings, Sheehan and Yeates, 2007).     
In relation to the Fianna Fáil government, it is important to note that this 
period represented the political fruition of policy ideas long held by Haughey; as 
early as 1975, he had outlined plans for economic development through 
partnership and promotion of higher living standards for the poor:  ―The vehicle 
for that effort can only be participative economic planning, which clearly 
demonstrates what real growth in living standards and employment can be 
attained…‖ (Haughey, 1975 as quoted in Hastings, Sheehan and Yeates, 2007).  
However, until 1987, the standard model of Irish politics prevented much 
progress in terms of social partnership; it was only after a common 
understanding of the way forward emerged among the social partners and 
political Opposition that these aims were to be achieved.  
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Finally, the conceptualization of poverty had clearly shifted in both the 
public and political view.  The view of poverty as multidimensional had taken 
root both internationally and domestically, and became truly embedded in Irish 
policymaking with the introduction of social partnership.  As a comprehensive 
solution to the national economic crisis, the new agreement outlined the 
multidimensionality of the problem by addressing housing, health care, 
education, welfare, employment and social exclusion.  The Programme for 
National Recovery begins: the social partners ―conscious of the grave state of our 
economic and social life, have agreed on this Programme to seek to regenerate 
our economy and improve the social equity of our society through their combined 
efforts‖ and commits the social partners to policymaking aimed at ―diminishing 
or removing social inequities in our society‖ (PNR, 1987). Subsequent 
agreements would broaden these social aims significantly, eventually directly 
including the Community/Voluntary sector in negotiations.  But given the depths 
of the economic crisis, it is clear, even from this minimalist language, that 
recognition of the need for consensual governance to combat social exclusion was 
pervasive among the social partners and Government.    
      
CONCLUSIONS 
Policy development in Ireland has been largely incremental and slow given the 
institutionalization of specific causal stories over time.  The conservative nature 
of the Irish State preserved the status quo for the majority of the last half 
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century.  As the conceptual understanding of poverty and the role of partnership 
shifted away from the existing policy ideas in the 1970s and ‗80s, however, an 
inherent friction developed within the system.  The institutional shift to a 
partnership model in the late 1980s became possible only after sufficient 
political mobilization forced a new conceptualization of partnership and a clearer 
understanding of social exclusion, and its potential solutions, onto the political 
agenda.  The resulting tension produced large scale change in the institutional 
structure as a direct consequence of shifting the causal stories underlying 
partnership and poverty.   
 As this chapter has outlined in detail, critical to the introduction of social 
partnership was the shifting causal ideas present in the relevant policymaking 
discourse, most specifically among the Government, unions and employers.  As 
the political parties in Ireland began to see their own futures as dependent upon 
practical, non-partisan solutions to the national economic crisis, the policy choice 
of social partnership became evident as the way forward.  For the Government, 
employers, and the unions in particular, as the view of partnership shifted 
towards a more collective, consensual understanding of governance, the 
preferred choice became a comprehensive national agreement over other 
available alternatives such as a return to limited pay deals, exclusion of the 
unions from negotiations, or a more strictly Thatcher style model of economic 
reform.  Finally, as the discourse about poverty advanced to being cognizant of 
structural, multidimensional causes and consequences, the appeal of social 
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partnership as a new policy direction increased significantly.  These causal ideas 
supported one another, and became the national blueprint for a new policy 
direction.   
 Earlier chapters have addressed the institutional and environmental 
conditions that affect policy change.  However, as demonstrated quantitatively 
and qualitatively, these theories are limited.  Institutional accounts of ‗slip-stick‘ 
policy dynamics fail to address dramatic policy change that occurs outside the 
parameters of existing policy processes, and cannot explain sufficiently explain 
why some episodes of friction produce change while others do not.  Economic and 
political explanations for policy change are also limited in this regard, 
suggesting we should not find the introduction of a comprehensive social 
partnership in parallel with a centrist, neo-liberal policy agenda.  The decision to 
adopt such a comprehensive social partnership model is uncommon around 
Europe; the structure simply does not exist in the UK, Ireland‘s nearest 
neighbor, and only Austria‘s national partnership is more involved.  This chapter 
has provided evidence that while institutional and environmental accounts fail 
to explain dramatic policy change, the fundamental contribution of causal ideas 
provides otherwise elusive insights.   
 However, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, the conditions for 
policy change are not isolated from other another.  Variation in institutional 
friction, political and economic conditions and causal ideas is required to 
generate major policy changes.  As shown in Table 9, the opportunity for policy 
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change appeared prior to 1987, as indicated by levels of friction and 
environmental conditions.   Yet, without the simultaneous shift in the causal 
ideas, change did not occur in any significant way.  Moreover, the data reflect 
the fact that later periods of equally charged conditions failed to produce 
corresponding policy changes.  I argue that the causal story of partnership had 
become embedded during the 1990s, effectively preventing new policy 
trajectories despite changing institutional, economic and political circumstances.   
 
TABLE 9: POLICY STASIS AND PUNCTUATION IN THE IRISH CASE 
Time 
Period 
Friction Environment Causal Ideas Policy Outcome 
1980-84 High 
Economic Recession/ 
Fine Gael-Labour 
coalition 
Traditional & 
Conservative 
1st Order Change 
1986-88 High 
Economic Recession/ 
Fianna Fáil minority 
Negotiated 
Consensus and 
Social Exclusion 
Punctuation: 
Social 
Partnership 
1995-98 Very High 
Economic 
Boom/Fianna Fáil 
and PD coalition 
Negotiated 
Consensus and 
Social Exclusion 
1st & 2nd Order 
Change 
2005-07 Low 
Beginning of 
Economic 
Recession/Fianna 
Fáil and Green 
coalition 
Shifting 
Punctuation: 
Social 
Partnership 
Collapse 
 
In light of the findings here, I suggest that the current partnership crisis 
is a function of the re-politicization of these same policy images; political 
manipulations of the causal stories surrounding partnership and social exclusion 
have irrevocably altered the institutional environment and subsequent policy 
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outcomes.  As new causal stories fill the void left by the collapse of partnership, 
new policy directions will emerge.  While it is too early to determine the idea 
around which policy will coalesce, it appears evident that the formerly powerful 
images of negotiated consensus, solidarity and social inclusion have been deeply 
tarnished at the national level.  Only at the local level do these concepts still 
resonate and generate deep commitments to social policy outcomes; this will be 
discussed more in the concluding chapter.  The national identity crisis produced 
by the recent economic recession is forcing new causal ideas to compete for the 
future of social policy in Ireland. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
A PARTNERSHIP FOR THE FUTURE? 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
―The wheels have now come off the partnership process and the year is 
ending with unions planning wide spread industrial action and warning 
that there is no hope of the Government securing its planned public-sector 
reforms…2009 will be remembered as the year in which social partnership 
broke down‖ 
– Martin Wall, The Irish Times, Dec. 28th, 2009 
 
 
―The extent of the fiscal crisis also makes it important to engage the 
cooperation of the Opposition and the social partners in a national effort 
to stem the crisis. It is certainly a lot to ask for the Opposition to ease up 
their pressure on the Government on any dimension. But we need to avoid 
a debilitating political battle that ultimately succeeds only in shrinking 
the economy and transferring our scarce income abroad in higher interest 
payments.   From conversations with Opposition figures, I know they are 
genuinely angry at Government failures, and believe strongly it should be 
replaced. But I also sense a genuine desire to do what is right for the 
country. I don‘t think it is hopelessly naive to think that a critical, if 
limited, form of cooperation is possible in the national interest.‖ 
   – Professor John McHale, NUI Galway, Sept. 28th 2010 
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INTRODUCTION 
The two quotes above give some indication of the magnitude of the current 
economic crisis in Ireland.  Indeed, as Martin Wall predicted at the end of last 
year, 2010 has been a year of industrial strike and protest across Ireland.  The 
public sector unions, nurses, airport workers, and others have all taken to 
industrial action in the past twelve months.  As the Government prepares to bail 
out the Allied Irish Bank group for thirty billion Euros in bond failures, the 
future of the Irish economy looks rather grim.  However, as the second quote 
eloquently captures, the idea, the causal story, that the policymakers and 
citizens alike continue to focus upon, is that inclusive, consensus based solutions 
are the only way forward.  John McHale‘s quote would have resonated well in 
the debate over the nation‘s economic future in 1986, but today it sounds a little 
sentimental, even as it captures the national mood.    Above all, his notion of 
‗doing what‘s right for the country‘ is suggestive of the powerfully attractive 
vision of social partnership.   
In this dissertation, I have had two goals.  First, my aim has been to 
contribute to the broader literature on policy change by incorporating significant 
causal ideas into the analysis.  Second, I have sought to develop an historical 
analysis of specific policy change in Ireland that accounts for major policy 
change more broadly and more definitively than existing accounts in the 
literature.  Before detailing the dissertation‘s contributions on these two levels 
in depth, I summarize the central arguments, methods and findings from each 
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chapter.  The final section of the dissertation draws out the broader implications 
of this research and suggests opportunities for future study.  The lessons learned 
from this study are significant, not only for students of the policy process and 
those interested in the role of ideas in affecting policy change, but for all scholars 
of modern governance.    
 
THEORIES AND ARGUMENTS 
My work begins with three fundamental premises: policies are generally static; 
institutional, political and economic factors condition policy outcomes; and 
shifting causal ideas, interacting with these conditioning factors, are required to 
produce episodes of dramatic policy change.  At the core of this study are the 
causal ideas that drive episodes of punctuated policy change.   More specifically, 
this work considers the dramatic policy shift witnessed in the late 1980s in 
Ireland with the introduction of social partnership.   Partnership fundamentally 
altered the way that welfare and anti-poverty policies are formulated in Ireland, 
representing a radical departure from conventional norms.   Essential to this 
dramatic shift, or policy punctuation, were the relevant causal ideas in use both 
politically and socially.   
Given these three premises, I then consider each stage of the 
policymaking process with respect to the dynamics of major policy 
transformation.   In the first stage, I ask whether the documented effects of 
institutional friction in general exist for a single policy domain: social welfare.  I 
144 
 
argue that this policy issue represents a tough case for the existing literature as 
theoretical expectations of responsiveness within the social protection agenda 
are high.   In order to test these expectations, I use a three country analysis of 
institutional friction.  By focusing on a single policy domain in multiple settings, 
leverage is gained on the relevant exogenous factors contributing to policy stasis 
and change over time.  I contend that the disaggregation of policy issues, across 
differing country settings, reveals alternative pathways for policymaking, 
conditioned by friction, which the existing literature on punctuated change has 
heretofore overlooked.   
In the second stage of the analysis, the role of conditioning factors 
working in concert with procedural friction is explored in more depth.  In this 
section, I consider the unique effects of changes in the political and economic 
environment on policy outcomes while including a temporal measure of 
institutional friction in the complete model.  I argue that conventional 
interpretations of social welfare spending patterns adequately account for some 
incremental or functional – 1st or 2nd order (Hall, 1993) – policy changes in 
Ireland over the past thirty years.  However, the analysis here is theoretically 
and empirically broadened to incorporate measures of institutional friction in 
order to better address the omitted variable bias present in existing literature on 
policy punctuation and social spending.   More importantly, I contend that the 
explanation of dramatic policy change remains incomplete without the 
operationalization of relevant causal ideas.   
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 The final stage of the analysis, therefore, asks how we can interpret 
radical policy change – 3rd order paradigm shift (Hall, 1993) – or policy change 
that occurs outside the predictions of both friction based accounts of ‗slip-stick‘ 
movement and more functional accounts of economic and political needs and 
capacities.  I suggest that episodes of radical departure need to be approached 
via interrogation of the causal ideas at work within the relevant policy discourse.       
 
METHODS AND FINDINGS 
Chapter Two recreates the Baumgartner and Jones punctuated equilibrium 
framework for a single policy domain across three European countries: Ireland, 
Denmark and the Netherlands.  Using measures of kurtosis and observing 
aggregated variable distributions, I test the level of institutional friction present 
at each stage of the social welfare policy process for these cases.  I extend the 
traditional empirical analysis via inclusion of Shapiro-Francia tests, revealing 
highly leptokurtic, non-normal distributions in social policy inputs, procedures 
and outcomes.  Moreover, I show that the levels of friction vary by stage in the 
policy process and by country, indicating multiple pathways to punctuated policy 
change.   
Findings from Chapter Two suggest that institutional resistance is a 
function of the political and economic conditions under which policymaking 
occurs, but also of the stage of the policy process in which actors and institutions 
affect resistance.  While these results confirm much of the existing literature on 
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policy punctuations, they also demonstrate the need to disaggregate policy issues 
and explore in more detail the underlying environmental factors contributing to 
periods of both stasis and change.  More significantly for the remainder of the 
study, this chapter situates the Irish case in the European context to reveal that 
policy outcomes in Ireland reflect similar trends in other countries.  As compared 
to Denmark and the Netherlands, the finding that friction is particularly 
sensitive to environmental conditions during the procedural process in Ireland 
generates new insight and new questions for the next stages of analysis.  
Specifically, results suggest that the policy process is directly linked with 
political and economic forces present in a given temporal context, generating 
unique policy trajectories over time. 
Chapter Three begins by deconstructing traditional accounts for 
variations in social welfare spending, relating the existing literature to the Irish 
case.  Using an autoregressive distributed lag model for time series analysis, this 
chapter takes seriously the effects of both environmental conditions and 
institutional friction over time on social policy outcomes while controlling for 
temporal autocorrelation. I use several control variables for economic and 
political factors that might also explain social welfare expenditure rates, 
including measures of inflation, trade openness, election cycles, and the 
influence of the political left.  The time series model displayed in this chapter 
uniquely operationalizes friction in the procedural process as an independent 
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variable to demonstrate the significant effect of institutional resistance to policy 
change. 
Findings in Chapter Three confirm much of the existing literature on 
welfare expenditure while highlighting the distinctive contribution of friction 
measures.  General trends in Irish social policy reflect general expectations for 
spending as a result of economic and political demands.  Higher inflation, 
unemployment, globalization, a stronger political left and impending election 
cycles all contribute to increases in welfare spending.  However, findings in this 
section also provide an empirical test of the policy process as a whole, 
demonstrating the direct effect of procedural friction on budgetary outcomes.  As 
such, this chapter significantly extends the work of punctuated equilibrium 
theory by moving beyond simple recognition of friction and operationalizing it in 
the analysis as an independent causal variable.  
Yet, conventional explanations for policy change in this realm still fail to 
provide insight into dramatic, transformative policy adoption, such as the 
introduction of social partnership in Ireland in 1987.  The decision to embed 
social policy in a national consensus based agreement is not accounted for by 
standard budgetary allocations or general welfare trends.  While economic and 
political factors are clearly significant for understanding the depth of the Irish 
crisis and the need for a radical new policy direction, traditional institutional 
and environmental models for policy change are insufficient to explain policy 
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outcomes in this case without operationalization of causal ideas within the 
dominant policy discourse.       
Having made the case that neither punctuated nor standard functional 
accounts of policy change are sufficient for explaining episodes of dramatic policy 
shift, the final empirical chapter completes the analysis, tracing the effects of 
causal ideas over time.  Specifically, the recognition by unions, employers and 
government that Ireland‘s economic problems in the 1980s should be addressed 
through a comprehensive, consensus based model of governance that trumped all 
alternative ways of conceptualizing the future. Traditional labor relations 
characterized by conflict during negotiations and bargaining cycles especially 
following the ‗free-for-all‘ period of the 1970s and early ‗80s were unsustainable. 
The unions were weakened by the recession, emigration and the events of 
Thatcher‘s England.  The employers also needed union support to make tough 
economic changes, including securing a pay deal on terms that open negotiations 
might not have achieved.  Finally, after a decade of instability, the government 
needed the support of all economic sectors to make the radical changes necessary 
to save the Irish economy.   
 Within the political realm, the same transformation was occurring.  Since 
independence, Ireland‘s major political parties had been entrenched in 
combative relationship based on traditional positions following the civil war.  
Ideologically, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael are not polar opposites; in fact, the 
political agendas of these two centrist parties are often highly convergent.  As 
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such, intense competition has often stymied cooperation.  A focus on consensus 
building and a willingness to overcome political barriers characterized the 
strategy of progressive political actors in both the incoming Government and 
Opposition of 1987.   
Finally, the social policy agenda, as advanced through the introduction of 
partnership, was fundamentally altered by the reconceptualization of poverty.  
During this time, the image of poverty shifted away from traditional 
considerations of personality responsibility, associated with the need to instill 
moral rectitude and provide charity to worthy recipients.  Increasingly, the 
causal story entrenched in Irish social policy became one of social exclusion, 
―associated with the concept of multidimensional disadvantage, or multiple 
deprivation…in relation to housing, health, education, transport, leisure, etc. 
and with limited participation in the decisions affecting life chances‖ (Geddes 
and Benington, 2001: 4).  Prescriptions for solving social exclusion necessitate 
multidimensional, inclusive, comprehensive policies.  As a new policy trajectory, 
tying anti-poverty programs to social partnership was an innovative, highly 
aspirational strategy which set Ireland apart from its European neighbors. 
 
THE CELTIC TIGER AND OTHER OUTCOMES OF PARTNERSHIP 
The early 1990s and 2000s are often referred to as the ―Celtic Tiger‖ era in 
Ireland.  After the devastating recession of the 1980s, which saw unemployment 
rates of nearly 30% and emigration returning to mid-19th century famine era 
150 
 
levels, Ireland began to recover economically in the early 1990s.  Several of 
Fianna Fáil‘s key initiatives in the late 1980s and early ‗90s took root, including 
industrial, educational and infrastructural policies that promoted foreign 
investment and domestic growth.  Central among these strategies was the 
formation of social partnership, binding all relevant sectors of the Irish economy 
together for long-term development and policymaking. To outside investors, the 
Irish government made the country as attractive as possible: a low tax regime on 
company profits; a highly educated, technically adept workforce; and 
nationalized pay deals ensuring wage moderation, union cooperation and 
progressive social policies.  Social partnership was undeniably a major factor in 
the success of the Celtic Tiger era. 
Over time, these structures were transferred to every level of governance 
and extended to multiple policy issues, instituting social partnership style 
decision making for most policymaking bodies and service providers across the 
country.  The Irish government was given kudos as well as extensive funding 
through the European Union Structural Funds to build and maintain the new 
partnership institutions.  Ultimately, the Irish model became a blueprint of best 
practice for other European countries to follow.  The flexibility and organic 
process of partnership in Ireland was recognized as a readily transferable policy 
idea, able to be tailored to the specific needs of national or local communities 
across Europe.  Moreover, Ireland was not alone is adopting competitive neo-
corporatist arrangements; the Netherlands, Portugal, Italy and Spain all 
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implemented social pacts to varying degrees in order to address the economic 
challenges of post-industrial development. The demands of the European single 
market produced strong incentives for bringing economic policy under control 
through partnership style institutions (Molina and Rhodes, 2002).  Yet, Ireland‘s 
model of competitive neo-corporatism and the deep commitment to social issues 
embedded in the pacts represented a unique form of institutional development.    
Today, Irish social partnership has collapsed.  At the national level, the 
most recent social partnership transitional agreement has stalled despite over 
two years of negotiations.  Employers, unions and the Government remain poles 
apart in trying to formulate new wage bargaining agreements in particular.  
Indeed, recent news reports claim that ‗partnership is dead‘ (Irish Times, 
December 5, 2009).  Neo-corporatist models in general have faltered across 
Europe as many countries typically governed by consensus have adopted more 
streamlined, decentralized and market-based approaches. Where once 
cooperative economies were seen as guaranteeing high productivity and 
investment growth (Gordon, 1996), they are now suffering from labor immobility 
and economic stagnation.  However, across other European economies, neo-
corporatist models are more typically evolving and adapting to changing 
economic circumstances rather than utterly collapsing.  In Ireland, it seems that 
there is little hope that the central tenets of the national social partnership can 
be resurrected.   
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Several explanations emerge for why consensual governance has failed in 
other countries.  The literature on corporatism identifies the weakening of trade 
unions, the increase in services industry employment and European integration 
as the three primary factors explaining the decline in social partnership.   The 
unions, in league with major political parties, have traditionally established 
strong positions in the economic forum, promoting economic efficiency through 
wage setting institutions.  Where the unions were once highly centralized and 
acting collectively, their role was to produce cooperative optimal policy solutions.   
However, where unions have been more independent of one another, the 
collective results have produced suboptimal outcomes relative to what unions 
might have achieved through direct negotiations.   Moreover, the capacity of the 
labor unions has now been reduced by decreasing numbers of blue collar 
workers.   So, while unionization may have formerly solved problems of economic 
efficiency and wage bargaining, the power of the institution is presently 
subsiding.   
The debate over corporatism‘s value in an open economy has become even 
more prescient in the era of globalization.  Three specific trends are evident in 
the literature focusing on the effect of globalization on ―production, occupational 
structures and international economic integration‖ in domestic economies 
(Wallerstein et al., 1997).  The expectations of increased flexibility and 
specialization, for both production and employment, in a globalized economy are 
less compatible with centralized wage bargaining.   Looser labor markets have 
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reduced the need for centralized bargaining and social partnership (Rhodes, 
2001).  Finally, integration into the single European market has also 
undermined the wage bargaining institutions at the national level (Wallerstein 
et al., 1997: 380).  The introduction of the European single market introduced 
pressure to control wage competitiveness, deficit spending and currency 
devaluation; these former tools of domestic economies to generate growth are 
now regulated tightly (Rhodes, 2001).   
However, results have been mixed across Europe on each of these issues 
and no consistent pattern of decline in social partnership has been associated 
with increased levels of globalization. Each country has been forced to address 
global economic development based on domestic concerns.  Indeed, in Ireland 
trade union density has declined in recent decades and today only accounts for 
approximately 30% of the workforce (OECD, 2007).  However, other countries 
that have adopted partnerships either started with lower rates of union 
membership initially (Spain) or experienced institutional setbacks despite 
maintaining steady levels of membership over time (Belgium, Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark).  The literature also suggests that development of the services 
industry (as opposed to blue collar employment) contributes to the decline of neo-
corporatist models.   However, employment in Ireland has long been focused 
primarily on the services industry.   Overall, manufacturing accounted for 23% 
of employment in 1981 and maintained that share between about 1991 and 
1997, eventually rising to about 27% as of 2009.  So, while the services industry 
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has rapidly expanded, it has not come at the direct expense of the manufacturing 
sector (Nolan et al., 2000; OECD, 2009).  More significantly, while 
manufacturing went through a major decline in the early 1980s, that 
development roughly paralleled the adoption of social partnership rather than 
its decline.    
Finally, partnership has not simply run its course with regard to social 
policy; indeed, the policy aims of the original social partnership agreements are 
far from being met.  By the end of 2002, despite average growth rates of real 
GDP of over 8% for nearly a decade (OECD), the percentage of people living 
below a 60% threshold poverty line remained at approximately 9%.  In 2005, the 
rate had dipped to 7%, but is back on the rise in the current economic recession 
(EU-SILC, 2005).  Social exclusion and unemployment rates are now returning 
to pre-boom levels (official unemployment stands at approximately 14% as of 
June 2010), further undermining the original anti-poverty goals of the 
partnership model.   
Today, the cost and commitment required to maintain partnership style 
policymaking may no longer be sustainable.  During the period of economic boom 
that followed the introduction of social partnership, the pie was large and 
growing and dividing it among the social partners was a happy task; this is no 
longer the case.  Social welfare programs and local partnerships funded by the 
national exchequer are among the many economic and social welfare provisions 
having their budgets severely cut in an effort to balance the national fiscal 
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ledger.  Equally, the political leadership of the late 1980s firmly believed in the 
power of social cohesion for economic recovery and growth, whereas the current 
political leadership lacks the dedication to either the design or the ethos 
necessary to maintain social partnership.  Wallerstein and Golden (2000) argue 
that the ability of corporatist models to adapt rather than self-destruct is 
primarily a function of politics, and recent research certainly suggests that the 
current Irish government is dismantling the consensus based aspects of working 
in partnership in favor of more streamlined policymaking (Kirby and Adshead, 
2008).   More significantly, the existing policy ideas defining social issues and 
the welfare state in Ireland are being altered by another conceptual shift.   In 
this instance, the ideas of social partnership and social exclusion are again 
under attack.  The problem definition now includes the inefficiencies of working 
in partnership among the causes of economic recession in modern Ireland; 
―Partnership itself may in some ways be responsible for lack of competitiveness‖ 
(Tony Crooks, interview July 7, 2009).  National agreements may have 
prevented the flexibility required to adapt to global recession.  Also, empathy for 
those who were unable to harness the benefits of the Celtic Tiger era is in short 
supply among policymakers and those in government.  Irish citizens are being 
repeatedly instructed to ‗tighten their belts‘ without complementary recognition 
of the broader structural causes of social exclusion today.  As a result, the model 
of partnership once promoted is now readily collapsing.  In Ireland, the policy 
image which shifted to create opportunities for partnership policies in the late 
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1980s is now under reconstruction, contributing to the demise of the partnership 
design today and forcing a dramatic reconsideration of anti-poverty policy.  
Causal ideas are again at work in affecting dramatic policy change in Ireland. 
 
LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In his book, Seeing like a State, James C. Scott (1998) highlights the unintended 
consequences of state action with regard to public policy and planning.  He 
focuses on the most tragic episodes of state initiated social programs, arguing 
that human misery is often the result of the unchecked pursuit of rationality 
(Scott, 1998).  In the case of Ireland, the creation of social partnership and its 
extension to the local level has also produced unintended consequences.  
However, these choices may have, in fact, created innovative ways to address 
human suffering.  The intentions of the national government, in introducing the 
first social partnership agreement, were to address the crippling levels of 
unemployment, emigration and economic stagnation that characterized Ireland in 
the mid-1980s.  The crisis had reached unmanageable levels; a dynamic new 
policy direction was needed.  Simultaneously, the policy ideas which had 
dominated the national view of poverty and partnership agreements – 
characterized by discord among the social partners and the leading political 
parties – began to collapse.  New ideas were rising on the policy agenda, 
specifically the images of social exclusion as a multidimensional understanding 
of poverty and the need for an inclusive, comprehensive policy direction.   Social 
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partnership, bringing the major parties of interest to the table, was conceived of 
as the way forward.   
Thus far, this work has covered the multitude of reasons why this 
dramatic policy change occurred, yet it is the effects at the local level and some 
of the unintended consequences of the national social partnership that remain 
unexplored.  By way of conclusion, this section addresses broader theoretical 
questions by suggesting avenues for future research that highlights the work of 
partnership at the local and national level.   While the national level partnership 
may not ultimately survive in Ireland, the institution has had a profound effect 
on how local communities address poverty and social exclusion.  Partnerships at 
the local level have built strong social networks, community based economic 
activities, and sustainable development of neighborhoods.   Though these goals 
were present in the national level agreements, it is only at the local level that 
partnership has approached their achievement.   
Irish local partnership was formally introduced in 1991 as a result of 
section seven of the second national partnership agreement: the Programme for 
Economic and Social Progress25.  The purpose of local partnership was to 
generate area-based, community oriented responses to long-term unemployment 
and social exclusion.  Each of the local partnerships was set up as a non-profit 
company with an organizational structure that mirrored the national 
partnership; board members were local representatives of unions, employers, 
                                                             
25
 As mentioned in the introduction, there were several local community partnerships, such as PAUL 
partnership in Limerick, already in existence by this time.   
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state agencies, and the voluntary/community sector.  Local area authorities were 
initially excluded from the original model in order to keep partnerships non-
partisan but were formally included by 2000.   
The twelve original local area partnerships were expanded to thirty-eight 
in 1993, following that year‘s national development plan. Throughout the 1990s, 
extensive funding from the European Union promoted the expansion of local 
partnerships under the area-based management schemes. Today local 
partnerships have now been merged with other rural, urban, agricultural, 
Gaeltacht (Irish speaking), and community organizations under the current 
governments‘ ―cohesion‖ process, creating thirty-seven integrated companies 
that cover a broad range of development activities.  Overall, area-based 
partnerships have become an integral part of the national level policy agenda in 
combating social exclusion across Ireland.   
While Ireland‘s experience of social partnership at both the national and 
local level is unique, the diffusion of partnerships as a social policy institution 
across Europe offers one potential avenue for future research.  The Irish decision 
to embed social policy in the national partnership agreement is unique among 
European countries; only Austria provides a more comprehensive program of 
social policies in their national agreements.  However, the decision to implement 
social policy at the local level via partnerships has become increasingly popular 
across Europe in countries other than Austria and Ireland, yet there is 
substantial variation in institutional design.  I argue that five significant factors 
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contribute to this variation in policy diffusion at both the national and local 
level: 1) Relevant causal ideas about social partnership and welfare policies; 2) 
EU directives on social inclusion programs and the attached conditionality of 
area-based responses; 3) domestic traditions, such as a history of national level 
corporatism; 4) domestic conditions, including economic, political and interest 
group priorities; and 5) adoption by nearest neighbors, either physical (sharing a 
border) or ideological (common traditions).     
 
TABLE 10: EUROPEAN CORPORATISM, POLICY CONCERTATION AND LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS 
Country 
National Level  of 
Corporatism 
(Siaroff, 1999) 
National Level of  
Policy Concertation 
(Compston & Berger, 2002) 
Degree of Local 
Partnership 
(EFILWC) 
Austria Strongly Corporatist 
Social, economic, industrial, 
labor, employment, EU 
Limited, 
Developing 
Britain Weakly Corporatist 
Very limited concertation at 
national level 
Active, 
Competitive 
France Weakly Corporatist Employment, social security 
Limited, 
Regional 
Germany Moderately Corporatist 
Social insurance, labor, 
health 
Active, Regional 
Ireland Moderately Corporatist 
Social, economic, industrial, 
labor, employment, EU 
Active, County 
Based 
Italy Weakly Corporatist Tax, expenditure, labor 
Limited, 
Regional 
Sweden Strongly Corporatist 
Labor, pensions, 
employment 
Limited, 
Developing 
The Netherlands Moderately Corporatist Social security, employment 
Limited, 
Developing 
 
Preliminary work in this area suggests that some European countries 
with the strongest traditions of corporatism, such as Finland, Sweden and 
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Norway, do not readily transfer social policy programs to the local partnership 
levels.   Likewise, despite generations of national level partnership, Austria has 
only recently begun to adopt strong local partnerships.  Conversely, as the case 
of Ireland demonstrates, national and local level partnerships can be 
implemented simultaneously.  Or, as in the case of Britain, national partnership 
need not occur for local area partnerships to thrive.   In the broader European 
context, there is a great deal of work to be done evaluating the diffusion and 
development of these unique policy institutions. 
Next, while a comprehensive analysis was conducted by Fitzpatrick 
Associates in the 2007 ―Value for Money Review‖ in Ireland, little comparative 
empirical work has been done on the question of institutional design and the 
outcomes local partnerships.  As a result of the recent cohesion process in 
Ireland, a quasi-natural experiment has presented itself as an opportunity to 
evaluate the effects of changing local partnership structures from organic, 
community-specific institutions to county-based, identical, streamlined 
structures.  As Lowdnes and Wilson (2002) suggest, institutional design can 
have a significant impact on social capital outcomes and community 
development.  Their study of local partnerships in the UK is suggestive of a 
research design that may be readily comparable to the Irish case and other 
European countries.   In addition to broader questions of European policy 
diffusion above, future research should focus on the conditions under which 
partnerships are more or less effective, specially asking what factors explain the 
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variation observed across EU member states and over time with regard to 
effectively combating social exclusion through the use of social partnerships.   
What are the domestic variables that contribute to their success or failure?   
These results could then be usefully compared to other European local 
partnerships with the benefit of observing outcomes for policy efficiency and 
effectiveness as well as the development of social capital, democratic inclusion 
and social cohesion.    
Finally, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that the benefits of social 
partnership may have been overestimated, particularly in light of the recent 
global economic crisis.  In the aftermath of the current recession, the role of 
social partnership in exacerbating or alleviating the downturn will be, no doubt, 
considered at length across the EU.  However, additional avenues for research 
are also apparent.  First of all, partnership potentially reinforces existing social 
barriers and marginalizing groups via tokenistic participation (Kirby, 2008; 
Geddes 1997; Syrett, 1997).  Social partnership may serve to reinforce existing 
power structures within society, nullifying the influence of non-traditional social 
partners if not objectively recognized and carefully managed (Syrett, 1997).  
Partnership may offer a diverse set of interests a place at the bargaining table, 
incorporating a broader range of actors in the decision making process, but these 
partnerships may also serve to isolate and/or insulate unelected policymakers 
from the broader populace.  Partnership is also typically reserved for those 
groups considered ‗mainstream‘ enough to participate in the first place.  The 
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partnership process tends to co-opt dissent among the social partners in the 
interest of achieving consensus; the degree to which this impinges on critical 
democratic discourse in worthy of careful consideration.  Indeed, as Meade 
(2005) acknowledges, ―if they were to be true to their democratic values, 
community and voluntary sector organizations must work towards the 
construction of alternative political forums that will allow them to publicize and 
popularize their critical social analysis‖ that is otherwise stifled by the 
partnership process (Meade, 2005).   
There is also some concern that partnership represents a ‗hollowing out‘ of 
the state and a relinquishment of responsibility for social policy by the state 
(Jessop, 2002).  Indeed, in their analysis of partnership in Ireland, the OECD 
concludes that partnership entails ―receiving and spending public money without 
the traditional procedures and instruments of control by democratically elected 
representatives‖ (OECD, 1996).  Some of the backlash against partnership may, 
in fact, be driven by a conceptual disconnect within the institution itself with 
regard to core ideas like poverty and social exclusion.  For those who are seeking 
egalitarian, consensus based decision making rather than just access to the 
boardroom table, the mere existence of partnerships does little to alleviate 
frustration.  The power structure and the adherence to democratic norms and 
principles within both national and local level partnerships certainly offer one 
rich vein of inquiry.   If, as Peader Kirby (2010) claims in the Irish context 
―Social partnership was, in the main, a device used by Government to assimilate 
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actors who might normally be sources of dissent, into a grand project which is 
the competition state‖, the future emergence of social partnerships across 
Europe may create problems for both social democracy and national economic 
development.   It is vital that policymakers find an appropriate balance.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
DISTRIBUTIONS STUDIED 
Ireland 
Distribution Description Source 
Policy 
Making 
Inputs 
Media Coverage  
 Percentage change in articles covering 
partnership and poverty, pooled across Front 
Page, Ireland and Opinion/Letters sections, 
1992-2009 
 
Industrial Disputes 
 Percentage change in industrial disputes that 
began or were in progress 1985-2009. 
 Percentage change in firms and workers 
involved in industrial disputes. 
 Percentage change in working days lost to 
action 
 
Elections  
 Percentage change in seats for each party in 
the Dáil Éireann 1937-2007 
 Percentage change in first preference votes for 
each party in the Dáil Éireann 1937-2007 
 
Source: The Irish 
Times 
Lexus-Nexus Search 
 
 
 
 
Source: Central 
Statistics Office – 
cso.ie 
 
 
 
 
Source: Irish 
Government Website 
– irlgov.ie  
 
Policy 
Process 
Series 
 
 
Irish Parliamentary Debates 
 Percentage change in Ministers Questions  
 Percentage change in Adjournment Debates 
 Percentage change in Motions and Private 
Members Business 
 Percentage change in Introduction of 
Legislation 
 
Source: Dáil Éireann 
Archives: 1983 to 
2009 
 
Policy 
Output 
Series 
Budget Allocations 
 Percentage change in budget for Education, 
Health, Welfare and Housing 
 Percentage change in budget for Local 
Partnerships 
 Percentage change in budget for all Social 
Protection  
Source: Irish 
Department of 
Finance; Irish 
Central Statistics 
Office; Irish Welfare 
Department; and 
Pobal 
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DENMARK 
Distribution Description Source 
Policy 
Making 
Inputs 
Elections  
 Percentage change in seats for each 
party in the Folketing 1947-2007 
Industrial Disputes 
 Percentage change in industrial 
disputes that began or were in 
progress 1996-2008. 
 Percentage change in firms and 
workers involved in industrial 
disputes. 
 Percentage change in working days 
lost to action 
Source:  Statistics Denmark 
http://www.dst.dk/homeuk.aspx 
 
Policy 
Process 
Series 
 
 
Parliamentary Speeches 
 Percentage change in references to 
social welfare in the Prime Ministers 
annual speeches 
Legislative Bills 
 Percentage change in number of 
social welfare bills debated in the 
parliament annually 
Source: Comparative Policy 
Agendas Denmark 
http://www.agendasetting.dk/ 
  
Policy 
Output 
Series 
Budget Allocations 
 Percentage change in annual social 
welfare expenditure budget 
 Percentage change in annual social 
transfer expenditure budget 
Source:  Statistics Denmark 
http://www.dst.dk/homeuk.aspx  
 
 
 
 
 
THE NETHERLANDS 
Distribution Description Source 
Policy 
Making 
Inputs 
Elections  
 Percentage change in seats for each 
party in the Tweede Kamer 1945-2007 
 Percentage change in first preference 
votes for each party in the Tweede 
Kamer 1947-2007 
Source: Statistics 
Netherlands 
http://www.cbs.nl/en-
GB/menu/home/default.htm 
 
 
  
Policy 
Process 
Series 
 
Queen‘s Speeches 
 Percentage change in references to social 
welfare in the Queen‘s annual speech to 
parliament 
Source: Comparative Policy 
Agendas Netherlands 
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 Coalition Agreements 
 Percentage change in references to social 
welfare in the governing coalition 
agreements 
Parliamentary Questions 
 Percentage change in minister questions 
regarding social welfare 
Legislative Bills 
 Percentage change in number of social 
welfare bills debated in the parliament 
annually 
Policy 
Output 
Series 
Budget Allocations 
  Percentage change in annual social 
welfare expenditure budget 
 
Source: Statistics 
Netherlands 
http://www.cbs.nl/en-
GB/menu/home/default.htm 
 
 
MEASUREMENT 
Strategies used for calculating change score measures are described in more 
detail in this section.  Change scores are either calculated using percentage-
count method or percentage-percentage method.  Year to year percentage 
changes in the amount of attention paid to poverty, social welfare, partnership, 
and social exclusion in The Irish Times, for example, is calculated using the 
following equation:  [(count at time 2 – count at time 1)/count at time 1].  So, if 
there were 11 articles in 1995 and 22 articles in 1996, the year to year change 
would be 1.  This method enables the capture of both change in attention to the 
issues in the media and the overall growth of the issues on the agenda over time 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 2003).  The second method, percentage-percentage 
measures the change in the relative size of the issue on the overall agenda.  So, 
if the percentage of time dedicated to discussing social exclusion in the Dáil is 
1.87% in 2004 and 2.24% in 2005, the year to year percentage change is 0.20.  
This measure captures the relative size of an issue on the agenda as compared to 
other issues taking up agenda space; change is based on both on what is 
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happening in a given policy issue and what is happening in other policy issues 
(Ibid pg. 168).  Both methods are used in this analysis in order to check the 
robustness of results.   The percentage-count method can be subject to skewed 
distributions in larger sample sizes, but given the small size of the samples in 
this study, it provides an acceptable check for robustness.  
 
Each of the eight indicators used for Ireland above are described in more detail 
below as an example of the data collection process.  Data gathered in the Irish 
case is comparable to both Denmark and the Netherlands: 
1. Irish Times:  Quarterly percentage-count change in the number of stories 
covered in three sections of the daily newspaper: Front, Ireland and 
Opinion & Letters from 1992 to 2010. 
2. Industrial Disputes: Annual percentage-count change in the number of 
ongoing industrial disputes; the total number of workers involved in 
disputes; the total number of firms involved in disputes; and the total 
number of working days lost to industrial disputes from 1985-2009.  All 
major industrial disputes are recorded by the Irish Central Statistics 
Office (www.cso.ie). 
3. Election Results: Percentage-percent change in the number of Dáil seats 
controlled by each political party from 1937 to 2007 for 22 national level 
elections.  The Oireachtas contained 138 seats in 1937, was increased to 
148 in 1948, and presently holds 165.  In this analysis, the An Leas-
Cheann Comhairle seat is not included since the house speaker becomes a 
neutral actor upon election to the position and no longer votes with his or 
her political party. 
4. Election Results: Percentage-percentage change in the percentage of first 
preference votes for each of the political parties from 1980 to 2007 for 10 
national level elections.  Data is aggregated at the national level and 
reflect only first preference votes rather than total percentage of votes 
received.  Because of Ireland‘s single transferrable voting system, a given 
182 
 
political party may have received a significantly higher percentage of the 
final vote tally than is reflected here.  However, in the interest of 
capturing allegiance to a specific political party, the percentage of first 
preference votes received is an adequate measure. 
5. Dáil Activity:  Percentage-count change in the annual number of oral 
questions, statements and adjournment debates presented in the Dáil 
from 1983 to 2010 regarding social welfare, poverty, social exclusion, 
national and local partnership, and other related issues (such as low 
income housing, disadvantaged communities, etc.)  Data was collected 
from the Irish Government (www.irlgov.ie) website under the historical 
debates of the Houses of the Oireachtas section.   
6. Dáil Activity: Percentage-count change in the annual number of motions, 
legislative debates and budgetary/financial debates from 1983 to 2010 
regarding social welfare, poverty, social exclusion, national and local 
partnership, and other related issues (such as low income housing, 
disadvantaged communities, etc.)  The Dáil meets an average of 90+ times 
per year; each session typically includes 10-15 questions, 3-4 pieces of 
legislative debate, 1-2 statements, motions or adjournment debates.  Each 
daily meeting was converted into Word documents and coded for further 
analysis. 
7. Budgets: Percentage-percentage change in the annual social welfare, 
housing, health and education budgets as a percentage of overall GDP 
from 1980 to 2009.  National social partnership agreements cite housing, 
health and education as the three target areas other than social welfare 
spending that need to be improved in order to combat social exclusion.  
Budget allocations are available from the Irish Central Statistics Office 
(www.cso.ie) and from the Department of Finance.   
8. Budgets: Percentage-percentage change in the annual social protection 
budgets as a percentage of overall GDP from 1980 to 2009.  Social 
protection budgets include multiple areas of spending such as 
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unemployment payments, state pensions, allocations to local anti-poverty 
partnerships, illness, accidents and child benefit payments.  Budget 
figures for all Irish partnerships were obtained from the Department of 
Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs and their subsidiary office, 
Pobal.   
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APPENDIX B 
DISTRIBUTION HISTOGRAMS FOR EACH DATA SERIES 
IRELAND 
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DENMARK 
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THE NETHERLANDS 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
REGRESSION MODELS WITH TOTAL SOCIAL SPENDING26 
PREDICTORS OF ANNUAL SOCIAL SPENDING AND SPENDING AS A % OF GDP 
 
Model 1: 
Annual Social 
Spending (logged) 
Model II: 
Annual Social 
Spending as % of 
GDP 
Lagged Total Social Spending  
1.02** 
(0.03) 
 
Lagged Social Spending as % of GDP  
1.57** 
(0.13) 
Friction in the Policy Process 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.16** 
(0.05) 
Lagged Friction in the Policy Process 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.12** 
(0.05) 
Share of Left/Center-Left Dáil Seats 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Election Cycle Dummy 
0.04** 
(0.01) 
0.50** 
(0.19) 
Lagged Consumer Price Index Rate 
0.02** 
(0.003) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
Lagged Trade to GDP Ratio 
0.0007† 
(0.0004) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
Lagged EU Revenue 
0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.15† 
(0.09) 
Lagged Tax Revenue 
-0.0001 
(0.004) 
-0.27** 
(0.07) 
Constant 
-0.33 
(0.41) 
3.21 
(3.31) 
R-squared 0.9991 0.9611 
Adj R-squared 0.9987 0.9427 
N 29 29 
Significance: †p > 0.1   *p>0.05   **p>0.01 
 
                                                             
26
 Measures of total social spending presented in these models include discretionary and statutory spending 
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PREDICTORS OF ANNUAL CHANGE IN SOCIAL SPENDING & SPENDING AS A % OF GDP 
 
Model III 
Annual Change in 
Social Spending 
Model IV: 
Annual Change in 
Social Spending as 
 % of GDP 
Lagged Annual Change in Social Spending  
0.90** 
(0.16) 
 
Lagged Change in Spending as % of GDP  
0.78** 
(0.25) 
Friction in the Policy Process 
-71.23** 
(27.09) 
-0.11** 
(0.05) 
Lagged Friction in the Policy Process 
-12.64 
(28.49) 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
Share of Left/Center-Left Dáil Seats 
11.84 
(9.55) 
-0.004 
(0.02) 
Election Cycle Dummy 
265.30** 
(101.59) 
0.28 
(0.20) 
Lagged Consumer Price Index Rate 
12.47 
(15.46) 
0.006 
(0.03) 
Lagged Trade to GDP Ratio 
3.37 
(4.50) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
Lagged EU Revenue 
-99.80 
(64.71) 
-0.03 
(0.11) 
Lagged Tax Revenue 
73.58† 
(45.39) 
-0.08 
(0.09) 
Constant 
-2579.10 
(2073.76) 
4.15 
(4.03) 
R-squared 0.9198 0.7691 
Adj R-squared 0.8797 0.6522 
N 28 28 
Significance: †p > 0.1 *p>0.05 **p>0.01 
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PREDICTED VALUES FOR SOCIAL SPENDING VARIABLES AND MEASURES OF LAGGED 
PROCEDURAL FRICTION 
 
FIGURE 18: TOTAL SOCIAL SPENDING (LOGGED) AND LAGGED PROCEDURAL FRICTION  
(WITH 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 19: TOTAL SOCIAL SPENDING AND PROCEDURAL FRICTION  
(WITH 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS) 
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FIGURE 20: TOTAL SOCIAL SPENDING AND LAGGED PROCEDURAL FRICTION  
(WITH 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 21: CHANGE IN SOCIAL SPENDING AS % OF GDP AND 
LAGGED PROCEDURAL FRICTION  
(WITH 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS) 
  
